In February 2022 the Governor wrote to the Department of Family and Protective Services (DFPS) noting an Attorney General opinion (KP-0401) that "gender transitioning" procedures on children are against the law and directing DFPS to investigate any reported instances, and the same day DFPS said it would follow Texas law as explained in that opinion.¹ A week later the parents of a 16-year-old with gender dysphoria and a psychologist, Dr. Megan Mooney, sued the Governor, the DFPS Commissioner, and DFPS (the Doe suit), and a few months later the Voe, Roe and Briggle families and PFLAG, Inc. brought a similar suit (the Voe suit), seeking a declaration that DFPS's statement was an unauthorized rule adopted without the notice and comment the Administrative Procedure Act requires, and an injunction.² The State says DFPS has neither intervened nor threatened to intervene as to any respondent.³

The trial court issued three temporary injunctions barring DFPS and its commissioner from taking actions against plaintiffs based on the Governor's letter, DFPS's statement and the Attorney General's opinion and from investigating reports based solely on allegations that a minor received medical treatment for gender transitioning.¹ The Third Court of Appeals (Austin) partially vacated the injunction against the Governor in the Doe suit and otherwise affirmed, and the defendants petitioned for review.² The Supreme Court, which had earlier stayed the injunctions, on April 24, 2026 reversed the judgments, dismissed the appeals and vacated the temporary-injunction orders in a per curiam opinion without oral argument, with Justice Sullivan not participating.³

Consolidated petitions for review (with No. 24-0384) from the Third Court of Appeals (Austin) in interlocutory temporary-injunction appeals; per curiam opinion without oral argument issued April 24, 2026, with a concurring opinion by Chief Justice Blacklock.⁴

• The families and Dr. Mooney:¹ whether the district court properly exercised its discretion in temporarily enjoining DFPS from implementing an allegedly unlawful rule that presumptively treats gender-affirming medical care as child abuse, whether it properly exercised jurisdiction and whether the defendants waived sovereign immunity.
• The State and DFPS:² whether two statewide injunctions against DFPS investigations were proper when DFPS has not intervened or threatened to do so as to any respondent.

Mootness is a constitutional limit on judicial authority that deprives the Court of jurisdiction to rule on the merits, standing is assessed plaintiff by plaintiff and claim by claim, and a plaintiff must show an injury in fact fairly traceable to the defendant and likely redressed by the relief sought.¹

Whether the injunctions should stand.

The families, PFLAG and Dr. Mooney (Respondents): The district court did not abuse its discretion, because DFPS's rule is a rule under the Administrative Procedure Act adopted without the required procedure, the record shows imminent and irreparable harm, the injunctions are targeted at the rule itself, and S.B. 14 and State v. Loe do not change their propriety or the courts' jurisdiction.¹

The State and DFPS (Petitioners): The Third Court of Appeals wrongly affirmed statewide injunctions barring DFPS from investigating possible abuse when it has neither intervened nor threatened to intervene as to any respondent.²

The defendants petitioned for review of the temporary injunctions, but the Court resolved the case on mootness and standing grounds that arose while the appeals were pending.¹

None noted

Holding

The families' claims for injunctive relief are moot because DFPS permanently closed its investigations or the children reached the age of majority, PFLAG's claim is moot because its associational standing rests on its members' claims, and Dr. Mooney lacks standing because her alleged injuries are speculative.¹

Reasoning

DFPS closed its investigations of three of the four families and says it will not investigate new reports involving the same allegation, the fourth family's investigation remained open only because the injunction barred closing it and their daughter is no longer a minor, so they face no credible, nonspeculative threat, and voluntary cessation does not prevent mootness when the threat of recurrence is too speculative, as in Grassroots Leadership.² PFLAG's claim falls with its members' claims.³ Dr. Mooney has not alleged that she has been threatened with prosecution or license action or that any patient has threatened to sue or leave, so her fears of future injury are hypothetical.⁴ The Court limited its holding to injunctive relief and expressed no opinion on declaratory claims.⁵ Chief Justice Blacklock, concurring, agreed the families' claims are moot and PFLAG lacks standing but would find that Dr. Mooney likely has standing because of the increased reporting burden, and would nevertheless vacate the injunctions because Texas has since outlawed the treatments and upheld the bans.⁶

Disposition

Court of appeals' judgments reversed, the appeals dismissed, and the trial court's temporary-injunction orders vacated for lack of jurisdiction.⁷

Mootness and standing are jurisdictional questions, and any ruling on a moot issue would be an advisory opinion.¹

Per curiam opinion, with Chief Justice Blacklock concurring and Justice Sullivan not participating.¹