In October 2013 the State told Joyce Hutcherson, Rudolph Pusok, and Jimmie Pusok (the Landowners) it intended to acquire their Tomball acreage for a highway project, offered $496,120 as just compensation, and gave them the Landowner's Bill of Rights, which describes a right to repurchase condemned property that becomes unnecessary for public use within ten years.¹ After they did not accept, the State petitioned for condemnation in April 2014, and about three weeks later the parties settled on a value of $681,705, the Landowners conveyed the property by special warranty deed, and the trial court dismissed the case on the State's nonsuit in August 2014.² The State later rerouted the project, used ninety-seven percent of the land, and in February 2017 sent the Landowners a map of what it considered surplus, but it refused to sell that portion back to them, and they assigned their rights to JRJ Pusok Holdings, LLC.³

JRJ sued the State and the Director of the Department of Transportation's Right of Way Division in a Harris County civil court at law to enforce its repurchase right under Property Code Chapter 21; the State filed a plea to the jurisdiction asserting sovereign immunity, and the trial court granted it and dismissed.¹ The Fourteenth Court of Appeals (Houston) reversed as to the repurchase claim, holding that Chapter 21 waives immunity, that the State acquired the property "through eminent domain" because it compelled the transfer by filing a condemnation action, and, in a supplemental opinion, that the county court at law had jurisdiction.² JRJ did not challenge the affirmance of the dismissal of its inverse-condemnation and ultra vires claims.³ The vehicle in this Court is a petition for review filed by the State, which challenges each holding; the Court heard argument on November 4, 2025, and decided the case on June 12, 2026.⁴

Petition for review from the Fourteenth Court of Appeals (Houston) after the trial court granted a plea to the jurisdiction; argued November 4, 2025, and decided June 12, 2026.⁵

The State's brief presents one issue in two parts:¹ 1. Whether the Fourteenth Court erred in finding a waiver of immunity in the repurchase statutes without unambiguous statutory language waiving it. 2. Whether it erred in extending any waiver to suits in county courts at law, to acquisitions by purchase, and to attempts to repurchase only part of the land.

The Court addressed these as whether the State is immune from repurchase claims, whether the property was acquired "through eminent domain" despite the later settlement, whether a landowner may repurchase only the unneeded portion, and whether a county court at law has jurisdiction.²

A plea to the jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity raises a question of law reviewed de novo.¹ A statute waives immunity only by clear and unambiguous language, though the rule cannot be applied so rigidly that the Legislature's almost certain intent is disregarded.² The State argued that the plaintiff bears the burden of affirmatively establishing jurisdiction.³

Whether the State is immune from repurchase claims.

State (Petitioner): The repurchase statutes do not clearly and unambiguously waive immunity; their text, context, and history show they refer to subject-matter jurisdiction and authorize district courts to determine all issues when parties and claims are already before them, and because the statutes have effect without a waiver there is no need to read one in.¹ In reply, the State says immunity is presumed whenever a plaintiff sues to control state action and that a legislative direction to the government to do something does not by itself waive immunity if the government does not comply.²

JRJ Pusok Holdings (Respondent): Immunity should not apply to the State's refusal to comply with Chapter 21's repurchase procedure, and the Legislature's consent to suit is at a minimum implicit in the repurchase statutes, which the State reads too narrowly and in a hypertechnical way.³

Whether the property was acquired "through eminent domain."

State (Petitioner): The State acquired the property by purchase for the agreed purpose of avoiding eminent-domain proceedings, and that it could have condemned the land does not make the purchase an acquisition by eminent domain.⁴

JRJ Pusok Holdings (Respondent): The State acquired the property by deed in settlement of a State-filed eminent domain suit, and attaching importance to the form of the settlement ignores the Legislature's intent and would let the State engage in speculative condemnations.⁵

Whether JRJ may repurchase only a portion, and whether a county court at law may hear the claim.

State (Petitioner): The statutes refer to "the property," not "a portion of the property," and the only hooks for a waiver refer to "district court," which is not where JRJ sued.⁶

JRJ Pusok Holdings (Respondent): The county court at law had jurisdiction under Government Code Section 25.1032(d)(6), and the court of appeals found no textual basis for making district courts the exclusive forum for repurchase suits.⁷

The State argued that two courts of appeals have now found a waiver of immunity in the repurchase statutes even while recognizing they contain no clear waiver language, and that the Fourteenth Court did not properly apply this Court's precedent on implied waivers and broadly construed the alleged waiver.¹

• Takings immunity. Asked whether the Constitution waives immunity for takings, the State's counsel said yes, and that an inverse condemnation claim would be appropriate if the State had not paid. (Oral Argument, 0:00:49; 0:01:53)
• Removed carve-out. Asked if the 2003 version carved out TxDOT rights-of-way and was later removed, the State's counsel said yes, but that only means the statute applies, not a waiver of immunity. (Oral Argument, 0:07:57)
• Gift clause. Asked about a gift clause problem in allowing repurchase of land not acquired by eminent domain, the State's counsel said yes, there would be a concern. (Oral Argument, 0:15:32)
• Not released. Asked why the settlement did not release repurchase claims, respondent's counsel said the Rule 11 agreement waived only compensation claims, and calling it more is an overstatement. (Oral Argument, 0:17:28)
• Mosquito lawsuits. Asked what stops repurchase suits from exploding, respondent's counsel said the statute requires the State to determine the property is no longer needed for public use. (Oral Argument, 0:22:06)
• Elevator pitch. Asked why the property was acquired through eminent domain, respondent's counsel said the State followed chapter 21's requirements, and the statute does not require a threat of condemnation. (Oral Argument, 0:33:14; 0:33:59)
• Why county court. Asked why not district court, respondent's counsel said the case began in the county court at law, which Government Code section 25.1032 allows. (Oral Argument, 0:26:21)
• Grand John. On rebuttal, asked if lawmakers acted against Grand John, the State's counsel said that case had a formal condemnation proceeding and judgment. (Oral Argument, 0:39:10)

None

Holding

The State is not immune from Chapter 21 claims to repurchase condemned property no longer necessary for public use; property is acquired "through eminent domain" when the State files a condemnation suit even if the parties later settle the value; a landowner may repurchase only the portion no longer needed; and district courts and county courts at law have concurrent jurisdiction over repurchase claims if other statutory requirements are met.¹

Reasoning

Immunity. Repurchase claims derive from the constitutional limits on the State's eminent domain power, and the Legislature nested the repurchase right within Chapter 21, a scheme in which the State enjoys no immunity.² Recent history confirms this: the Legislature created a repurchase right in 2003, voters amended the Constitution in response to Kelo to authorize repurchase at the price the entity paid and to strengthen the public-use limit, and the Legislature amended Chapter 21 in 2011.³ The 2011 amendments authorize district courts to "determine all issues" in any repurchase suit, which shows the Legislature anticipated the State as a defendant, and Chapter 21 objectively limits the State's liability by returning the price it paid.⁴ The repurchase right serves virtually no purpose absent a waiver, which distinguishes Texas Department of Transportation v. City of Sunset Valley, and the later expansion of the right to private condemnors does not change that.⁵

"Through eminent domain." "Through" means "by way of," and eminent domain is the State's power rather than a process it "goes through," so the State's forced transfer by condemnation suit acquires property "through eminent domain" and a later settlement on value does not alter that.⁶ The State's reading would swap the statute's words for "condemnation judgment," which the Legislature did not use.⁷

Partial repurchase. A portion of property is accurately described as "property," the statute does not require repurchase of the entire parcel, and Section 21.103(b) supplies the price rule: the price the entity paid at the time of acquisition.⁸

Jurisdiction. A repurchase claim is a species of eminent domain case, and county courts at law have concurrent jurisdiction in eminent domain cases, though the parties may address the Harris County courts' amount-in-controversy limit on remand.⁹

Separate writings. Justice Young, concurring, wrote that the Legislature's decision to place the repurchase right in Chapter 21 is itself a clear and unambiguous waiver and that assessing waiver can be simpler than the precedents suggest.¹⁰ Justice Hawkins, dissenting, would hold that the statute lacks an unmistakable waiver, objected to the Court's multi-factor inquiry, and would reverse and render judgment for the State.¹¹

Disposition

Court of appeals' judgment affirmed and the case remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.¹²

Vote Breakdown

Majority Opinion by Justice Bland

Joined by Busby, Devine, Huddle, Lehrmann, and Young, JJ.

Concurrence by Justice Young

No other Justice joined.

Dissent by Justice Hawkins

Joined by Sullivan, J.; Blacklock, C.J. (except as to Part III)