After S.B. 8 (the Texas Heartbeat Act) took effect, the Lilith Fund's deputy director, Neesha Davé, declared under penalty of perjury that the Fund had paid for at least one abortion without confirming gestational age and at least one believing the pregnancy was past the period when cardiac activity is usually detectable, intending to pay even if cardiac activity was detected.¹ In January 2022 Sadie Weldon filed a Rule 202 petition in Jack County seeking to depose Davé and obtain documents about any abortions provided in violation of the Heartbeat Act, and the trial court denied it in August 2022.²

Forty-eight days after Weldon filed her Rule 202 petition and while it was pending, the Fund sued her for a declaration that S.B. 8 is unconstitutional, a temporary injunction against any S.B. 8 suits by her, an anti-suit injunction against the Rule 202 petition and attorney's fees under the UDJA.¹ Weldon moved to dismiss under the TCPA, the motion was denied by operation of law, and the Second Court of Appeals (Fort Worth) affirmed, holding the TCPA did not apply because the suit was not based on or in response to her Rule 202 petition.² The Supreme Court heard argument on January 14, 2026.³ On May 15, 2026 it reversed and remanded for the court of appeals to consider the remaining steps.⁴

Interlocutory petition for review from the Second Court of Appeals (Fort Worth), 722 S.W.3d 40; argued January 14, 2026; opinion by Justice Busby issued May 15, 2026.⁵

• Weldon:¹ whether claims seeking declaratory relief are exempt from dismissal under the TCPA even when the declaratory-judgment action is based on or in response to the defendant's exercise of the right of free speech, petition or association.
• Lilith Fund:² whether the court of appeals correctly held that Weldon failed to meet her burden to show the TCPA applies because the Fund's declaratory claims are based on or in response to her exercise of those rights.

The Court applies settled principles of statutory interpretation to the TCPA, construing it by its plain language and giving undefined terms their ordinary meaning.¹

Whether the TCPA applies to the Fund's declaratory-judgment suit.

Sadie Weldon (Petitioner): The TCPA covers any "legal action" based on or in response to the exercise of the protected rights, and the 2019 amendments added "declaratory" to the definition of legal action, repudiating the cases that exempted declaratory-judgment claims, so the court of appeals' carveout has no textual support.¹ In reply she argued that the court of appeals held that a declaratory claim is exempt unless the requested relief would restrain "constitutionally protected activity," and that the TCPA's rights sweep well beyond constitutionally protected conduct.²

The Lilith Fund (Respondent): The court of appeals did not hold that declaratory claims are categorically exempt, only that Weldon failed to prove this suit was based on or in response to her protected activity, and it considered the requested relief only to see whether it revealed such a connection.³

Weldon argued that the court of appeals' holding defies the enacted language of the TCPA, which expressly covers actions seeking declaratory relief, and the Fund responded that review was not warranted because she misdescribed the court of appeals' actual holdings.¹

• No basis without Rule 202. Asked if it would have sued Weldon without her Rule 202 petition, the Fund's counsel said it would have no basis under the declaratory judgment act. (Oral Argument, 0:45:01)
• Wrong tool. Asked why SB 8's constitutionality would not arise at step two, the Fund's counsel said the TCPA is not the right tool: its burden-shifting focuses on evidence. (Oral Argument, 0:23:51; 0:25:18)
• Pure legal question. Asked what standard governs a pure legal question, Weldon's counsel said no evidence is needed, only a prima facie case argued from the law. (Oral Argument, 0:05:11; 0:07:42)
• Only fees left? Asked if only fees remain, Weldon's counsel said no: on remand the Fund will argue the Heartbeat Act is unconstitutional, and fees follow the prevailing party. (Oral Argument, 0:13:15; 0:16:12)
• Abandoning the petition. Asked if abandoning the Rule 202 petition moves the case, the Fund's counsel said no, since standing is determined when suit was filed. (Oral Argument, 0:41:06)
• Why Rule 202. Weldon's counsel said they used Rule 202 to learn who was involved and how far the violation went, having only one declaration from the Van Stean litigation. (Oral Argument, 0:52:07)
• 2019 amendments. Weldon's counsel said the 2019 amendments made the TCPA more restrictive by deleting "relates to," so a legal action must be based on or in response to protected activity. (Oral Argument, 0:01:33)
• Liberal construction. Asked how to follow the command to construe the Act liberally, the Fund's counsel said that works with its statement of purpose in section 27.002. (Oral Argument, 0:46:24)

None noted

Holding

The TCPA applies because the Fund's declaratory and injunctive suit was based on or in response to Weldon's Rule 202 petition, which is an exercise of the right to petition.¹

Reasoning

The TCPA has a three-step dismissal process, and the only issue the court of appeals reached was step one, whether the defendant showed the legal action is based on or in response to her exercise of a protected right.² A Rule 202 petition is a communication in a judicial proceeding and the Fund's suit is a lawsuit requesting declaratory and equitable relief, and the suit meets the "based on or in response to" standard because it sought an anti-suit injunction against the petition, relied on the petition to show the need for an injunction, mentioned it more than a dozen times, and its counsel said the claims were filed in response to it.³ The court of appeals erred in following Van Stean I, which assumes the plaintiff's position and applies the TCPA only to a defendant's lawful protected conduct, because that approach blends step one with the merits questions reserved for steps two and three.⁴ In a footnote the Court noted that developments during the case could suggest mootness but that the Fund's pending request for attorney's fees under the UDJA preserves jurisdiction under existing precedent, while leaving the lower courts to examine whether jurisdiction continues.⁵

Disposition

Court of appeals' judgment affirming denial of the motion to dismiss reversed and the case remanded for that court to consider steps two and three of the TCPA analysis.⁶

Statutory interpretation of the TCPA's step-one requirement that the legal action be "based on or in response to" the exercise of a protected right.¹

Justice Busby delivered the opinion of the Court, with no separate writings.¹