On December 30, 2014, Trey Salinas was driving an F-350 pickup on I-20 eastbound near Odessa with Jennifer Blake and her three children, in freezing rain after a weather advisory. Salinas lost control, crossed the 42-foot grassy median in two to three seconds and hit a Werner Enterprises 18-wheeler driven by Shiraz Ali, a trainee, traveling westbound at about 50 mph (43-45 mph at impact) below the speed limit, killing seven-year-old Zackery Blake and severely injuring the others; Brianna Blake was left a quadriplegic. Ali passed three accidents in the previous hour, did not check the weather and did not slow further, and the plaintiffs' expert said his split-second reaction was appropriate.¹

Jennifer Blake, Nathan Blake and Brianna Blake's guardian sued Werner and Ali; Werner admitted Ali was in the course and scope of his employment. The jury found Werner and Ali liable and apportioned 70% to Werner employees other than Ali, 14% to Ali and 16% to Salinas, awarding $16.5 million, $5 million and $68.2 million, and the trial court rendered judgment on the verdict. The en banc Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed over two dissents (672 S.W.3d 554). The Court granted review and heard argument December 3, 2024.¹

Petition for review from the en banc Fourteenth Court of Appeals after a jury trial; argued December 3, 2024.²

Whether Ali's negligence was a proximate cause of the injuries, and, if not, whether Werner can be liable on derivative or direct theories.¹

A no-liability-as-a-matter-of-law ruling against a jury verdict is proper when the law does not allow reasonable jurors to decide otherwise, crediting favorable evidence if reasonable jurors could.¹

Werner and Ali (Petitioners): Ali's negligence was not a proximate cause, he owed no duty in these circumstances, Werner cannot be liable for negligent training or other derivative theories, the Court should adopt the admission rule, and the charge and apportionment findings are flawed.

Blakes (Respondents): Ali's excessive speed for icy conditions was a but-for and proximate cause because he would have avoided the collision or lessened injuries at fifteen miles per hour, and he knew passenger vehicles slide on ice.¹

Not applicable to the Court's decision; the opinion does not recite the petition's cert-worthiness arguments.

• Duty or causation. Asked whether framing it as duty or foreseeability matters, petitioners' counsel said they reach the same place, but duty is a legal question that can end cases on summary judgment. (Oral Argument, 0:08:11)
• Cause or condition. Asked how courts separate cause from condition in speeding cases, respondents' counsel said speed is a substantial factor if a reasonable speed would have let the driver avoid the collision. (Oral Argument, 0:30:14)
• Speed on ice. Asked whether it is established that an 18-wheeler should go 15 miles per hour or less on ice, respondents' counsel said yes, citing evidence that others drove 15 to 20. (Oral Argument, 0:29:05)
• Cross-median crashes. Asked whether the driver had seen other cars spin across the median, respondents' counsel said no, but he passed crashes resulting from cross-median collisions, with cars off the road. (Oral Argument, 0:25:13)
• Duty once spun out. Asked whether Ali owed a duty once Salinas spun out, petitioners' counsel said yes, and the court of appeals assumed he met it in the two seconds he had. (Oral Argument, 0:11:53)
• Six-week trial. Asked about a juror's remark that a car wreck case would not take four weeks, petitioners' counsel said it took six weeks, mostly on Werner's training, supervision, and policies. (Oral Argument, 0:15:05)
• No median. Asked how the argument changes with a narrower median or none, petitioners' counsel said most interstates have medians of 25 or 30 feet, and the older cases involved two-lane roads. (Oral Argument, 0:09:46)

None noted

Holding

Ali's negligence was not a substantial factor in causing the injuries as a matter of law, so the sole proximate cause was Salinas's loss of control, and the claims against Werner fail with it.¹

Reasoning

Proximate cause requires cause in fact (but-for plus substantial-factor causation) and foreseeability, and the substantial-factor element carries "the idea of responsibility." The Court assumed Ali was negligent and a but-for cause, but his conduct merely created the condition for the injury, a "happenstance of place and time" like the defendants in Lear Siegler and IHS Cedars, while the pickup's sudden crossing of a wide median was the sole substantial factor. Biggers v. Continental Bus System, decided on foreseeability and involving a narrow two-lane bridge crossing with 3.5 seconds of reaction time, is distinguishable and Baumler v. Hazelwood, where the driver had a split second, is closer; each driver on a divided highway bears responsibility to keep control and stay on his side, and the holding is limited to allocating fault between two colliding drivers and does not reach design-defect or other claims. Werner's derivative and "direct" theories rest on Ali's negligence being a proximate cause, as in Endeavor Energy Resources v. Cuevas for negligent hiring.²

Disposition

Court of appeals' judgment reversed and judgment rendered for Werner and Ali.³

Vote Breakdown

Opinion by Chief Justice Blacklock, joined by Justices Devine, Busby, Young, and Sullivan. Justice Young, joined by Justice Huddle, concurred to say the Court's holding leaves the admission rule undecided but that Justice Wilson's court-of-appeals dissent seems presumptively correct, and to caution trial courts not to defeat the rule merely by a pleaded gross-negligence claim.⁴ Justice Bland, joined by Justices Boyd and Huddle, joined the reversal but dissented from the rendition, saying some evidence that Ali's speed contributed to the severity of the injuries supported a proportionate share and the case should be remanded because the charge and evidence of untenable liability theories misled the jury.⁵ Justice Lehrmann did not participate.⁶