The plaintiffs own thirty homes in Van Vleck and Bay City in Matagorda County that flooded during Hurricane Harvey in August 2017, when 21.6 inches of rain fell in four days. Tenaris Bay City Inc. operates a pipe-fabrication plant on a former sod farm, with a drainage system designed and built by Fluor Enterprises, reviewed by Jones & Carter and approved by the county drainage district, including detention ponds surrounded by a berm.¹

The plaintiffs sued Tenaris, Fluor, and Jones & Carter for negligence, gross negligence, negligence per se, and negligent nuisance; the other defendants settled. At a liability trial the plaintiffs relied on civil engineer Gabriel Novak, the court directed a verdict on gross negligence, and the jury found Tenaris liable on the other theories, leading to a $2.8 million agreed damages judgment. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed (704 S.W.3d 37). The Court heard argument February 19, 2025, with Justices Huddle and Young not participating.¹

Petition for review from the Fourteenth Court of Appeals after a jury verdict on liability; argued February 19, 2025.²

Whether the plaintiffs presented legally sufficient evidence that Tenaris, rather than the storm and other environmental factors, caused their homes to flood.¹

Legal sufficiency review asks whether the evidence supports the finding, and an expert's causation opinion is unreliable if it fails to exclude other plausible causes with reasonable certainty.¹

Tenaris (Petitioner): no evidence showed that, but for its facility, the plaintiffs' houses would not have flooded.

Plaintiffs (Respondents): they recovered on three theories, expert testimony was not required, and evidence that the berm was built one foot short and poorly maintained, plus prior dry storms, supports causation.¹

Not applicable to the Court's decision; the opinion does not recite the petition's cert-worthiness arguments.

• Tying water to houses. Asked what ties the evidence to particular houses, plaintiffs' counsel said only four houses are at issue, three next to Tenaris's property, with no intervening watercourses. (Oral Argument, 0:18:48)
• Need for testimony. Asked how causation works for houses in different places, Tenaris's counsel said given an unprecedented rainfall event, plaintiffs needed testimony these houses would not have flooded without increased runoff. (Oral Argument, 0:04:59)
• Not impossible. On rebuttal Tenaris's counsel said the heaviest-ever rainfall does not make causation impossible to prove; plaintiffs still need evidence that the homes would not have flooded without the increase. (Oral Argument, 0:37:48)
• Water Code standard. Asked what causation standard applies under the Water Code, Tenaris's counsel said at least but-for causation, and proximate causation is also required. (Oral Argument, 0:12:36)
• Conclusory opinion. Asked why an opinion citing higher discharge is conclusory, Tenaris's counsel said an opinion whose offered basis provides no support is conclusory and cannot be considered evidence. (Oral Argument, 0:15:56)
• Other storms. Asked about the next-largest flood, plaintiffs' counsel said a 1984 hurricane and Hurricane Claudette, with 43 inches of rain 18 miles away, caused no flooding there. (Oral Argument, 0:31:55)
• Takings cases. Asked whether the Court must overrule a takings decision for plaintiffs to win, their counsel said no, because that test turned on actual knowledge, a different state of mind. (Oral Argument, 0:33:00)

None noted

Holding

Legally insufficient evidence supported but-for causation on all of the plaintiffs' theories, so the Court reversed and rendered judgment for Tenaris.¹

Reasoning

Cause in fact requires both but-for and substantial-factor causation. Novak's testimony showed that the design contributed to some additional flooding somewhere in the area, but he admitted he could not say what caused any of the thirty homes to flood, had done no flooding analysis of the area, and did not exclude Harvey and other environmental factors, which he could have done with topographic data, drainage analysis, hydrological models, soil maps, and waterway studies. The same but-for requirement applies to negligent nuisance and to negligence per se under Water Code § 11.086, whose text ties liability to damages caused by an unlawful diversion or impounding, and Bostic's relaxed asbestos standard does not apply. Expert testimony was needed because the flow of flood waters across flat terrain is beyond jurors' understanding (City of Keller v. Wilson); Gragg, involving a single floodgate and ranch, is distinguishable. Evidence that the berm was a foot short and maintenance lacking shows negligence only, and the plaintiffs' prior dry history does not prove Tenaris caused this flooding.²

Disposition

Court of appeals' judgment reversed and judgment rendered for Tenaris on all claims.³

Vote Breakdown

Opinion of the Court by Chief Justice Blacklock; Justices Huddle and Young did not participate.⁴