A 1997 federal consent decree barred the federal government from housing illegal-immigrant minors in residential facilities lacking a valid state license, and in 2015 a federal court held that the government breached it by housing mothers and children in the unlicensed Dilley and Karnes facilities in Texas.¹ The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (DFPS) responded with a rule, adopted on an emergency basis in 2015 and finalized in March 2016, creating licensing requirements for "family residential centers," which allows adults and children to share bedrooms in some circumstances and more than four occupants per bedroom in others.² Grassroots Leadership, Inc., detainee mothers on behalf of themselves and their children, and a day-care operator challenged the rule, alleging that Dilley and Karnes allowed unrelated adults and children to share bedrooms, that one mother's child was sexually assaulted, and that the rule increased safety risks and lengthened detention.³ The operators, CoreCivic and GEO Group, intervened to defend the rule.⁴

The plaintiffs sought a declaration under the Administrative Procedure Act that DFPS lacked authority to adopt the rule and an injunction; the trial court declared the rule invalid, the Third Court of Appeals reversed for lack of standing, and in 2022 the Court reversed and remanded.¹ On remand, the court of appeals held the mothers' claims moot because none remained detained, rejected the capable-of-repetition exception, but invoked a "public-interest exception" to reach the merits and held the rule invalid.² DFPS and the Texas Health and Human Services entities, CoreCivic, and GEO Group each petitioned for review on May 10, 2023, and Grassroots responded on October 13, 2023; the Court requested merits briefing on December 15, 2023, granted the petitions on August 30, 2024, heard argument on October 31, 2024, and decided the case on May 30, 2025, with Chief Justice Blacklock and Justice Sullivan not participating.³

Three petitions for review from the Third Court of Appeals in a suit for declaratory and injunctive relief under the Administrative Procedure Act; argued October 31, 2024, and decided May 30, 2025.⁴

DFPS presents whether Texas law recognizes a "public-interest exception" to mootness and, if the Court reaches the merits, whether the rule is valid under the Administrative Procedure Act.¹ CoreCivic and GEO Group raise the same mootness question and also whether the Human Resources Code's definition of a child-care facility lets DFPS regulate the centers.² Grassroots presents whether the Court can reach the public-interest exception at all, because the case is not moot or falls within an exception, and whether the court of appeals correctly held the rule invalid.³ The Court decided whether the claims are moot, whether the capable-of-repetition exception applies, and whether Texas courts may adjudicate moot cases under a public-interest exception.⁴

Justiciability, including mootness, is a jurisdictional limit that the Court decides for itself, and a court always has jurisdiction to determine its own and the lower courts' jurisdiction; mootness is assessed in two steps, asking whether the case is moot on its face and, if so, whether an exception shows that it remains live.¹

Whether the claims are moot and whether a public-interest exception exists.

Petitioners (DFPS, CoreCivic, and GEO Group): The claims are moot because no plaintiff is detained or likely to return to the facilities, the court of appeals' public-interest exception is a doctrine of its own creation that departs from nearly 150 years of precedent and violates the Constitution's limits on advisory opinions, and the Court should reject it.¹

Respondents (Grassroots and the mothers): The Court cannot reach the public-interest exception because the claims are not moot, since the federal government may re-detain the mothers at any time, or are saved by the capable-of-repetition exception; if the exception is needed, the court of appeals correctly applied it and correctly held that DFPS lacked authority for the rule.²

The petitioners argued that the court of appeals defied nearly 150 years of precedent by applying a mootness doctrine of its own creation, and that a split of authority among the courts of appeals on whether the public-interest exception is valid is ripe for review (Petition for Review (Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, et al), PDF p. 19; Petition for Review #2 (Corrections Corporation of America (CoreCivic)), PDF p. 19; Petition for Review #3 (GEO Group, Inc), PDF p. 22). They also argued that the court of appeals misconstrued the Human Resources Code in holding that DFPS could not regulate facilities where parents are housed with their children.¹

• Wolfgang P. Hirczy de Miño of Bellaire, Texas filed an amicus curiae letter on May 30, 2025.

Holding

Mootness is a constitutional justiciability limit rooted in the judicial power and the other provisions of the Texas Constitution; the claims are moot on their face and the capable-of-repetition exception does not save them; and there is no "public-interest exception" to mootness in Texas, so the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to reach the merits.¹

Reasoning

Mootness is constitutional. Justiciability doctrines ensure that courts exercise only the "judicial power," which does not include rendering advisory opinions, and the Court identified five constitutional provisions that bear on it: the judicial-power clause in article V, section 1, the "cases" requirement of article V, section 3(a), the separation-of-powers clause in article II, section 1, the legal-advice provision for the attorney general in article IV, section 22, and the open-courts provision in article I, section 13.² Only a constitutional amendment, article V, section 3-c, lets the Court answer certified questions from federal courts, which shows that other advisory opinions remain barred, and the Court reaffirmed that a moot case should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.³

Facial mootness. The mothers' claim concerns the validity of a state licensing rule, and all agree that none remains detained, so the case is moot on its face unless a non-speculative basis shows that a judgment would still affect them.⁴ The possibility that the federal government might re-detain them is not enough, because the claim requires that all four events occur: a decision to re-detain, re-detention at Dilley or Karnes, with a minor child, and for longer than the consent decree allows, and Grassroots's expert's testimony showed re-detention to be only a remote possibility.⁵ The dismissal is without prejudice, so a plaintiff who is actually re-detained could refile.⁶

Exceptions. The "exceptions" to mootness are not true exceptions but ways of identifying disputes that remain live, such as collateral consequences and capable of repetition.⁷ The capable-of-repetition exception requires that the challenged action be too short to be litigated and a reasonable expectation that the same party will be subjected to it again; the first prong was met, since detention averages eleven days, but the second was not for the reasons above.⁸

No public-interest exception. The public-interest exception differs in kind from the recognized exceptions because it would let courts adjudicate non-live disputes, which guarantees an advisory opinion; each of the constitutional provisions confirms that conclusion, and other states' decisions rest on different constitutional texts.⁹ The Court adopted as a holding the statement in Morath v. Lewis that it has no power to decide moot cases whether or not they involve a matter of public concern, held that the exception violates the Texas Constitution, and disapproved cases that relied on it.¹⁰ Because the court of appeals lacked authority to reach the merits, the Court vacated its merits judgment and the trial court's orders and judgment.¹¹

Disposition

The Court reversed the court of appeals' judgment in part, vacated the judgments of the court of appeals and the trial court, and dismissed the case without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.¹²

Vote Breakdown

Majority Opinion by Justice Young

Joined by Bland, Boyd, Busby, Devine, Huddle, and Lehrmann, JJ.

Did Not Participate

Blacklock, C.J., and Sullivan, J.