After Jonathan Noyes's former romantic partner ended their relationship, he sent her about 1,500 text messages from dozens of numbers and hundreds of emails, and she made several police reports; she also testified that he had physically assaulted her and that, among other things, he slashed the air mattress she was sleeping on.¹ The State obtained an arrest warrant, filed criminal charges, and sought a permanent protective order under Code of Criminal Procedure article 7B, subchapter A.² After a bench hearing the trial court found reasonable grounds to believe Noyes had engaged in criminal stalking, but it did not find that he poses a credible threat to her or anyone else's physical safety or that his conduct involved family violence, threats of bodily harm, or a weapon, and the State's prosecutor told the court there was no future-threat element.³ The court nonetheless issued an order prohibiting Noyes from possessing any firearm for the rest of his life.⁴

Noyes moved for a new trial, arguing among other things that the lifetime ban violated his rights under the Second Amendment and article I, section 23 of the Texas Constitution, and the trial court denied the motion.¹ The court of appeals affirmed on November 22, 2023, holding that subchapter A requires only reasonable grounds to believe the applicant is the victim of a qualifying offense, and disposing of the constitutional claims in a footnote as unpreserved.² The parties jointly moved to abate pending United States v. Rahimi, which the Court granted in January 2024, and Noyes petitioned for review on August 23, 2024 after Rahimi issued; the Court requested merits briefing on March 7, 2025, and on May 15, 2026, it granted review, vacated, and remanded per curiam without oral argument.³

Petition for review from the Third Court of Appeals, granted, and decided per curiam without oral argument under Rules of Appellate Procedure 59.1 and 60.2(f) on May 15, 2026, with two concurring opinions.⁴

Noyes presents whether the court of appeals erred in holding his challenge to the lifetime ban unpreserved or waived and refusing to reach the merits, or whether the Court should remand in light of Bruen and Rahimi; whether the lifetime ban violates the Second Amendment and article I, section 23; and whether the order was authorized without findings that he is a credible threat.¹ The State frames the issues as whether Noyes preserved any historical-analysis argument and whether the Court should consider unpreserved arguments, view the evidence in his favor, and disregard his failure to request findings.² The Court decided only that Noyes sufficiently preserved his constitutional challenges and that the court of appeals should consider them in light of Rahimi.³

The briefs state no standard of review in their issue statements, and the Court did not reach the merits. Justice Hawkins notes that a remand for reconsideration in light of a change in law under Rule of Appellate Procedure 60.2(f) is appropriate where there is a reasonable probability that the decision below rests on a premise the lower court would reject on reconsideration.¹

Whether the lifetime firearm ban in the protective order is constitutional and authorized.

Petitioner (Noyes): The lifetime ban violates his rights under the Second Amendment and article I, section 23, since no evidence shows he is a credible threat to anyone next week, next year, or for life; the lower courts misconstrued subchapter A by refusing to apply the two-year cap in Family Code section 85.025, so the lifetime order is not authorized without additional evidence and findings; and the court of appeals wrongly held his challenge unpreserved.¹

Respondent (State): Noyes conceded the statutes are generally constitutional and failed to preserve any argument based on the historical analysis of Heller, Bruen, and Rahimi; even if preserved, subchapter A is consistent with the historical tradition of restricting firearms from people who present a threat to others.² It also argues that the Court should view the evidence in favor of the trial court's judgment and presume implied findings because Noyes requested no findings.³

Noyes argued that the case presents the construction or validity of a frequently applied statutory scheme governing protective orders and state and federal constitutional questions, and that the court of appeals' opinion opens the door to mass lifetime disarmament of Texans after a summary hearing.¹ The State responded that the court of appeals correctly concluded the complaints were unpreserved and that Noyes's statutory-construction arguments are meritless.² The Court granted review and disposed of the case on the petition, as a grant, vacate, and remand (GVR) order prompted by Rahimi.³

None. The docket shows no amicus filings.

Holding

Noyes's constitutional challenges to the lifetime firearm prohibition were sufficiently preserved, and because the court of appeals did not have the benefit of Rahimi, which addressed the circumstances under which an individual may be disarmed and the permissible duration of disarmament, the case must be reconsidered there.¹

Reasoning

The per curiam order gives only brief reasons: the court of appeals decided Noyes's Second Amendment and Arms Clause challenges before Rahimi, so the Court vacated and remanded instead of deciding them.²

Concurrence (Justice Hawkins, joined by Justices Young and Sullivan). He explained why the case is suited to a grant, vacate, and remand (GVR) order: Rahimi upheld a temporary disarmament tied to a judicial finding that the person posed a credible threat to another's safety, and its emphasis on individualized dangerousness findings and temporal limits casts substantial doubt on an order that permanently disarmed Noyes without such a finding.³ The court of appeals' footnote disposing of the constitutional claims as unpreserved meant it never reached the merits, and it had held that subchapter A requires "[n]o additional showings beyond status as a crime victim".⁴ He encouraged litigants to ask for GVRs at the petition stage, since the Court has issued few and they spare parties the cost of merits briefing.⁵

Concurrence (Justice Sullivan, joined by Justices Devine, Young, and Hawkins). He agreed with the remand and offered preliminary views, noting that the Court has said little about the Second Amendment or Arms Clause in about a century.⁶ On the statute, he agreed with the State that Family Code section 85.025's two-year limit does not apply to subchapter A, because that section applies only to orders "under this subtitle" and article 7B.007(a) authorizes orders lasting for the lives of the offender and victim.⁷ On the constitutional questions, he thought Rahimi does not squarely answer whether a lifetime disarmament without a finding of dangerousness is permitted, found no historical analogue to subchapter A in the going-armed and surety laws, and tentatively concluded that the order likely violates both the Second Amendment and the Texas Arms Clause as applied to Noyes, because the Texas right to bear arms is probably absolute within its scope, save for the Legislature's power to regulate the "wearing" of arms to prevent crime.⁸

Disposition

Without hearing oral argument, the Court granted the petition for review, vacated the court of appeals' judgment, and remanded the case to that court for further proceedings.⁹

Vote Breakdown

Per Curiam Opinion

Joined by Blacklock, C.J., and Bland, Busby, Devine, Hawkins, Huddle, Lehrmann, Sullivan, and Young, JJ.

Concurrence by Justice Sullivan

Joined by Devine, Hawkins, and Young, JJ.

Concurrence by Justice Hawkins

Joined by Sullivan and Young, JJ.