Kiersten Smith was killed when a construction crane collapsed during a storm and struck her apartment building, and her parents sued Greystar Development & Construction, L.P., its Gabriella Tower Contractor Series, Gabriella Tower, LLC (the Greystar Entities) and a crane company for negligence and gross negligence.¹ The jury found the three Greystar Entities engaged in a joint enterprise and caused her death, resulting in about $360 million of non-economic damages, plus $500 million in exemplary damages that the trial court reduced under statutory caps, and the judgment held them jointly and severally liable for over $360 million in compensatory damages.² The Greystar Entities filed a single $25 million joint supersedeas bond.³

The plaintiffs moved to declare the bond insufficient, and the trial court ruled that the joint bond "could only potentially suspend the judgment against one of the three judgment debtors" and that "no valid bond is in place" until individual bonds were filed or the bond was designated to one defendant.¹ The Greystar Entities designated the joint bond for Greystar Development & Construction, L.P. and moved for appellate review under Rule 24.4, the court of appeals affirmed, and they petitioned this Court for mandamus, which granted their emergency motion for temporary relief.² The Court heard argument on September 11, 2025 and on May 22, 2026 conditionally granted relief in part, with Justice Huddle concurring in part and dissenting in part.³ The Court denied rehearing on September 18, 2026, with a statement by Justice Hawkins joined by Justices Young and Sullivan.⁴

Original proceeding for writ of mandamus under Rule 24.4 from a court of appeals' ruling on a supersedeas bond; argued September 11, 2025; opinion by Justice Busby issued May 22, 2026, with rehearing denied September 18, 2026.⁵

• The Greystar Entities:¹ whether the trial court abused its discretion, and the court of appeals erred, in invalidating the $25 million joint bond as to two entities in violation of section 52.006(b)(2)'s cap and of Rule 24.3(a), and whether they lack an adequate remedy by appeal.
• The plaintiffs:² whether the court of appeals correctly concluded that the $25 million cap applies per judgment debtor and not per judgment, and whether the trial court acted within its Rule 24 jurisdiction in finding the joint bond invalid as to two defendants.

The Court reviews for abuse of discretion a trial court's rulings on the amount of security and bond modification under Rule 24, and because Rule 24.4 authorizes mandamus review of these orders a petitioner need not show it lacks an adequate appellate remedy.¹

Whether the $25 million cap applies per judgment debtor.

The Greystar Entities (Relators): Section 52.006(b)(2) caps supersedeas security at $25 million per judgment, so a single joint bond of that amount suspends the judgment against all three jointly liable debtors, and the trial court's contrary order violated the statute.¹ They argued that the cap's policy is to make supersedeas more easily available, that the singular "judgment debtor" should be read as plural and that the statute's title refers to security for a judgment.²

The plaintiffs (Real Parties in Interest): The text and structure show the cap applies per judgment debtor, because section 52.006(b) speaks of "the amount of security" and section 52.001 defines security by reference to a bond posted by a "judgment debtor," pluralizing that term would make it singular and plural within the same section, and the Legislature's concern was relief for individual debtors.³

Whether the trial court could invalidate the bond immediately.

The Greystar Entities (Relators): Rule 24.3(a) limits a trial court's post-plenary jurisdiction to ordering or modifying the type and amount of security and does not allow invalidating a bond.⁴

The plaintiffs (Real Parties in Interest): Rule 24 gives the trial court continuing jurisdiction over supersedeas matters, so it properly found the joint bond invalid as to two defendants and instructed all three how to supersede the judgment.⁵

The Greystar Entities identified a split among Texas courts on how section 52.006(b)(2) applies, one applying the cap per debtor and another capping the total security posted by all debtors.¹

• Single joint bond. Asked if one defendant's $25 million bond suspends execution against another, relators' counsel said no; each liable defendant must be on the bond, citing Fortune and Jackson Walker. (Oral Argument, 0:08:56)
• Engrafted definition. Asked how its reading squares with the $25 million limit on security, the real party's counsel said security means a bond or deposit made by a judgment debtor. (Oral Argument, 0:32:37)
• Separate bonds. The real party's counsel said each judgment debtor needs its own $25 million bond, because each takes advantage of a per-debtor cap. (Oral Argument, 0:25:21; 0:26:11)
• Not essential. Asked if the Court must decide whether the cap is per debtor even for several liability, relators' counsel said not essential, though the text shows little distinction. (Oral Argument, 0:16:11)
• Rule 24.4(a). A Justice asked relators' counsel to say on rebuttal which of Rule 24.4(a)'s five subparts the court of appeals reviewed, noting a possible jurisdictional consequence. (Oral Argument, 0:19:49)
• Joint and several. Asked about relief to debtors under either reading, relators' counsel said liability is joint and several for the whole $360 million judgment. (Oral Argument, 0:03:07)
• Time to cure. Asked why the real party should not get a reasonable time to cure, its counsel said he believed one should, but the rule's scheme does not provide it. (Oral Argument, 0:43:30)
• Multi-party cases. On rebuttal, relators' counsel said section 52.001's definition shows lawmakers were not thinking about multi-party cases. (Oral Argument, 0:49:23)

None noted

Holding

The $25 million cap in section 52.006(b)(2) applies to a bond posted by a judgment debtor, not to all bonds posted by all debtors, so the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the joint bond insufficient as to two of the three entities.¹ But the trial court clearly abused its discretion by immediately invalidating the joint bond without allowing a reasonable time, presumptively 20 days, to post sufficient bonds.²

Reasoning

Read together, section 52.006(b) limits "the amount of security," defined as "a bond . . . posted . . . by a judgment debtor," so the cap applies to a debtor's bond, which fits the party-specific nature of execution, appeals and supersedeas and the century-old rule that joint bonds do not change each debtor's liability.³ The Greystar Entities' proposed pluralization of "judgment debtor" would require selective pluralization contrary to the canon, the title cannot override the text, a per-judgment cap would permit one debtor's bond to protect even non-appealing debtors, and any policy preference for easier supersedeas is already served by the per-debtor reading, which cut the required security from more than $400 million to $75 million.⁴ On the second issue, Rule 24.3(a) defines the trial court's continuing jurisdiction after plenary power expires to order or modify the amount or type of security, so immediately invalidating the bond fell outside it, and the Court set a presumptive 20-day period to cure.⁵

Disposition

Mandamus relief conditionally granted in part, directing the trial court to give Greystar Development & Construction, L.P.⁠—Gabriella Tower Contractor Series and Gabriella Tower, LLC a reasonable time to post sufficient bonds under the per-debtor cap, with the writ to issue only if it does not comply.⁶ Rehearing was denied and the stay order lifted on September 18, 2026.⁷

Abuse of discretion, applied to the trial court's rulings on the amount of security under Rule 24.¹

Justice Busby delivered the opinion, joined by Chief Justice Blacklock and Justices Lehrmann, Devine and Hawkins.¹ Justice Huddle, joined by Justices Bland, Young and Sullivan, concurred in part and dissented in part, because the $25 million cap applies per bond and the joint bond should have been held sufficient for all three entities.² On the denial of rehearing, Justice Hawkins, joined by Justices Young and Sullivan, wrote that the statute may warrant legislative attention and urged considering cost-shifting of supersedeas-bond costs on the federal model, by amending the rules to make them taxable against the losing side.³