Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP, through attorneys Barrett Howell and Ryan Meyer, represented James Courville in a criminal investigation. John Grisham and Rob Wilburn were also subjects of the same investigation, but represented by their own separate counsel; the various parties and their respective counsel coordinated some aspects of their defense (an alleged oral joint defense agreement). Courville was ultimately not indicted; Grisham and Wilburn were indicted, though the charges against them were later dismissed before trial.
After the charges against them were dismissed, Grisham and Wilburn sued the Katten attorneys for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, DTPA violations, negligence, aiding and abetting, and negligent hiring/supervision/retention, based on the attorneys' conduct during the joint-defense coordination. The Katten attorneys moved to dismiss under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a, arguing all of the challenged conduct was undertaken while representing Courville and is protected by attorney immunity. The 160th District Court of Dallas County (Hon. Aiesha Redmond) denied the motion without explanation. The Fifth Court of Appeals denied mandamus relief by memorandum opinion. The Katten attorneys sought mandamus in the Supreme Court, which set the case for oral argument on February 10, 2027.
Relators (Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP, Barrett Howell, and Ryan Meyer): Texas attorney-immunity doctrine broadly shields lawyers from civil liability to non-clients for conduct undertaken representing a client, precisely to ensure loyal, zealous advocacy without lawyers having to weigh their own liability exposure against their client's interests. Every one of Plaintiffs' claims -- fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, DTPA, breach of contract, negligence, and the rest -- arises entirely from conduct within the attorneys' representation of Courville in an adversarial criminal investigation; co-subjects of a criminal investigation are inherently adverse to one another regardless of any coordination between their separate counsel. Denying dismissal here, and forcing the attorneys to litigate the claims on the merits, is exactly the outcome the immunity doctrine exists to prevent, and there's no adequate remedy by ordinary appeal once that litigation burden has been imposed.
Real Parties in Interest (John E. Grisham and Rob Wilburn): The relationship between the Katten attorneys, their client, and Plaintiffs was not sufficiently adversarial under this Court's Haynes & Boone, LLP v. NFTD, LLC framework to support attorney immunity, and none of the factors this Court identified in Barcelo v. Elliott as justifying immunity are present on these facts. An attorney who enters into a joint defense agreement -- even with someone who isn't formally the attorney's own client -- owes a fiduciary duty to each party to that agreement, which would make the attorneys directly liable regardless of immunity. Separately, immunity shouldn't apply where, as alleged here, the attorneys' conduct violated state and federal criminal statutes.
Not framed as a separate "reasons to grant" argument distinct from the mandamus prerequisites themselves (clear abuse of discretion and no adequate remedy on appeal); the petition does emphasize that if the decisions below stand, attorneys generally will be forced to weigh their own liability exposure against their clients' best interests whenever coordinating a joint defense.
professional-liability, civil-procedure
Original proceeding for writ of mandamus; Relator / Real Party in Interest. Set for oral argument February 10, 2027. Not yet decided.
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