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Privilege Underwriters Reciprocal Exch. v. Mankoff

Case No. 24-0132

Key Issues

Factual History

In 2019 a tornado damaged the home of Jeff and Staci Mankoff, and it "likely" rained for about two minutes afterward.1 Their homeowners insurer, Privilege Underwriters Reciprocal Exchange (PURE), paid only part of the claim, applying an $87,156 "Windstorm or Hail Deductible" that covers loss "caused directly or indirectly by windstorm or hail," and the policy does not define "windstorm".2

Sources
  1. Opinion, PDF p. 2 ↩
  2. Opinion, PDF p. 2 ↩

Procedural History

The Mankoffs sued for breach of contract, alleging the damage was not caused by a windstorm, and on cross-motions for summary judgment the trial court granted PURE's motion and rendered a take-nothing judgment.1 A divided Fifth Court of Appeals (Dallas) reversed and rendered judgment for the Mankoffs, holding the term ambiguous because it was subject to more than one reasonable meaning, over a dissent concluding that a tornado is unambiguously a "subtype" of windstorm.2 The Supreme Court heard argument on September 10, 20253 and on February 13, 2026 reversed and reinstated the trial court's judgment.4

Petition for review from the Fifth Court of Appeals (Dallas) after cross-motions for summary judgment; argued September 10, 2025; opinion by Justice Lehrmann issued February 13, 2026.5

Sources
  1. Opinion, PDF p. 2 ↩
  2. Opinion, PDF p. 3 ↩
  3. Opinion, PDF p. 1 ↩
  4. Opinion, PDF pp. 14-15 ↩
  5. Opinion, PDF pp. 1, 15 ↩

Issues Presented

  • PURE:1 whether the court of appeals incorrectly held the term "windstorm" ambiguous and created a false ambiguity by relying on inappropriate sources to find ordinary meaning.
  • The Mankoffs:2 whether "windstorm" is ambiguous because it has more than one reasonable ordinary meaning, including one that excludes a tornado.
Sources
  1. Opinion, PDF p. 4 ↩
  2. Opinion, PDF pp. 2, 5 ↩

Standard(s) of Review

The Court reviews summary-judgment rulings de novo, determines on cross-motions the legal question presented, and treats whether a contract is ambiguous as a question of law, with an ambiguous coverage limitation construed in the insured's favor.1

Sources
  1. Opinion, PDF pp. 4-5 ↩

Legal Arguments

Whether "windstorm" unambiguously includes a tornado.

PURE (Petitioner): "Windstorm" has a plain meaning, a storm with strong and violent wind, that encompasses a tornado, so the claim is subject to the Windstorm or Hail deductible.1

The Mankoffs (Respondents): "Windstorm" denotes a peril distinct from a tornado, because dictionary definitions requiring "little or no precipitation" exclude tornadoes, which are precipitation events, and because media coverage, statutory lists naming tornadoes and windstorms separately, a meteorologist's opinion and other sources support a meaning that excludes tornadoes.2

Sources
  1. Opinion, PDF pp. 2, 5-7 ↩
  2. Opinion, PDF pp. 2, 6-7, 9, 12 ↩

Stated Reasons the Court Should Take the Case

PURE petitioned for review arguing that the court of appeals incorrectly held the term ambiguous and created a false ambiguity by relying on inappropriate sources.1

Sources
  1. Opinion, PDF p. 4 ↩

Oral Argument

  • Dictionaries. Asked whether courts should consult Google or AI, petitioner's counsel said he is suspicious of the internet; dictionaries are the historic tool for ordinary usage. (Oral Argument, 0:03:23)
  • Narrow definitions. Asked which dictionary excludes tornadoes, respondent's counsel cited Merriam-Webster, American Heritage and New Oxford, which include the element of little or no precipitation. (Oral Argument, 0:16:01)
  • Two meanings. Asked if the term is ambiguous in one context but not another, respondent's counsel said that would be strange, but it is reasonably susceptible to two interpretations. (Oral Argument, 0:18:53; 0:19:50)
  • Exclusionary deductible. Petitioner's counsel acknowledged a deductible provision is treated as exclusionary in Texas, so ambiguity is construed for the insured. (Oral Argument, 0:08:22)
  • Best practice. Asked what it would advise insurers, respondent's counsel said the best practice is always to define the term in an exclusion. (Oral Argument, 0:28:13)
  • Strong wind. On rebuttal, asked if all wind strong enough to damage a house is a windstorm, petitioner's counsel said he thought so but was not entirely certain. (Oral Argument, 0:31:19)
Show full transcript

Unofficial and machine-generated: YouTube’s automatic captions of the Court’s recording, with no speaker names and frequent errors in names, numbers and legal terms. Use the video, linked at each time stamp, as the record of what was said.

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Amicus Involvement

None noted

Summary of Opinion

Holding

The undefined term "windstorm" in a homeowners policy is not ambiguous, and its ordinary meaning unambiguously encompasses a tornado, so the Mankoffs' claim was subject to the policy's Windstorm or Hail deductible.1

Reasoning

Dictionaries consistently define "windstorm" as a storm with violent, strong winds but little or no precipitation, and they define a tornado as a violent, destructive movement of wind, some even as a type of windstorm.2 Whether the broader weather event that produced a tornado counts as a windstorm depends on its precipitation, but that does not change that a tornado is itself a windstorm, since not all windstorms contain tornadoes but all tornadoes are windstorms.3 Statutes that list tornadoes and windstorms separately use broad terms alongside narrower ones, which does not give "windstorm" a meaning that excludes a tornado, and the court decisions Landmark and Weatherman do not show a different meaning and in the latter suggest tornadoes were viewed as windstorms.4 The media excerpts, the Encyclopedia Britannica entry and the meteorologist's opinion are consistent with the common dictionary thread and do not exclude tornadoes.5

Disposition

Court of appeals' judgment reversed and the trial court's judgment, which granted summary judgment for the insurer, reinstated.6

Sources
  1. Opinion, PDF p. 14 ↩
  2. Opinion, PDF pp. 6-8 ↩
  3. Opinion, PDF pp. 8, 14 ↩
  4. Opinion, PDF pp. 9-11 ↩
  5. Opinion, PDF pp. 12-14 ↩
  6. Opinion, PDF p. 14 ↩

Standard of Review

De novo review of summary judgment, with ambiguity decided as a question of law.1

Sources
  1. Opinion, PDF p. 4 ↩

Vote Breakdown, Authorship, and Any Concurrence/Dissent

Justice Lehrmann delivered the opinion of the Court, with no separate writings.1

Sources
  1. Opinion, PDF p. 1 ↩

The Docket

The following is current as of October 9, 2026.

DateEvent
10/18/2024Brief on the Merits Ordered
09/10/2025Oral argument
Argued on behalf of Petitioner by Robert B. Dubose (Alexander Dubose & Jefferson LLP). Argued on behalf of Respondents by Ryan P. Pitts (Haynes and Boone, LLP).
02/13/2026Opinion issued
The Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and reinstates the trial court's judgment. Justice Lehrmann delivered the opinion of the Court.
05/29/2026Motion for Rehearing - Disposed
05/29/2026Mandate issued
Full case docket for 24-0132search.txcourts.gov →