Rita Oteka, a faculty member of The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley (UTRGV), voluntarily attended a commencement ceremony to support former students and was struck and injured by a vehicle driven by a University police officer while walking to her car.¹ The University, a self-insured employer for workers' compensation purposes, reported the injury to its claims administrator, which denied benefits because Oteka was seeking treatment under her own insurance, no supporting medical evidence was presented, and the injury did not arise out of and in the course and scope of her employment.² Oteka never contested the denial or filed a compensation claim with the Division of Workers' Compensation.³

More than a year later Oteka sued the police officer for negligence, and the University substituted in as defendant under a Rule 11 agreement and asserted the exclusive-remedy defense for the first time placing in dispute whether her injury was work-related; the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on it.¹ Thirty-one months after the incident, the claims administrator reversed course and wrote that the injury "has been accepted as compensable," and the next day the University filed a plea to the jurisdiction arguing that the Division has exclusive jurisdiction over the course-and-scope issue and that Oteka failed to exhaust administrative remedies.² The trial court denied the plea, and the court of appeals affirmed, holding that the Division's exclusive jurisdiction does not extend to every case that touches on workers' compensation and that Oteka's suit is not based on her eligibility for benefits.³ The University petitioned for review on May 12, 2023, and Oteka responded on October 6, 2023; the Court requested merits briefing on November 10, 2023, granted the petition on December 20, 2024, heard argument on February 20, 2025, and decided the case on June 13, 2025.⁴

Petition for review from the Thirteenth Court of Appeals in an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a plea to the jurisdiction; argued February 20, 2025, and decided June 13, 2025.⁵

The University presents whether an employee's failure to exhaust her administrative remedies under the Workers' Compensation Act deprives a trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction over her personal-injury claims when the employee and employer dispute whether the injury was sustained in the course and scope of employment.¹ Oteka presents whether an employee with non-work-related injury claims who is not seeking benefits must seek administrative review from the Division when the University had stipulated that she was not in the course and scope of employment and by agreement was substituted for the tortfeasor.² The Court decided whether the Division has exclusive jurisdiction to determine the course-and-scope issue when an employer raises it as an exclusive-remedy defense.³

Whether an agency has exclusive jurisdiction is a question of statutory interpretation reviewed de novo, and a party resisting a district court's jurisdiction in favor of an agency's must make a compelling showing that the Legislature divested the court of jurisdiction, by an express grant of exclusive original jurisdiction or a pervasive regulatory scheme.¹

Whether the Division has exclusive jurisdiction over the course-and-scope issue.

Petitioner (the University): The Division has exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether Oteka's injuries occurred in the course and scope of her employment and are compensable, so even though she contends they did not, she must exhaust her administrative remedies before a court can address the issue.¹ At argument the University agreed that abatement, not dismissal, would be an appropriate remedy.²

Respondent (Oteka): The court of appeals' decision is consistent with Texas precedent and does not threaten the Legislature's grant of authority to the agency, her suit is for a nonwork-related injury and does not turn on entitlement to benefits, and the University's own administrator initially said her injury was outside the course and scope of her employment.³

The University cited a line of courts of appeals' decisions holding that the Division's exclusive jurisdiction over compensability encompasses the course-and-scope issue, and Oteka pointed to competing authority; the Court granted review to resolve that split of authority.¹ The University's petition asked whether an employee's failure to exhaust administrative remedies deprives the district court of subject-matter jurisdiction over her personal-injury claims.²

• No statutory text. Asked what language gives the Division exclusive jurisdiction, the University's counsel conceded that language is not in the statute but said courts read entitlement to benefits as the Division's province. (Oral Argument, 0:14:34)
• Compensability and her claim. Asked why compensability and course and scope do not fall within the Division's exclusive jurisdiction, Oteka's counsel said her negligence claim does not hinge on compensability or entitlement to benefits. (Oral Argument, 0:33:48)
• Abatement. Asked if abating the suit for the Division would be proper, Oteka's counsel said she would hope so; the University's counsel later said abatement, not dismissal with prejudice, should happen. (Oral Argument, 0:38:31; 0:40:05)
• Does a denial exhaust? Asked why the carrier's denial letter did not exhaust the process, the University's counsel said an initial acceptance or denial is only the first step in the administrative process. (Oral Argument, 0:42:12; 0:42:44)
• Who decides first. Asked who decides first if an employer argues course and scope, the University's counsel said the Division, and pointed to sanctions in Labor Code chapter 415. (Oral Argument, 0:09:45)
• Rule 11 agreement. Asked what her Rule 11 agreement letting the employer step in means, Oteka's counsel said Tort Claims Act substitution is not negotiable; it acknowledged only the officer's course and scope. (Oral Argument, 0:25:17)
• Private-insurance hypothetical. Asked how a case where an employee declines benefits for private insurance comes out, Oteka's counsel said it depends on whether the adjuster accepts or denies a claim. (Oral Argument, 0:29:01; 0:30:03)
• Section 410.001. Asked to read the statutory language behind the brief's citation to Labor Code section 410.001, the University's counsel turned to section 410.251 and judicial review after the Division process. (Oral Argument, 0:16:42; 0:17:52)

• Texas Mutual Insurance Company filed an amicus curiae brief on June 13, 2024, which the opinion describes as arguing that exclusive jurisdiction must lie with the Division.¹
• Brad McClellan filed an amicus brief on February 7, 2025.
• Wolfgang Hirczy de Mino filed an amicus brief on June 16, 2025.

Holding

The Division of Workers' Compensation does not have exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether an injury occurred in the course and scope of employment when the employer raises the issue as an affirmative defense outside the compensability context and the employee's requested relief does not depend on entitlement to benefits, so the district court retains jurisdiction and Oteka need not first exhaust administrative remedies.¹

Reasoning

Burden and framework. The Texas Constitution vests district courts with jurisdiction over all actions unless exclusive jurisdiction is conferred on another tribunal, an agency has only the powers expressly conferred, and the University therefore had to show an express grant or a pervasive regulatory scheme that makes the administrative process the exclusive means of resolving the issue.² The Division has exclusive jurisdiction to determine a claimant's entitlement to benefits, and an employee may not circumvent it with a suit predicated on entitlement to benefits, but not every claim against an employer does that, and Oteka's damages are not predicated on benefits and it was uncontested when she sued that her injury was outside the course and scope of her employment.³

No exclusive jurisdiction. The University acknowledged that the Legislature enacted no express language granting the Division exclusive jurisdiction over the exclusive-remedy defense, and the exclusive-remedy provision will bar damages if the injury is work-related regardless of who decides.⁴ The Act has no procedural mechanism for an employee or employer to obtain a course-and-scope finding without the employee first filing a compensation claim for benefits she neither seeks nor believes she is entitled to, so the University's theory would require her to defeat her own claim in order to exhaust her remedies, which does not reflect a legislative intent that the administrative process be the exclusive means.⁵ The Court's earlier decisions, such as Walls Regional Hospital v. Bomar, reached the merits of the exclusive-remedy defense without requiring exhaustion, which is persuasive support.⁶ The Court disapproved the courts of appeals' contrary holdings.⁷

Safeguards and abatement. The Court said its holding does not diminish the exclusive-remedy provision: the Act requires a compensation claim within a year of injury, absent good cause, so an employee who wants to preserve both options should file a claim and a mere desire to pursue a larger tort recovery first would not be good cause, and when parallel proceedings are pending the trial court may abate on prudential grounds.⁸ Because no parallel proceeding was pending and the University sought only dismissal until oral argument, the Court did not decide whether abatement would be warranted here.⁹

Disposition

The Court affirmed the court of appeals' judgment.¹⁰

Vote Breakdown

Majority Opinion by Justice Devine

Joined by Blacklock, C.J., and Bland, Boyd, Busby, Huddle, Lehrmann, Sullivan, and Young, JJ.