A Piper Light Sport Aircraft suddenly lost engine power and crashed on the runway at an airport in Addison, Texas, permanently injuring passenger Sheema Shaik and traumatizing her husband, Touseef Siddiqui, who witnessed it.¹ The engine was designed and manufactured by BRP-Rotax GmbH & Co. KG (Rotax) in Gunskirchen, Austria, which does no business in Texas, has no employees, offices, or property here, and sells its engines under distribution agreements with independent distributors located outside the United States.² Rotax sold this engine to Kodiak Research Ltd., a Bahamian company with a distribution territory covering the United States, Central America, and most of South America; Kodiak shipped it to its independent sub-distributor in Florida, Lockwood Aviation Supply, which sold it to U.S. Sports Aircraft, the Texas company that installed it in the plane.³

The Shaiks sued the aircraft's designer and manufacturer, its seller, and Rotax in Dallas County for strict liability, negligence, and gross negligence, alleging that Rotax intentionally placed the engine into the stream of commerce and moved it along to Texas.¹ Rotax filed a special appearance supported by a declaration of its general manager and vice president of sales, and the trial court denied it.² The Fifth Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that Rotax purposefully availed itself of Texas under the stream-of-commerce-plus test, relying on the distribution agreement, Rotax's website, a repair center in Bulverde called "Texas Rotax," and the number of Rotax engines registered in Texas.³ Rotax petitioned for review on September 15, 2023; the Court granted review on June 14, 2024, heard argument on December 4, 2024, and decided the case on June 20, 2025.⁴

Petition for review from the Fifth Court of Appeals in an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a special appearance; argued December 4, 2024, and decided June 20, 2025, with a concurring opinion.⁵

Rotax presents, among other issues, whether the evidence is insufficient to establish purposeful availment, whether there is jurisdiction under the stream-of-commerce-plus test and Michiana's "stream, not a dribble" doctrine, whether it structured its business so as not to be subject to Texas jurisdiction, whether the court of appeals misread Volkswagen, and whether targeting the Western Hemisphere is the same as targeting Texas.¹ The Shaiks contend that the court of appeals' decision is correct and should be affirmed.² The Court decided whether Texas courts may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Rotax under the stream-of-commerce-plus test.³

Whether a defendant is amenable to specific personal jurisdiction is a question of law reviewed de novo, and where the relevant facts are undisputed the Court considers only the legal question whether those facts establish Texas jurisdiction.¹

Whether Rotax is subject to specific personal jurisdiction in Texas.

Petitioner (Rotax): It has no Texas contacts, sells only to an independent foreign distributor, and did not target Texas, so the claims do not arise from any purposeful availment and the exercise of jurisdiction offends fair play; the "stream of commerce plus" test and Michiana's requirement of a stream rather than a dribble are not met, it structured its business to avoid Texas, and targeting the Western Hemisphere is not targeting Texas.¹

Respondents (the Shaiks): Rotax created, employed, and controlled a distribution network, specifically authorized the Texas service center "Texas Rotax," interacted directly with Texans through its website, and about 150 engines were registered in Texas, showing deliberate and systematic efforts to establish a Texas market that it should have severed if it wished to avoid suit, as it did with Iraq, Iran, and North Korea.²

Rotax argued that the court of appeals' decision misapplied the stream-of-commerce-plus test, Michiana, and Volkswagen.¹ The Court said that its decision breaks no new jurisprudential ground and that, under its precedents, the lawsuit should have been dismissed.²

• Texas Rotax. Asked what difference it makes that no Texas trade is shown, respondents' counsel said branding an entity Texas Rotax shows a direct link to Texas, like a Texas McDonald's. (Oral Argument, 0:26:56)
• Sales records. Asked whether anything shows Rotax asking about Texas, respondents' counsel said it does not keep information that way, because its shipping scheme is designed to avoid jurisdiction anywhere. (Oral Argument, 0:30:50)
• Distribution agreement. Asked about a Texas distributor, Rotax's counsel said an agreement alone is not enough to invoke jurisdiction, whether the distributor is in Texas or elsewhere. (Oral Argument, 0:10:27)
• Other countries. Asked whether other countries with the same law could assert jurisdiction over Rotax, counsel said no, absent specific targeting of that sovereign. (Oral Argument, 0:12:41)
• Advertising. Asked about the distribution agreement's advertising clause, Rotax's counsel said the distributor must advertise, but Rotax did not control how, and required no advertising in Texas. (Oral Argument, 0:05:38)
• Website control. Asked whether it matters that Rotax appears to control the website, counsel said not for targeting Texas; manufacturers control trademarks, marketing, and safety certification. (Oral Argument, 0:08:18)

• Texas Civil Justice League filed an amicus curiae letter brief on October 28, 2024.

Holding

The evidence is legally insufficient to show that Rotax purposefully availed itself of Texas: the stream-of-commerce-plus test requires additional conduct specifically targeting Texas, and foreseeability that products may arrive here, a territory-wide distribution agreement with an independent distributor, a passive website, and third parties' repair and registration of engines are not enough; the case must be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.¹

Reasoning

Specific jurisdiction requires purposeful availment, meaning the defendant's own deliberate choice and not random, isolated, or fortuitous contacts, and claims that arise out of or relate to the defendant's Texas-focused activities.² Under the stream-of-commerce-plus test, placing a product into the stream of commerce is not enough without "additional conduct" showing an intent to serve the Texas market, and mere awareness or foreseeability that a product will be sold here cannot create minimum contacts; relevant conduct must show "targeting" Texas.³

The distribution agreement. Rotax's "network" consists of one relevant distributor, Kodiak, an independent Bahamian company in which Rotax holds no ownership interest; the Shaiks treat Rotax and Kodiak as the same but never argued agency or alter ego, and only Rotax's own contacts count.⁴ An independent distributor does not defeat jurisdiction if the manufacturer specifically targets Texas through it, but the agreement makes Kodiak responsible for advertising in a territory spanning two continents and "expresses no view, much less any command, about whether any business at all will be transacted in Texas"; Rotax's required permission for use of its trademark is jurisdictionally unremarkable.⁵

"Texas Rotax," the website, and registrations. Kodiak, not Rotax, established and was responsible for the Bulverde repair center, and there is no evidence Rotax had any interest in a center in Texas as opposed to elsewhere in the territory.⁶ The website is not purchasable from, does not target Texas or Texans, and its English text is no more directed at Texas than at other English-speaking places, and a download by someone in Texas is the unilateral act of a third party; the roughly 150 engines registered in Texas were registered by third parties, and there is no evidence of any sales in Texas beyond this one engine.⁷

Precedents. The court of appeals' reading of Volkswagen, Luciano, and Ford went too far: Volkswagen stressed the manufacturers' control over cars already in Texas, Luciano involved the manufacturer's own warehouse and local sales representative, and in Ford the manufacturer admitted substantial business in the forum.⁸ Stream-of-commerce jurisdiction "requires a stream, not a dribble," and the Court rejected the argument that Rotax must have treated Texas as it treats Iraq, Iran, and North Korea to avoid jurisdiction.⁹

Concurrence (Justice Busby, joined by Justice Devine). He joined the opinion but expressed concern that the "fair play" and "reasonableness" standards of International Shoe are unmoored from the Constitution's text and history and produce inconsistent results, including that this case would have been decided differently in a Texas federal court under the "pure" stream-of-commerce test; he encouraged the U.S. Supreme Court to return the inquiry to the sovereign-power touchstone of Pennoyer v. Neff.¹⁰

Disposition

The Court reversed the court of appeals' judgment and rendered judgment dismissing the case against Rotax.¹¹

Vote Breakdown

Majority Opinion by Justice Young

Joined by Blacklock, C.J., and Bland, Boyd, Busby, Devine, Huddle, Lehrmann, and Sullivan, JJ.

Concurrence by Justice Busby

Joined by Devine, J.