Nicole Tarpley, a certified nursing assistant, sued her employer, Red Bluff, LLC, a nonsubscriber to the workers' compensation program, for injuries she suffered at its rehabilitation facility, and the trial court's judgment awarded her $7.1 million on negligence and premises-liability claims.¹ The court signed the judgment on February 4, 2022; until April 25, 2022, the rules required the clerk to "immediately give notice to the parties or their attorneys of record by first-class mail".² On February 8, the clerk instead sent notice by email to Red Bluff's lead counsel, who says he did not see, open, or read it until March 14, 2022 (thirty-eight days after signing), when Tarpley's attorney emailed him a payment demand.³

On March 14, Red Bluff's counsel filed a notice of appeal and a sworn Rule 306a motion to reset the post-judgment-motion deadline to run from that date, and on April 13 he filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a motion for new trial.¹ The trial court denied the Rule 306a motion, finding that counsel acquired actual knowledge when the clerk emailed notice on February 8, and the Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Red Bluff was not entitled to an extension and the trial court lacked plenary power over its post-judgment motions.² Red Bluff petitioned for review on February 8, 2024; the Court requested merits briefing on June 21, 2024, and decided the case per curiam on May 9, 2025, without oral argument.³

Petition for review from the Fourteenth Court of Appeals in a challenge to the denial of a Rule 306a motion; decided per curiam without oral argument under Rule of Appellate Procedure 59.1.⁴

Red Bluff presents whether the trial court erred in denying its motion to reset the post-judgment deadlines when the undisputed evidence showed that the clerk never gave notice in compliance with Rule 306a(3) and that Red Bluff and its attorneys did not acquire actual knowledge of the judgment until 38 days after it was signed.¹ The question for the Court was whether a party acquires "actual knowledge" of a judgment under Rule 306a(4) when the clerk emails notice that its lawyer does not see or read for more than twenty days.²

The rules do not define "actual knowledge," so the Court gave the phrase its plain and ordinary meaning.¹ Tarpley argues that the court of appeals properly applied legal and factual sufficiency standards of review to the trial court's finding.²

Whether counsel acquired "actual knowledge" of the judgment by receiving the emailed notice.

Petitioner (Red Bluff): When the clerk fails to give notice by first-class mail, the trial court must reset the deadlines if the party proves it did not receive notice or acquire actual knowledge within 20 days; the clerk never gave notice as the rule required, and Red Bluff conclusively proved it did not acquire actual knowledge until March 14, 2022.¹ It argues that the court of appeals held the mere presence of the email in counsel's inbox was actual knowledge because counsel could have seen it, which rewrote Rule 306a and exacerbates a conflict among the courts of appeals over the meaning of "actual knowledge".²

Respondent (Tarpley): The court of appeals properly applied the legal and factual sufficiency standards and correctly held that the trial court's finding that Red Bluff obtained actual knowledge on February 8 is supported by legally and factually sufficient evidence; Red Bluff has not shown the finding is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust.³ She argues there is no conflict among the courts of appeals to resolve.⁴

Red Bluff argued that the court of appeals rewrote Rule 306a and that its holding exacerbates an existing conflict among the courts of appeals about the meaning of "actual knowledge," a confusion that also affects other Texas statutes and rules.¹ Tarpley responded that there is no conflict, that the court of appeals' opinion is consistent with the Waco court's decision in Scott v. S2S Domain Waco Associates, and that the case presents only a sufficiency determination.²

None. The docket shows no amicus filings.

Holding

Red Bluff satisfied both prongs of Rule 306a(4): it did not receive notice by first-class mail as the then-applicable rule required, and it did not acquire actual knowledge of the judgment, because "actual knowledge" means subjective awareness and not constructive knowledge; it was therefore entitled to a deadline extension and its post-judgment motions were timely.¹

Reasoning

Rule 306a(4) lets a party extend the post-judgment deadline up to ninety days by showing that within twenty days it neither received notice of the judgment as the rules require nor acquired actual knowledge of it, and the period then begins on the earlier of the date it received notice or acquired actual knowledge.² Because the clerk did not send notice by first-class mail, Red Bluff satisfied the first prong.³ Courts that treated an emailed but unread notice as actual knowledge misconstrued the rule: notice and actual knowledge are alternative sufficient conditions, so if the clerk fails to deliver notice as required, actual knowledge independently defeats an extension.⁴

Giving the phrase its plain meaning, actual knowledge means that a person is in fact aware of the information, which is distinct from constructive knowledge that a person using reasonable care should have; that the information was available to counsel, even if he should have noticed it, does not establish actual knowledge.⁵ Counsel's receipt of the email is relevant to whether he gained knowledge, but the rule bars an extension only if he in fact became aware, and he provided sworn proof that he did not see the email or learn of the judgment until March 14, which Tarpley did not contradict.⁶

Disposition

Without hearing oral argument, the Court granted the petition for review, reversed the court of appeals' judgment, and remanded to the trial court to consider Red Bluff's post-judgment motions.⁷

Vote Breakdown

Per Curiam Opinion

Joined by Blacklock, C.J., and Bland, Boyd, Busby, Devine, Huddle, Lehrmann, Sullivan, and Young, JJ.