First Sabrepoint Capital Management, L.P. is a Dallas hedge fund that in February 2018 hired QKM, L.L.C., owned by David Quinton Mathews, to conduct investment research for a $9,500 monthly fee; analyst Donald Marchiony later sent Mathews materials on Farmland Partners Inc. (FPI), a Colorado real estate investment trust, noting that First Sabrepoint held a relatively small short position in its stock.¹ Mathews researched FPI, shared findings with employees including CEO George Baxter, and published a Seeking Alpha article under the pseudonym "Rota Fortunae" that warned of a "significant risk of insolvency".² Within one day of publication FPI's stock price dropped 39%, and FPI sued Mathews in Colorado state court, alleging a "short and distort" scheme, then added First Sabrepoint, Baxter, and Marchiony as defendants in a case removed to federal court.³

The Colorado federal court dismissed FPI's claims against the three defendants under Rule 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction, finding that the evidence at most supported an inference that they knew it was possible Mathews would publish an article about FPI, which did not show purposeful direction at Colorado.¹ FPI sued in Texas state court asserting six claims, including defamation, business disparagement, and civil conspiracy, and added two Sabrepoint entities that were not parties in Colorado; the defendants (collectively "Sabrepoint") pleaded collateral estoppel, moved for summary judgment on it, and moved to dismiss under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA).² The trial court heard the TCPA motion on November 12, 2021, and granted both motions on December 17, 35 days after the hearing.³ The Fifth Court of Appeals held that the TCPA ruling was void because the motion had been overruled by operation of law, reviewed only the summary judgment, and reversed it because the Colorado jurisdictional issue was not identical to the issues in Texas.⁴ Sabrepoint petitioned for review on October 13, 2023, and FPI responded on December 27, 2023; the Court requested merits briefing on February 16, 2024, granted the petition on December 20, 2024, heard argument on January 16, 2025, and decided the case on April 25, 2025.⁵

Petition for review from the Fifth Court of Appeals in an appeal from a summary judgment and an order granting a TCPA motion to dismiss; argued January 16, 2025, and decided April 25, 2025.⁶

Sabrepoint presents whether a trial court has authority to grant a TCPA motion to dismiss more than 30 days after the hearing, whether facts established in a ruling dismissing for lack of personal jurisdiction can have preclusive effect on the merits of a later case, and whether it carried its summary-judgment burden on collateral estoppel.¹ FPI presents whether the Legislature intended to permit trial courts to grant TCPA motions after they have been denied by operation of law, and whether Sabrepoint failed to show that a Colorado federal court's jurisdictional order precluded the merits of FPI's Texas claims.² The Court decided both questions.³

The Court reviews questions of statutory interpretation de novo, and reviews summary judgments, including issues of collateral estoppel, de novo, taking as true evidence favorable to the nonmovant and requiring a defendant asserting an affirmative defense to conclusively establish each of its elements.¹

Whether the trial court could grant the TCPA motion after the 30-day deadline.

Petitioners (Sabrepoint): The 30-day deadline protects TCPA movants, the statute says the motion is denied only "by operation of law," and nothing in the TCPA deprives a trial court of power to revisit any ruling on the motion, as In re Panchakarla indicates.¹

Respondent (FPI): Every court of appeals and federal court that has reached the issue has held that a TCPA motion denied by operation of law cannot be granted after the statutory period expires, and Sabrepoint's reading would nullify provisions of the TCPA.²

Whether collateral estoppel entitled Sabrepoint to summary judgment.

Petitioners (Sabrepoint): The Colorado court's finding that Sabrepoint had no involvement with the article bars FPI's Texas claims, and facts established in a jurisdictional dismissal can have preclusive effect on the merits.³

Respondent (FPI): The only issue the Colorado court decided was whether Sabrepoint purposefully directed its conduct at Colorado, not Sabrepoint's liability to FPI; Sabrepoint failed to identify an identical issue that FPI fully and fairly litigated and that was essential to the Colorado judgment, and the Colorado court never determined the involvement of the two new defendants.⁴

Sabrepoint argued that both issues are vitally important to protecting litigants from harassing and duplicative litigation, and that the Court should finish what it started in Panchakarla by holding that nothing in the TCPA prevents trial courts from reconsidering any ruling on a TCPA motion after the 30-day deadline, including a denial by operation of law.¹ It added that some Texas appellate courts have continued to hold that trial courts lack authority to grant a motion after the deadline, so the Court's intervention is needed.²

• Thirty-day deadline. Asked why not enforce the 30-day deadline against repeated TCPA motions, petitioners' counsel said no one suggests ignoring it, but a court's failure should not fall on the protected party. (Oral Argument, 0:02:32)
• Appeal cuts off the trial court. Asked whether an immediate appeal ends the trial court's ability to reconsider, petitioners' counsel said yes: jurisdiction over the motion moves to the court of appeals and proceedings are stayed. (Oral Argument, 0:12:38)
• Motion lingering for years. Asked why the Legislature would let a TCPA motion linger for years, petitioners' counsel saw no statutory indication of that, since a denied motion could be reconsidered anytime. (Oral Argument, 0:04:51)

• Stacy R. Obenhaus filed an amicus curiae brief on December 31, 2024.
• Anita Kawaja filed an amicus curiae letter brief on January 13, 2025.

Holding

A trial court errs by granting a TCPA motion to dismiss after the 30-day ruling deadline, but the error is harmless and does not warrant reversal if the ruling comes within the 20-day period in which the movant could have appealed the denial by operation of law, so the order was not void; and Sabrepoint did not conclusively establish collateral estoppel because it did not show that the Colorado purposeful-direction findings are identical to issues that decide FPI's Texas claims or that the two new defendants were in privity with the Colorado defendants.¹

Reasoning

The TCPA ruling. The TCPA requires a ruling within 30 days after the hearing, and if the court does not rule, the motion is considered denied by operation of law and the movant may appeal.² In re Panchakarla held that nothing in the TCPA takes away a trial court's plenary power to reconsider a ruling before final judgment, and the Court saw no reason to apply a different rule because the original ruling was a denial by operation of law, or because the court on reconsideration granted the motion.³ The statute provides a simple consequence for a late ruling, denial by operation of law and a right to appeal, and nowhere limits the court's power to revisit it.⁴ The Court did not suggest that the trial court committed no error, but because the ruling came five days after the deadline, within the time Sabrepoint could have appealed the denial, any error was harmless under Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.1(a), which also serves the TCPA's goal of expedition by sparing the movant an interlocutory appeal.⁵ It remanded for the court of appeals to address the merits of the TCPA ruling, which the court of appeals had told the parties not to brief.⁶

Collateral estoppel. Collateral estoppel bars relitigation of identical issues, and the party asserting it must show that the issue is identical to the one litigated earlier, that it was fully and fairly litigated, that it was essential to the prior judgment, and that the parties were adversaries, bearing the burden to "map" the earlier findings onto the new claims.⁷ The Colorado court found only that Sabrepoint's foreseeability that Mathews might publish an article was insufficient to show purposeful direction at Colorado, and although both suits concern Sabrepoint's "involvement" with the article, the issues must be identical and not merely related.⁸ The court of appeals did not hold that jurisdictional findings can never have preclusive effect; Sabrepoint simply did not conclusively show how those findings dispose of FPI's Texas theories, including that Sabrepoint intended, knew, or should have known that Mathews would publish an article, which bear on its defamation, interference, and disparagement claims.⁹ The two entities that were not defendants in Colorado add an independent reason for reversal, since the Colorado court could not have decided their involvement and Sabrepoint did not conclusively establish privity.¹⁰

Disposition

The Court affirmed the court of appeals' judgment as to the summary judgment on collateral estoppel, reversed its holding that the TCPA order was void, and remanded to the court of appeals to consider the merits of FPI's appeal from the TCPA dismissal.¹¹

Vote Breakdown

Majority Opinion by Justice Huddle

Joined by Blacklock, C.J., and Bland, Boyd, Busby, Devine, Lehrmann, Sullivan, and Young, JJ.