Reynaldo "Rey" Gonzalez, Jr. earned both a medical degree and a law degree but has never been licensed to practice medicine; he practiced law and taught as an adjunct professor at the University of Texas.¹ While running for Congress he called himself "Dr. Gonzalez" and a "physician," and his candidate profile began, "By God's grace I am a physician and an attorney".² The Texas Medical Board received a complaint that he was falsely holding himself out as a physician, opened an investigation, held a hearing, and concluded that he had violated the Medical Practice Act and the Healing Art Identification Act.³ Its cease-and-desist order commanded him to stop using the titles "doctor," "physician," and "Dr." without "designating the authority giving rise to th[ose] title[s]" and warned of civil penalties of $5,000 per violation.⁴ As far as the Board is aware, this is the first time it has disciplined anyone for statements made on the campaign trail.⁵

Gonzalez's motion for rehearing was overruled by operation of law, and eighty-one days later he sued the Board in Travis County district court.¹ His petition boils down to four arguments: that the order lacked substantial evidence, that Occupations Code section 104.004 is unconstitutional as applied to him, that it is facially unconstitutional, and that the Board exceeded its statutory authority because he is not licensed and did not practice medicine (the ultra vires claim).² The district court granted the Board's plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed all claims.³ The Third Court of Appeals affirmed except as to the facial constitutional claim, which it remanded, holding the others barred by the redundant-remedies doctrine.⁴ The Court granted Gonzalez's petition; the Board filed no cross-petition, and the Court heard argument on September 10, 2025, and decided the case on October 31, 2025.⁵

Petition for review from the Third Court of Appeals after the trial court granted a plea to the jurisdiction; argued September 10, 2025, and decided October 31, 2025.⁶

Gonzalez asks whether the trial court erred in granting the plea to the jurisdiction, whether the court of appeals should also have remanded his as-applied constitutional challenge, and whether it erred in holding that the Board may regulate political speech by an unlicensed person who did not practice medicine.¹ The Board frames two issues: whether Gonzalez's suit for judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) was untimely, and whether his requests for declaratory relief and his as-applied constitutional challenge were redundant remedies, apart from his facial challenge.² The Court addressed whether the redundant-remedies doctrine bars the ultra vires and as-applied claims and whether the district court had jurisdiction over the substantial-evidence claim.³

The briefs state no standard of review in their summaries. The Court applied the redundant-remedies doctrine, under which courts will not entertain a Declaratory Judgments Act action when the same claim could be pursued through different channels, and asked whether the relief sought goes beyond reversal of the agency order.¹

Whether the redundant-remedies doctrine bars the ultra vires and as-applied claims.

Petitioner (Gonzalez): His claims seek declaratory and injunctive relief to protect his future political speech from new Board proceedings, which merely vacating the cease-and-desist order cannot redress; constitutional claims are not redundant of an administrative appeal because the APA does not permit attacks on a statute's constitutionality; and the court of appeals' treatment of his as-applied challenge undermines Patel.¹ He also argues that the Board's authority over non-licensees is limited to those practicing medicine and that using the title "doctor" without more is not practicing medicine.²

Respondent (Texas Medical Board): Gonzalez's requests for declaratory relief are redundant of his claim attacking the order, because the remedy for his as-applied constitutional claim and his claim that the Board exceeded its authority was identical to what the APA offered, reversal of the order.³ It adds that the merits are not ripe for appellate review.⁴

Whether the substantial-evidence claim was timely.

Respondent (Texas Medical Board): The APA's 30-day deadline in Government Code section 2001.176 is mandatory and jurisdictional, and Gonzalez filed eighty-one days after it, so the district court lacked jurisdiction.⁵

Petitioner (Gonzalez): He disclaims reliance on the APA and contends that the Board created a right to judicial review independent of the APA, through a since-repealed rule with no deadline.⁶

Gonzalez argued that the court of appeals approved an administrative overreach giving the Board "breathtaking power" to regulate political speech by ordinary Texans, and that applying the statute to his political speech violates the Constitution.¹ The Board responded that the court of appeals correctly decided each jurisdictional issue and that Gonzalez was asking the Court to bypass the threshold question of jurisdiction and reach the merits.²

• Facial challenge only. Asked if it is backward to send Gonzalez back for only a facial challenge, the Board's counsel said it is odd; it argued below that he brought none. (Oral Argument, 0:23:55)
• Prospective relief. Asked if the live petition properly sought prospective injunctive relief, the Board's counsel said there is simply no way to read it that way. (Oral Argument, 0:22:49)
• Right of review. Asked how an agency can create a right to judicial review, Gonzalez's counsel said the statute authorizes agencies to write rules for their own proceedings. (Oral Argument, 0:03:00)
• Ultra vires. Asked if he concedes Patel does not reach ultra vires claims, Gonzalez's counsel said an ultra vires challenge differs from a constitutional one. (Oral Argument, 0:07:43)
• Missed deadline. Asked why Gonzalez missed the deadline, his counsel said the record gives no reason, and the Board's regulation provides a right to appeal with no deadline. (Oral Argument, 0:02:12)
• Other doctors. Asked if the Board ever did this to anyone else, its counsel did not know and offered a letter; he also could not say if anonymous complaints are routine. (Oral Argument, 0:30:22; 0:31:14)
• Never off square one. The Board's counsel said the case has never gotten off square one, and a remand would let Gonzalez bring the legal theories at its heart. (Oral Argument, 0:42:30)

• Ron Beal of Waco, Texas filed an amicus letter on April 28, 2024.
• Ron Beal of Waco, Texas filed an amicus curiae letter brief on December 4, 2024.
• Ron Beal of Waco, Texas filed an amicus curiae letter brief on March 10, 2025.
• Ron Beal of Waco, Texas filed an amicus curiae letter brief on May 20, 2025.
• Ron Beal of Waco, Texas filed an amicus curiae brief on September 11, 2025.
• Ron Beal of Waco, Texas filed an amicus letter on September 25, 2025.
• Ron Beal of Waco, Texas filed an amicus letter on September 25, 2025.
• Ron Beal of Waco, Texas filed an amicus letter on October 9, 2025.

Holding

The redundant-remedies doctrine does not bar Gonzalez's ultra vires and as-applied constitutional claims, because they seek declaratory and injunctive relief broader than the reversal of the cease-and-desist order that the APA could provide; his substantial-evidence claim was properly dismissed because judicial review of an agency order requires a statute authorizing it, and a since-repealed agency rule cannot create jurisdiction.¹

Reasoning

Redundant remedies. The court of appeals went astray in two ways. First, it read Gonzalez's petition too narrowly: obtaining relief from the order was one reason he sued, but he also sought declaratory and injunctive relief on the grounds that the Board lacked authority to regulate non-licensees and that the statutes are unconstitutional as applied to him, and a declaration that the statutes do not apply to him would protect him from future sanctions and not just from the order.² Second, it erred in emphasizing that he could have raised those claims in a timely APA petition: what matters under the doctrine is whether the APA would have afforded the same remedy, not whether he could have brought the same claims, and the APA's remedy is limited to reversal of the order.³ Following Patel, because Gonzalez seeks more than reversal, including relief against future agency action, the APA does not provide a redundant remedy.⁴ The Court noted that the Board's counsel conceded at argument that Gonzalez may file an amended petition on remand.⁵

Substantial evidence. The Court took a more direct path than the court of appeals, which had held the claim untimely under the APA's 30-day deadline.⁶ Because Gonzalez disclaims reliance on the APA and relies on a since-repealed Board rule allowing a petition in Travis County district court with no deadline, the question is whether a statute authorizes review; there is no right to judicial review of an administrative order unless a statute provides one or the order violates a constitutional right, and an agency's rulemaking cannot expand or create district-court jurisdiction beyond what the Legislature has given.⁷ Gonzalez pointed to no statute, so the district court correctly dismissed this claim.⁸

Disposition

The Court reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded to the district court for further proceedings on Gonzalez's facial constitutional claim, his as-applied constitutional claim, and his ultra vires claim.⁹

Vote Breakdown

Majority Opinion by Justice Sullivan

Joined by Blacklock, C.J., and Bland, Busby, Devine, Huddle, Lehrmann, and Young, JJ.

Did Not Participate

Hawkins, J.