John Carrozzella, a physician, treated patients with pellet hormone therapy through his company JCMD under a contract with BioTE Medical that allowed him to terminate without cause but charged $250,000 if afterward he treated patients with a competing pellet therapy.¹

The trial court granted Carrozzella and JCMD summary judgment that the fee provision is an unenforceable restraint of trade; the Second Court of Appeals (Fort Worth) reversed. The Court granted review January 31, 2025 and set argument for March 18. After Carrozzella filed a notice of nonsuit, the Court on March 6 asked the parties whether it should cancel argument, dismiss the case as moot and vacate the lower-court judgments and the court of appeals' opinion under Morath v. Lewis. On March 12, 2025, under Rule of Appellate Procedure 56.2, the Court granted the petition, without hearing argument or considering the merits vacated the court of appeals' judgment and opinion and the trial court's relevant summary-judgment orders, and dismissed the case as moot; the mandate issued March 18.

Petition for review from the Second Court of Appeals (Fort Worth); granted January 31, 2025, then judgments and opinion vacated and the case dismissed as moot March 12, 2025 (Docket).

The petition raised whether the fee provision is subject to the Covenants Not to Compete Act and, if so, whether it is enforceable; the Court did not reach either question.¹

Carrozzella and JCMD (Petitioners): the fee is an unenforceable covenant not to compete or restraint of trade.

BioTE (Respondent): the Act does not reach a fee for using a competitor's therapy.¹

Carrozzella said the decision created a conflict in Texas covenant-not-to-compete law;¹ the Court disposed of the case as moot after the nonsuit.

None noted