Pedro Castaneda was driving across State Highway 249 at Woodtrace Boulevard when two vehicles collided with his truck at an intersection under construction where traffic lights had been installed but were not yet operational.¹ The parties dispute whether the lights were covered with black fabric to show they were not working, and the police report says Castaneda failed to yield at the stop sign that controlled the intersection.² After the Transportation Commission designated part of SH 249 as a future toll facility, TxDOT and Montgomery County (through its Toll Road Authority) agreed that the County would "finance, acquire right-of-way, design, construct, maintain, and operate" the southern "County Project," with plans submitted to TxDOT for review and approval and built to TxDOT standards, while TxDOT would be responsible for "the operation and maintenance of the frontage roads that are adjacent to the County Project".³ The County hired SpawGlass Civil Construction, Inc. as general contractor, and SpawGlass hired Third Coast Services, LLC as a subcontractor to furnish and install electrical components, including traffic signals.⁴

Castaneda's family sued, and SpawGlass and Third Coast moved for summary judgment on the defense in Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 97.002; the trial court denied the motions, and the contractors took an interlocutory appeal under section 51.014(a)(17).¹ The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the statute "applies only to contractors hired by TxDOT," rejecting the First Court of Appeals' contrary decision in Mahoney v. Webber, and not reaching Castaneda's alternative arguments.² Each contractor petitioned for review on December 15, 2023; the Court granted review on April 4, 2025, heard argument on September 9, 2025, and decided the case on December 12, 2025, with Justice Lehrmann not participating.³

Petition for review from the Fourteenth Court of Appeals in an interlocutory appeal from the denial of summary judgment; argued September 9, 2025, and decided December 12, 2025.⁴

Third Coast presents what it means to be a "contractor who constructs or repairs . . . for" TxDOT, including whether the statute requires direct privity, and what it means to construct or repair "a highway, road, or street," including installing a traffic signal.¹ SpawGlass presents whether a contractor must contract directly with TxDOT, whether it conclusively established that it constructed or repaired a highway for TxDOT, whether it established the remaining elements, and whether the trial court erred in overruling its objections to a declaration.² The Court decided whether privity is required, whether the contractors worked "for" TxDOT, and whether their work was construction or repair of a "highway," and remanded the compliance element.³

Section 97.002 is an affirmative defense, so to obtain summary judgment the contractors must conclusively establish each of its requirements.¹ Statutory interpretation is a question of law reviewed de novo, beginning with the text and presuming the Legislature chose its words with care.²

Whether section 97.002 requires privity with TxDOT and whether the contractors worked "for" TxDOT.

Petitioners (Third Coast and SpawGlass): The statute's "for" indicates the aim or purpose of the work, not privity; Third Coast, the electrical subcontractor, installed a traffic signal according to TxDOT's specifications, and SpawGlass's contract required it to construct a highway for TxDOT because the SH 249 frontage roads remained part of the state highway system.¹ They also argue that the statute extends to all contractors in the chain of contracts on a project, as the First Court held in Mahoney, and that installing traffic signals is construction or repair of a road.²

Respondents (Castaneda): Under a plain-language reading and legislative history, section 97.002 requires a contractual relationship with TxDOT, and there was none; TxDOT expressly relinquished control of the County Project to Montgomery County and removed it from the state highway system, so the contractors worked only for the County; and adding traffic signals to an existing highway is not "construction" of a highway, so the accident did not arise from the construction or repair of a highway.³

The contractors argued that the case presents a clear split between the First and Fourteenth Courts of Appeals on whether section 97.002 requires privity, and that the Court had never construed the statute.¹ Third Coast added that the question affects hundreds of lawsuits and that, as amici explain, the decision below leaves contractors with much less protection than the Legislature intended.²

• Associated General Contractors filed an amicus curiae brief on January 21, 2024, at the petition stage.
• American Subcontractors Association filed an amicus curiae brief on February 1, 2024.
• Rogers-O'Brien Construction, et al. filed an amicus curiae brief on February 2, 2024.

Holding

Section 97.002 does not require privity with TxDOT; the contractors conclusively established that they worked "for" TxDOT because TxDOT would ultimately bear responsibility for operating and maintaining the frontage roads on which they worked, and that installing traffic signals is construction or repair of a "highway"; the remaining element, compliance with contract documents, was remanded to the court of appeals.¹

Reasoning

No privity. Section 97.002's text applies to a contractor that "constructs or repairs a highway, road, or street for" TxDOT and nowhere limits it to contractors who contract directly with TxDOT; the Legislature expressly requires privity when it intends to, as in Transportation Code sections 474.003 and 472.021, and the Court agreed with Mahoney that privity is not required.²

"For" TxDOT. Dictionaries show that "for" means the result of the work will be received, owned, or used by the person it is "for," so one who contracts directly with TxDOT to build a state-owned road works for TxDOT, as do subcontractors hired for part of the work.³ Castaneda's argument that TxDOT ceded control to the County fails because work "for" the County can also be "for" TxDOT; but the contractors' view that any project subject to TxDOT's review and specifications is for TxDOT proves too much, since almost any work on a public road would qualify.⁴ The Court did not define the precise line but held that the work here qualifies because the County and TxDOT agreed that TxDOT would bear responsibility for operating and maintaining the frontage roads, and the contractors' work was on the existing SH 249 lanes that would become those frontage roads, with Castaneda's own evidence acknowledging that the signals would be controlled by TxDOT after completion.⁵

Highway. The Transportation Code defines "highway" to include "a bridge, culvert, building, or other necessary structure related to a public road," which pertains to the physical function of the road, such as a guard rail; traffic signals likewise reduce the risks of travel and fall within it, and SpawGlass, as the general contractor bearing ultimate responsibility, "constructs" the project even if a subcontractor does the physical work.⁶

Remand. Whether the contractors conclusively established compliance with contract documents material to the defect, which Castaneda disputes in several respects, is a fact-intensive question that the Court remanded to the court of appeals.⁷

Disposition

The Court reversed the court of appeals' judgment and remanded the case to that court to consider whether SpawGlass and Third Coast conclusively established the remaining elements of section 97.002.⁸

Vote Breakdown

Majority Opinion by Justice Huddle

Joined by Blacklock, C.J., and Bland, Busby, Devine, Hawkins, Sullivan, and Young, JJ.

Did Not Participate

Lehrmann, J.