Carlos "C.Y." Benavides Jr., a Laredo patriarch with substantial assets, including as a beneficiary of the Benavides Family Mineral Trust, married his fourth wife, Leticia Russo, on September 11, 2004; each signed a pre-marital agreement and a post-marital agreement stipulating that no community property would be created and that each spouse's separate property would remain theirs.¹ About seven months after the wedding Carlos filed for divorce, a physician diagnosed him with dementia while it was pending, and the suit was dismissed for want of prosecution in 2007; Leticia says Carlos changed his mind, and his daughter Linda Cristina Benavides Alexander says his worsening dementia kept him from pursuing it.² Disputes between Leticia and Linda led to numerous lawsuits, including a guardianship proceeding in which Carlos's 2011 will leaving everything to Leticia was held void for his incapacity, and in March 2013 the guardianship court gave the guardians power to "file, prosecute or defend any litigation, including divorce proceedings on [Carlos's] behalf," without expressly finding that a divorce would be in his best interest.³ Linda moved Carlos into a house on her property, and in 2016 she became permanent guardian of his person and estate.⁴

In March 2018, Linda filed the Third Divorce Proceeding, in which the trial court granted partial summary judgments enforcing the marital agreements and rendered a divorce on the ground that the spouses had lived apart without cohabitation for at least three years.¹ Leticia appealed, and Carlos died about two weeks later; Linda then offered a 1996 will leaving everything to her and her brothers for probate, Leticia offered the 2011 will, and the will-contest appeal has been abated pending this one.² The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal as moot but affirmed the decree.³ Leticia petitioned for review on July 26, 2023, and Linda, as guardian, responded on September 29, 2023; the Court requested merits briefing on November 10, 2023, and granted the petition on June 14, 2024, heard argument on September 10, 2024, and decided the case on April 25, 2025.⁴

Petition for review from the Fourth Court of Appeals in an appeal from a divorce decree whose spouse died while the appeal was pending; argued September 10, 2024, and decided April 25, 2025, with a concurring opinion.⁵

Leticia presents whether a divorce may validly be granted based solely on an interested party's having kept the couple involuntarily separated for three years, whether Carlos's death mooted her appeal despite the effect on the parties' property rights under Dunn v. Dunn, and, if it did, whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the decree instead of vacating it.¹ The Court decided that Carlos's death did not moot the appeal, did not definitively decide whether a guardian may seek a divorce for a ward, and did not reach the living-apart issue.²

Mootness is a jurisdictional question; an appeal is moot when the court's action on the merits cannot affect the rights of the parties, and the Court considers whether the way the marriage ended significantly affects a spouse's property rights.¹

Whether Carlos's death mooted the appeal.

Petitioner (Leticia): The court of appeals misframed the jurisdictional question: under Dunn, before holding an appeal from a divorce decree moot a court must compare the parties' property rights if the marriage ended by decree with their rights if it ended by death.¹ She argued that the decree defeats her rights under the 2011 will, and the Court recorded that she conceded at argument that the will was the only property right she relied on.²

Respondent (Linda, as guardian): The petition raises no issue warranting review, because the court of appeals correctly held the dissolution issue moot on Carlos's death, and the Dunn test and the court of appeals' test are merely different ways of saying the same thing.³ She also argued that courts have already held the 2011 will invalid, though she conceded at argument that under Dunn the appeal is not moot.⁴

Whether the divorce decree was valid.

Petitioner (Leticia): The decree was invalid because it was procured by an interested party who kept Carlos and Leticia involuntarily separated for more than three years; the great weight of authority holds that a guardian cannot obtain a divorce for her ward without evidence of the ward's own intent, and the living-apart statute requires voluntariness.⁵

Respondent (Linda, as guardian): The guardianship court authorized the guardian to obtain the divorce, Texas law does not require that a totally incapacitated ward consent, and if it did, Carlos's earlier suit for divorce satisfied the requirement; in a no-fault, living-apart divorce the reason for the separation is irrelevant.⁶

Leticia argued that the court of appeals misframed the jurisdictional question, contrary to Dunn, and that the guardian's financial interest in the outcome provides a compelling reason for the Court to place Texas in the mainstream of nationwide authority on guardians' authority to obtain divorces.¹ Linda responded that the petition raises no issue warranting review and is not an appropriate vehicle.²

• Best-interest finding. Asked whether the record has a best-interest finding allowing the guardian to start the divorce, Linda's counsel said without the guardianship record the Court should presume proper exercise of discretion. (Oral Argument, 0:33:39; 0:34:44)
• What is at stake. Asked what the divorce being final prevents Leticia from seeking, Linda's counsel said setting it aside would also undo the summary judgments on the premarital and postmarital agreements. (Oral Argument, 0:36:20)
• Death after judgment. Asked what happens if the judgment is set aside after death, Linda's counsel said a community estate would exist for the whole period of the appeal. (Oral Argument, 0:37:57)
• Guardian and marriage. Asked whether a guardian could marry a ward off with court approval, Linda's counsel said guardianship law lets a guardian prosecute or defend claims but says nothing explicit about marrying. (Oral Argument, 0:30:41)
• Remedy. Pressed on the remedy, Leticia's counsel said the court of appeals erred and the marriage should be reinstated. (Oral Argument, 0:03:44)
• Living apart. Justice Lehrmann asked what evidence shows a ward's wishes; Leticia's counsel pointed to a decision combining the living-apart statute and a guardian-initiated divorce, asking whether the leaving was voluntary. (Oral Argument, 0:12:19)
• Earlier divorce filing. Asked what to make of Carlos's divorce filing a year after the marriage, Leticia's counsel said it is hard to make much of it, and it does not matter legally. (Oral Argument, 0:15:03)

• Wolfgang P. Hirczy de Mino of Bellaire, Texas filed an amicus curiae letter brief on April 25, 2025.

Holding

Carlos's death did not moot Leticia's appeal because whether the marriage ended by decree or by death substantially affects her asserted rights under the 2011 will; and to whatever extent the Estates Code permits a guardian to seek a divorce for a ward, it at least requires the guardianship court and the divorce court to find that pursuing and granting the divorce serves the ward's best interests and well-being, which neither court found and neither can now find, so the decree is vacated and the suit dismissed.¹

Reasoning

Mootness. A marriage may be terminated only by death or a court decree, and a divorce suit is moot if a spouse dies before judgment, but when a spouse dies after a valid decree the marriage ended by decree, so a live controversy remains if the way it ended significantly affects a spouse's property rights.² Under the Estates Code a divorce before death would cause a former spouse's provisions in a will to be read as if she had failed to survive the testator, so the decree would defeat Leticia's claim under the 2011 will but she would be a surviving spouse if it were invalid.³ No court has issued a final, non-appealable judgment that both declares the 2011 will invalid and binds Leticia, because she was dismissed from the guardianship for lack of standing, the will-contest appeal is abated, and the earlier capacity ruling was only a pretrial determination about the attorney's authority.⁴ The appeal was therefore not moot.⁵

A guardian's authority to seek divorce. Wahlenmaier said in 1988 that a guardian ad litem or next friend can exercise a mentally ill person's right to obtain a divorce, but it was a per curiam decision without analysis, and the ward there had initiated the divorce before becoming incompetent.⁶ The Court surveyed other states, where the traditional majority rule bars a guardian from seeking divorce absent statutory authorization because divorce is purely personal, some courts allow it when the ward expressed intent, and a growing trend allows it, and it recognized the competing policy concerns as a choice for the Legislature.⁷ The Estates Code is unclear: section 1151.101(a)(4) lets a guardian of the estate bring and defend suits by the ward, while section 1151.104(a) lists only two kinds of suits, and the Family Code recognizes a guardian's suit for annulment, so the Court invited the Legislature to clarify but did not definitively decide.⁸

Two limits. The Court held that, to whatever extent the Estates Code permits a divorce suit by a guardian, the guardianship court must expressly grant that authority, because a ward retains all legal rights except those specifically granted to the guardian, and the divorce must be in the ward's best interest, which the guardianship court and the divorce court must each expressly find.⁹ Neither court made those findings here, and because Carlos has died, Linda can no longer obtain them, so the Court vacated the decree and dismissed the suit without deciding the authority issue.¹⁰ The Court did not reach Leticia's argument that the living-apart ground requires a voluntary separation, noting that the Legislature may wish to clarify section 6.006.¹¹

Concurrence (Chief Justice Blacklock, joined by Justice Devine and Justice Sullivan). He joined the opinion in full but wrote that the traditional view treats divorce as an expression of the will of the spouse that no guardian or judge can supply, said Texas followed that view for most of its history until Wahlenmaier, and said he found the traditional view compelling and that the Court may adopt it in a future case.¹²

Disposition

The Court reversed the court of appeals' judgment finding the appeal moot, vacated the trial court's divorce decree, and dismissed the suit.¹³

Vote Breakdown

Majority Opinion by Justice Boyd

Joined by Blacklock, C.J., and Bland, Busby, Devine, Huddle, Lehrmann, Sullivan, and Young, JJ.

Concurrence by Chief Justice Blacklock

Joined by Devine and Sullivan, JJ.