Boeing introduced the 737 MAX in 2011, presenting it as more fuel-efficient than earlier 737 models but similar enough that pilots could fly it with no additional training, and after crashes in October 2018 and March 2019 killed all 346 people on the two planes, the FAA grounded it.¹ The Southwest Airlines Pilots Association (SWAPA), a nonprofit labor organization representing about 11,000 Southwest pilots, had agreed on its members' behalf in a new collective bargaining agreement (CBA) in 2016 that they would fly the MAX.² Under the 2006 CBA, which became amendable in 2012, SWAPA and Southwest disputed for years whether the pilots had to fly the MAX, and in 2016 SWAPA sued Southwest in federal court.³ SWAPA alleges that Boeing inserted itself into the settlement negotiations and falsely assured it that the MAX was essentially a more fuel-efficient version of the 737 that pilots could fly without additional training, and that it relied on those misrepresentations in agreeing to the 2016 CBA, which explicitly required the pilots to fly the MAX.⁴ After the crashes and the grounding, Southwest cancelled hundreds of flights and the pilots were left without planes to fly.⁵

SWAPA sued Boeing in state court for fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation, tortious interference, negligence, and fraud by nondisclosure, seeking damages on its own behalf and on behalf of its members; Boeing removed the case arguing that the Railway Labor Act completely preempts the claims, and the federal court remanded.¹ In state court, Boeing filed a plea to the jurisdiction on preemption and associational standing, and 8,794 SWAPA members then assigned their claims against Boeing to SWAPA; Boeing amended its plea to argue the assignments are void as against public policy, and the trial court granted the plea and dismissed the claims with prejudice.² The Fifth Court of Appeals held that the Act does not preempt the claims, that SWAPA lacks associational standing for its members' claims, that SWAPA has standing for its own claims, and that the assignments are not void, and it modified the judgment to dismiss the representative claims without prejudice.³ Boeing petitioned for review on October 19, 2022, and SWAPA responded on February 1, 2023; the Court requested merits briefing on March 10, 2023, and the briefs were filed on June 9, July 28, and October 13, 2023 (Docket). The Court denied the petition on May 31, 2024, but granted Boeing's motion for rehearing and the petition on January 10, 2025, heard argument on March 19, 2025, and decided the case on June 20, 2025.⁴

Petition for review from the Fifth Court of Appeals in an interlocutory appeal from a ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction; the petition was first denied and then granted on rehearing, and the case was argued March 19, 2025, and decided June 20, 2025, with an opinion dissenting in part.⁵

Boeing presents whether the Railway Labor Act preempts SWAPA's claims, which it says require interpretation of collective bargaining agreements, and whether SWAPA has standing to bring its members' claims through pass-through assignments despite the statute barring associational standing when individual members' participation is required.¹ SWAPA presents whether the Act applies to a dispute between a non-carrier and a non-employee, whether it would preempt claims that require no interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement, and whether the assignments confer standing.² The Court decided preemption and whether the assignments are void as against public policy.³

Whether a federal statute preempts a state-law claim is a question of congressional intent, focusing first on the statutory language, and under Supreme Court decisions the Act preempts a state-law claim only when its resolution is substantially dependent on analysis of the terms of a collective bargaining agreement.¹

Whether the Railway Labor Act preempts SWAPA's claims.

Petitioner (Boeing): The Act expressly preempts claims whose resolution requires interpreting the 2006 and 2016 CBAs, even when asserted against a third party, and SWAPA cannot prevail unless a court determines whether the 2006 CBA already required the pilots to fly the MAX.¹

Respondent (SWAPA): The Act's dispute-resolution mechanism covers disputes between carriers by air and their employees, so it does not apply to a suit against a non-carrier, and in any event no element of the claims requires interpreting a CBA, since they concern whether Boeing's misrepresentations induced SWAPA to agree to fly the MAX in 2016.²

Whether the assignments give SWAPA standing for its members' claims.

Petitioner (Boeing): The assignments are void as against public policy because their sole purpose is to circumvent the statutory limit on associational standing and the class-action requirements.³

Respondent (SWAPA): The Business Organizations Code's plain terms govern, and the assignments are valid, giving SWAPA standing as assignee.⁴

Boeing argued that the court of appeals' opinion is a national outlier on preemption under the Railway Labor Act, contrary to federal decisions, and lets unions avoid Texas public policy on associational standing.¹ SWAPA responded that Boeing identifies no issue of importance to Texas jurisprudence, because Texas appellate opinions on the Act arise rarely and federal courts provide ample guidance.²

• Fraud stands alone. Asked whether the lemon defense requires construing the collective bargaining agreement, SWAPA's counsel said no: the fraudulent-inducement claim stands alone, because Boeing's lie impaired its decision. (Oral Argument, 0:35:44)
• Duties from state law. Asked why the Court should not focus on whether duties arise from state tort law, Boeing's counsel said the interference and fraud claims arise directly from the collective bargaining agreements. (Oral Argument, 0:10:46; 0:11:51)
• Rights to interfere with. Asked what legal rights were subject to interference, Boeing's counsel said SWAPA claims it was induced to give up rights under the 2006 agreement that Boeing says it never had. (Oral Argument, 0:15:48)
• Standing conceded. Asked whether Boeing concedes SWAPA may pursue claims on its own behalf, Boeing's counsel said yes, so for those claims the Court need address only preemption. (Oral Argument, 0:02:49)
• Remedial gap. Boeing's counsel acknowledged a remedial gap in very few cases, saying the cases the Court was given recognize it. (Oral Argument, 0:09:01)
• Assignee aligned. Asked whether the Court has recognized assignments to a newly created entity, SWAPA's counsel said no, but the association here is aligned with the individuals. (Oral Argument, 0:41:14)

• The Chamber of Commerce filed an amicus brief on October 27, 2022, at the petition stage, and filed an amicus curiae letter on June 20, 2023.

Holding

The Railway Labor Act does not preempt SWAPA's claims because their resolution is not substantially dependent on interpreting the 2006 or 2016 collective bargaining agreements; the assignments are not void as against public policy and give SWAPA standing to pursue its assigning members' claims as assignee, so the court of appeals did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the representative claims without prejudice.¹

Reasoning

Preemption. The Court agreed with the court of appeals but for a different reason, and it did not decide whether the Act applies to disputes with third parties, noting that most courts hold that it preempts all state-law claims that require interpreting a carrier-employee CBA even when the dispute involves only one or neither party.² Under Hawaiian Airlines v. Norris, the Act preempts a state-law claim only when its resolution is substantially dependent on analysis of a CBA, and a claim is not preempted if it can be resolved independent of any negotiated labor agreement.³ SWAPA's claims turn on whether Boeing's misrepresentations induced SWAPA to agree in the 2016 CBA to fly the MAX, and Boeing identified no provision of that CBA that a court would have to interpret.⁴ Boeing argued that the 2006 CBA might already have required the pilots to fly the MAX, but the pilots never flew it under that CBA, the 2006 CBA was amendable in 2012, and SWAPA was not obliged to agree to fly the MAX in 2016, so the claims do not depend on the 2006 CBA, and purely factual questions about SWAPA's reliance do not require interpreting a CBA.⁵ The federal court's remand statement that the claims require interpreting the CBA does not bind the Court.⁶

Assignments. SWAPA did not petition for review of the holding denying associational standing and so waived any argument for it.⁷ Causes of action are generally assignable unless that violates public policy, and the Gandy line voids assignments that distort litigation, but these assignments do not make litigation more protracted, the claims are property-based and remedial, and SWAPA negotiated the CBA and allegedly relied on Boeing's misrepresentations.⁸ The Court declined to extend Gandy, noting that the Legislature barred associational standing where individual participation is required but did not bar assignments to an association, and that associational standing, class-action standing, and assignment are alternative means of standing.⁹ As assignee, SWAPA must prove each assigning pilot's reliance and damages and may not use the assignments to circumvent the rules for associational standing, and the Court did not decide whether the claims must be joined, consolidated, severed, or tried separately.¹⁰

Dissent in part (Justice Bland, joined by Justice Huddle). She joined the preemption holding but not Part III, because assignment law should cohere with the Business Organizations Code, which does not let an association pursue claims on its members' behalf when their individual participation is required, and the Court's holding permits an association to do through 8,794 assignments what the statute forbids; she would reinstate the trial court's dismissal with prejudice of the representative damages claims.¹¹

Disposition

The Court affirmed the court of appeals' judgment remanding the case to the trial court for further proceedings on the claims SWAPA asserts on its own behalf, and left in place the modification dismissing the representative claims without prejudice.¹²

Vote Breakdown

Majority Opinion by Justice Boyd

Joined by Blacklock, C.J., and Busby, Devine, Lehrmann, Sullivan, and Young, JJ.

Dissent in Part by Justice Bland

Joined by Huddle, J.