Rodney and Debbie Morrison divorced in April 2021 by an agreed decree that allocates half of the proceeds from the sale of the marital residence to each spouse, awards Debbie 55.5% of funds recovered in bankruptcy proceedings involving Rodney's company, requires both to deliver designated personal property to an appointed receiver within fourteen days, and requires Rodney to vacate and deliver the marital home and shop to an appointed realtor for sale.¹ The decree provides that if a spouse fails to deliver property or delivers it damaged, the fair market value of the undelivered or damaged property is to be assessed against the breaching spouse and "accounted for" out of the proceeds from the sale of the marital residence.² Disputes arose over implementation, and Debbie moved for contempt and enforcement, alleging that Rodney damaged the parties' property and refused to deliver multiple items of personal property to the receiver.³

After several hearings over a year and a half, during which the court's registry received payments totaling $850,434 from the sales and the bankruptcy, the trial court granted Debbie's motion, found that Rodney violated the decree, and awarded her damages equal to 100% of the proceeds from the sale of the marital home, plus attorney's fees, costs, and part of the receiver's fees, in total $722,725.33.¹ The Twelfth Court of Appeals (Tyler) held that the trial court impermissibly modified the property division in violation of Family Code Section 9.007 by redividing the proceeds under the guise of enforcement, vacated the order, and dismissed for want of jurisdiction.² The vehicle in this Court is a petition for review filed by Debbie, argued October 7, 2025, and decided January 30, 2026.³

Petition for review from the Twelfth Court of Appeals (Tyler) after a post-decree enforcement order; argued October 7, 2025, and decided January 30, 2026.⁴

Debbie presents whether divorcing parties may contractually agree to a liquidated-damages provision mandating damages for post-decree wrongdoing, including a redistribution of assets or cash, and whether a trial court may enforce that agreement even though it otherwise lacks authority under Section 9.007(b) to alter a property division.¹ Rodney frames the issues as whether the enforcement order modified the original property division, whether parties may confer jurisdiction by agreeing to a provision that makes a final property division indefinitely interlocutory, and whether the court of appeals properly vacated the order and dismissed.² The Court framed the question as whether the trial court properly exercised its jurisdiction to enforce a decree when one spouse failed to maintain property of the community estate.³

Whether the enforcement order is void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law about the limits of Family Code Chapter 9, and the Court construes the divorce decree as it does other judgments, as a whole and giving effect to all its provisions.¹

Whether the order enforced or modified the decree.

Debbie (Petitioner): Parties are generally free to contract, and these parties bargained for a specific damage provision in their decree to provide certainty if either failed to deliver property as ordered, a novel approach that the court of appeals did not analyze.¹

Rodney (Respondent): The court of appeals correctly applied settled law that a court may specify more precisely the manner of effecting the division of property but may not substantively alter it, and parties cannot contractually circumvent Family Code Sections 9.006(b) and 9.007 and Rule 329b by agreeing to a damages provision that redistributes marital assets.²

Debbie argued that the case is one of first impression on whether divorcing parties may agree to a liquidated-damages provision enforceable by redistributing assets.¹

None

Holding

The trial court had jurisdiction to enforce the decree and to award damages caused by breach of the decree, but it erred in reallocating 100% of the sale proceeds of the marital home to the aggrieved spouse without determining the damages caused by the breach, which exceeded its enforcement authority under Section 9.007.¹

Reasoning

Enforcement versus modification. Family Code Section 9.001 permits a suit to enforce a decree, the rendering court retains the power to enforce the property division and render further orders, and the court may award a money judgment for damages from a violation and attorney's fees, but Section 9.007's limits on that power are jurisdictional: a court may not amend, modify, or alter the substantive division of property, and an order that does so is void and unenforceable.² The court does not lose its continuing enforcement jurisdiction because it oversteps, since those oversteps are what are void, and whether an order is improper modification turns on the text of the decree and the relief afforded in the name of enforcement.³

The decree's enforcement provision is valid. The decree allocates half the proceeds to each spouse, agrees on a valuation method for damages caused by noncompliance, and identifies the sale proceeds as an asset from which to collect, which does not redivide the property but provides a mechanism for collecting damages from a breach, consistent with Sections 9.006 and 9.010(a).⁴ The Court disagreed with the parties' characterization of the provision as liquidated damages.⁵

The order did not comply. The trial court found that Rodney's violations raised the cost of marketing the properties, reduced their fair market value, and led to delivery of personal property late and in a different condition, but it placed no fair market value on those losses and made no findings of actual damages, as both the decree and the Family Code require, instead shifting Rodney's entire share of the proceeds to Debbie.⁶ Because the amount awarded must result from the violation of the decree, that reallocation exceeded the court's enforcement authority, but the error did not deprive it of jurisdiction to consider the motion and render a proper enforcement order.⁷

Disposition

Court of appeals' judgment reversed and the case remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.⁸

Vote Breakdown

Majority Opinion by Justice Bland

Joined by Blacklock, C.J., and Busby, Devine, Hawkins, Huddle, Lehrmann, Sullivan, and Young, JJ.