Clay and Lacy Kolle live and graze cattle on a 126-acre property in Victoria County, and they sued their neighbors David and Valerie Kucera and K&K Inez Properties, LLC, alleging that obstructions on the Kuceras' land caused flooding on the Kolles' property.¹ The jury found for the Kolles on all liability theories, including intentional and negligent nuisance and trespass, found that Valerie Kucera conspired with David and K&K, apportioned responsibility 40% to David, 20% to Valerie, and 40% to K&K, and found by clear and convincing evidence that David and K&K were grossly negligent.² It awarded $175,000 for decreased market value and $250,000 for past and future loss of use, and exemplary damages of $250,000 and $250,000 from David and K&K to Clay Kolle and $500,000 and $250,000 to Lacy Kolle.³

The Kuceras designated Victoria County as a responsible third party, but the trial court struck the designation for lack of evidence, refused to submit the Kolles' own negligence to the jury, and rendered judgment on the nuisance theory for $425,000 in economic damages and exemplary damages of $200,000 to each plaintiff against David and $250,000 to each plaintiff against K&K.¹ The Thirteenth Court of Appeals (Corpus Christi-Edinburg) reversed the $250,000 loss-of-use award because the injury was permanent, reducing economic damages to $175,000, and affirmed the rest, including the exemplary damages.² The vehicle in this Court is a petition for review filed by the Kuceras and K&K, argued December 2, 2025, and decided May 22, 2026.³

Petition for review from the Thirteenth Court of Appeals (Corpus Christi-Edinburg) after a jury trial; argued December 2, 2025, and decided May 22, 2026.⁴

The Kuceras raise four issues:¹ 1. Whether the trial court erred in striking the designation of Victoria County as a responsible third party. 2. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to submit the Kolles' negligence and proportionate responsibility. 3. Whether the judgment violates the one-satisfaction rule. 4. Whether the judgment misapplies Chapter 41's cap on exemplary damages.

The Court did not state a general standard of review. It construed Chapter 41 and the responsible-third-party statute from their text, reading provisions in context, and reviewed the striking of a designation under Section 33.004(l)'s no-evidence standard.¹

Responsible third party and proportionate responsibility.

Kuceras and K&K (Petitioners): Lower courts have muddied the waters by confusing a person's "responsibility" with "liability" in striking or apportioning a responsible third party, and the Court should hold for the first time that a landowner has a duty to exercise ordinary care to prevent damage to its own property.¹

Kolles (Respondents): The court of appeals only held that the Kuceras provided no evidence the County was responsible, and the Kuceras expressly waived any argument about the Kolles' comparative fault.²

One-satisfaction rule and nuisance.

Kuceras and K&K (Petitioners): Intentional nuisance and negligent nuisance are mutually exclusive theories, so allowing recovery on both treats "nuisance" as a cause of action and produces a double recovery.³

Kolles (Respondents): The court of appeals properly applied the law of nuisance, gross negligence is compatible with intentional conduct, and there was no double recovery.⁴

Exemplary-damages cap.

Kuceras and K&K (Petitioners): The Chapter 41 cap must be applied to economic damages reduced by each defendant's percentage of responsibility, and applied once per defendant rather than to each plaintiff's separate award.⁵

Kolles (Respondents): The cap refers to the total economic-damages award without reduction for percentage of responsibility and applies claimant by claimant, and the Kuceras waived any argument that the exemplary damages are unconstitutionally excessive.⁶

The Kuceras argued that the case gives the Court the opportunity to clarify a split among the courts of appeals on responsible-third-party designations and to decide how Chapter 41's cap applies.¹ The Kolles answered that the court of appeals applied well-established law in a straightforward way and that review is unnecessary.²

None

Holding

Section 41.008(b)'s cap on exemplary damages "awarded against a defendant" is calculated from the percentage of economic damages attributable to that defendant, not the total economic damages awarded against all defendants, and where plaintiffs who jointly own the injured property receive a single economic-damages amount, the cap applies to each defendant based on that single amount.¹ The Court rejected the Kuceras' other challenges.²

Reasoning

Responsible third party. A designated person is not "responsible" unless he has violated some applicable legal standard, including by negligent act or omission, so the designation must be struck absent evidence raising a fact issue on that point.³ The Kuceras offered only a former commissioner's description of the County's work as "imprudent" and no evidence of the standard of care, so the trial court did not err in striking the designation.⁴

Kolles' negligence and one-satisfaction. The Kuceras withdrew the comparative-negligence issue in the court of appeals in express terms, which is waiver.⁵ The one-satisfaction rule was not violated, because the Kuceras' premise that negligent and intentional nuisance cannot both support a judgment containing exemplary damages is mistaken.⁶

Cap per defendant. Section 41.008(b) caps exemplary damages "awarded against a defendant," Section 41.006 requires an award to be specific as to a defendant, and Section 41.011 requires the jury to consider the wrongdoer's degree of culpability, so the cap uses the economic damages attributable to that defendant, and the Kolles' reading would subject a defendant with a small share of responsibility to a larger cap based on other defendants' conduct.⁷ Because the Kolles jointly own the property and the jury awarded a single amount of economic damages, the cap applies to each defendant once, based on that amount: 40% of $175,000 is $70,000, twice that is $140,000, which is below the $200,000 floor, so David's and K&K's exemplary damages are each capped at $200,000.⁸

Excessiveness. Because the court of appeals reduced the actual damages, the question whether the exemplary damages are excessive in relation to the reduced amount arises from its judgment and can be raised for the first time in this Court, and the court of appeals should have reevaluated it.⁹

Disposition

Court of appeals' judgment affirmed except as to exemplary damages, which are reversed, and the case remanded to the trial court to allocate the exemplary damages between the Kolles, not to exceed $200,000 each as to David Kucera and K&K, and to consider any further excessiveness challenge by the Kuceras.¹⁰

Vote Breakdown

Majority Opinion by Justice Huddle

Joined by Blacklock, C.J., and Bland, Busby, Devine, Hawkins, Lehrmann, Sullivan, and Young, JJ.