Emily Lehmberg sued Studio E. Architecture and Interiors, Inc. and others over a remodel of her home, and Studio E. moved to dismiss the claims against it because she filed no certificate of merit with her petition as Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 150.002 requires.¹ Lehmberg responded that no certificate was required because her claims arose from Studio E.'s dishonesty and fraud rather than the provision of professional services, and that Studio E. had waited too long to seek dismissal.²

In an earlier interlocutory appeal, the Fourth Court of Appeals held that the claims arose from professional services and that Studio E. had not waived dismissal, and it remanded for the trial court to decide whether dismissal should be with or without prejudice.¹ While that appeal was pending, Lehmberg's claims against the other defendants stayed in the trial court, and she amended her petition to reassert her claims against Studio E. with a certificate of merit.² On remand the trial court dismissed the original claims without prejudice but let Lehmberg pursue the claims in her amended petition, denied Studio E.'s renewed motion, and the court of appeals affirmed, reasoning that the dismissal placed the parties in the position as if Lehmberg had never sued Studio E..³ The vehicle in this Court is a petition for review filed by Studio E., argued November 4, 2025, and decided May 29, 2026.⁴

Petition for review from the Fourth Court of Appeals (San Antonio) in an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a motion to dismiss; argued November 4, 2025, and decided May 29, 2026.⁵

Studio E. presents one issue:¹ whether a plaintiff whose claims against a construction professional are dismissed without prejudice for failure to attach the required certificate of merit may evade limitations by attaching the certificate to an amended petition instead of filing a new action. The Court framed it as whether Section 150.002 requires dismissal of the amended petition, that is, whether the plaintiff may reassert the claims by amended petition in the same lawsuit or only by a new and separate suit.²

The Court construes Section 150.002 from its text, presuming the Legislature chose each word for a purpose and purposefully omitted words not chosen.¹

Whether claims dismissed without prejudice may be reasserted by amended petition.

Studio E. (Petitioner): Dismissal without prejudice places the parties as if the suit had never been brought, so the claims can be reasserted only by a new action, and allowing an amended petition in the already-dismissed action spurns the Legislature's directive that the certificate accompany the plaintiff's first petition and lets the plaintiff evade limitations.¹ Its petition added that the courts of appeals are split on whether repleading and refiling differ.²

Lehmberg (Respondent): After the dismissal without prejudice it was as though she had never sued Studio E., so her amended petition operated as her first-filed petition against it; allowing repleading avoids an almost-certain consolidation with the original suit in which her claims against six other defendants remained pending; and the decision is consistent with the legislative intent of giving a claimant a second opportunity to comply.³ She also argues that Studio E. waived its limitations arguments by not raising them below.⁴

Studio E. argued that certificate-of-merit disputes are highly litigated, with more than twenty appellate decisions in eighteen months, and that this case cleanly presents a split of authority in the courts of appeals about the requirement.¹

• Relation back. Asked why the third amended petition is treated as a first complaint, petitioner's counsel said no action remained to relate back to, because the earlier action was dismissed. (Oral Argument, 0:06:36; 0:08:48)
• Second chance. Asked about judicial economy with several defendants, respondent's counsel said amendment fits the Legislature's intent to give claimants a second chance to comply with the statute. (Oral Argument, 0:21:03)
• Mandate timing. Asked how a third amended petition was filed before the mandate issued, respondent's counsel said no stay was in place and the parties kept seeking continuances. (Oral Argument, 0:23:24)
• "Complaint." Petitioner's counsel said "complaint" is a defined term in chapter 150, meaning a pleading that first raises a claim against a professional. (Oral Argument, 0:15:56)
• Whole complaint. Asked if the whole complaint, including defamation claims, would have to be dismissed, petitioner's counsel said yes, because it includes an allegation within the statute. (Oral Argument, 0:42:40)
• Respondent's position is relation back. On rebuttal, petitioner's counsel said respondent's position is relation back, and it has no equitable tolling doctrine to point to. (Oral Argument, 0:37:50)
• No certificate at first. Asked why no certificate accompanied the first petition, respondent's counsel said it did not believe it was implicating architects. (Oral Argument, 0:35:08)
• New action. Asked if amending an existing pleading is ever an option, petitioner's counsel said the claim must be refiled as a new action. (Oral Argument, 0:41:02)

• Texas Society of Architects supports Studio E.: the certificate-of-merit statute protects architects and other licensed building professionals by requiring plaintiffs to substantiate claims at the outset.
• AmeriSuryevors, LLC filed an amicus brief, and the American Council of Engineering Companies of Texas filed an amicus letter.

Holding

Section 150.002 requires a certificate of merit with the first pleading asserting claims against a covered professional, but a dismissal without prejudice places the parties in the position they were in before suit, so where other defendants and the underlying lawsuit remain pending a plaintiff may reassert the dismissed claims by amended petition with a certificate, rather than by a new suit.¹

Reasoning

Dismissal without prejudice. Section 150.002 requires the certificate with the "complaint," defined as the petition that raises the claim "for the first time," and the only exception is for claims about to expire, but a dismissal for noncompliance may be without prejudice, and a dismissal without prejudice does not prevent relitigating the same claim because it places the parties as if the suit had never been brought.²

Amended petition in the pending suit. Because dismissal removed the claims as though they had never been brought, Lehmberg's amended petition functionally became the first petition to assert claims against Studio E. in the case and satisfied the contemporaneous-filing requirement, and the ordinary rule allowing amendment let her rejoin Studio E. in the surviving lawsuit.³ The Court noted that if all claims and parties had been dismissed and no deadlines for continuing jurisdiction remained, a plaintiff could not amend because no case would be pending.⁴ The Court also noted that the Thirteenth Court of Appeals reached the same result in Miramar Petroleum and that the conclusion promotes judicial efficiency.⁵

Limitations. Studio E.'s premise was that an amended petition would relate back to the original filing and so circumvent Section 150.002(g)'s bar on extending limitations; the Court doubted that Lehmberg's amendment, which added the affidavit and nothing more, changes the facts or grounds of liability for purposes of the relation-back statute, and did not embrace Lehmberg's argument that Section 150.002(e) would be meaningless without relation back.⁶

Separate writings. Justice Hawkins, joined by Justices Busby and Young, concurred, saying both the Court and the dissent offer permissible readings and he sides with the Court because it harmonizes the statute with baseline procedural rules and the Legislature gave no clear statement to depart from them.⁷ Justice Sullivan dissented, reasoning that the Legislature made it hard to sue an architect, that "first" means the first petition raising the claim, and that dismissal without prejudice only means res judicata will not apply and does not excuse noncompliance with the statute.⁸

Disposition

Court of appeals' judgment affirmed.⁹

Vote Breakdown

Majority Opinion by Justice Huddle

Joined by Blacklock, C.J., and Bland, Busby, Devine, Hawkins, Lehrmann, and Young, JJ.

Concurrence by Justice Hawkins

Joined by Busby and Young, JJ.

Dissent by Justice Sullivan

No other Justice joined.