# Merger Three, LLC v. City of Kemah Supreme Court of Texas, No. 26-0575 **Merger Three, LLC v. City of Kemah, No. 26-0575, is before the Supreme Court of Texas. Key issue: Does a general-law city "close" a street under Transportation Code section 311.008 and Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 65.015 when it bars public vehicular travel except for emergency vehicles?** Practice areas: real property, administrative law ## Key issues - Does a general-law city "close" a street under Transportation Code section 311.008 and Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 65.015 when it bars public vehicular travel except for emergency vehicles? - Was the court of appeals right to rely on Jordan v. Landry's Seafood Restaurant in holding that a resolution "restricting" traffic does not close a street? ## Factual History The City of Kemah, a general-law city, adopted a resolution restricting a block of Sixth Street between Kipp Avenue and Bradford Avenue to pedestrians and emergency vehicles (Petition for Review, PDF pp. 3, 11; Response to Petition, PDF p. 14). The abutting property owners and lessees (Merger Three, LLC; Voodoo Hut, LLC; 605, LLC; BK Stephens Investment, LLC; and The Greco, LLC) say that barricades physically blocked the street and that closing it without the unanimous consent of the abutting owners violates section 311.008 of the Transportation Code, which they say bars a general-law city from closing a street without the consent of all abutting owners (Petition for Review, PDF pp. 2-3, 19-20; Reply to Response, PDF p. 5). The City says it merely regulated traffic for public safety and did not vacate, abandon, or close the street (Response to Petition, PDF p. 14). ## Procedural History The owners sued to enjoin the closure under Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 65.015, and the 405th District Court of Galveston County (Judge Jared Robinson) granted a temporary injunction on November 1, 2024 (Petition for Review, PDF p. 11; Response to Petition, PDF p. 14). The Fourteenth Court of Appeals (Chief Justice Christopher, joined by Justices Wilson and Bridges) reversed on March 17, 2026, dissolved the injunction, and remanded, holding that the City had restricted rather than closed the street and that sections 311.008 and 65.015 therefore did not apply, relying on *Jordan v. Landry's Seafood Restaurant, Inc.*, 89 S.W.3d 737 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. denied) (Petition for Review, PDF pp. 11, 19-20; Response to Petition, PDF p. 14). This is a petition for review of an interlocutory order. The owners petitioned on June 19, 2026; the City responded August 10 and the owners replied August 25 (Docket). On October 23, 2026 the Court granted the petition and set the case for oral argument on March 3, 2027 (Docket). ## Issues Presented The owners present two issues: (1) whether the Fourteenth Court of Appeals erred when it "ignored established law and held that the street was not closed"; and (2) whether it erred in relying on *Jordan v. Landry's Seafood Restaurant, Inc.* (Petition for Review, PDF p. 13). ## Legal Arguments **Issue 1 (what it means to "close" a street)** **Petitioners (Merger Three, LLC, et al.):** The statutes do not define "close," and the Court has not addressed it. Because a "street" is defined as a publicly maintained way "any part of which is open to the public for vehicular travel," a street is closed when it is not open to the public for vehicular travel; the court of appeals adopted a definition under which a street stays open if a single vehicle of any kind can use it. They say their block was closed because public vehicular travel was prohibited and physically blocked (Petition for Review, PDF pp. 2-3, 19-20). **Respondent (City of Kemah):** Restricting access to pedestrians and emergency vehicles is a valid exercise of the City's power to regulate traffic on its streets, and restricting traffic is not closing a street. The court of appeals properly applied *Jordan*, and the Court denied review in that case (Response to Petition, PDF pp. 14-15). **Issue 2 (*Jordan*) and the alternative constitutional claims** **Petitioners:** *Jordan* misapplied an earlier decision of this Court and ignored the plain language of the resolution in that case, so the Fourteenth Court's reliance on it is error (Petition for Review, PDF p. 20). In reply they say the court read *Jordan* as setting a categorical rule that a street is not closed unless the ordinance says so, even if it is in fact closed, and neither the City nor the court defines when a street is closed (Reply to Response, PDF pp. 8-9). **Respondent (City):** The owners' alternative constitutional claims also fail because they retain access through adjacent streets, have no vested right to on-street parking or traffic volume, and allege only economic harm that damages could compensate, not a taking (Response to Petition, PDF pp. 14-15). ## Stated Reasons the Court Should Take the Case The owners say the Court has not explored what a closure means under the two statutes, the question is one of statutory interpretation with important consequences for abutting owners across Texas, and without the Court's guidance lower courts will misapply the law and cities will use "semantics to effectively close streets without calling it a closure" (Petition for Review, PDF pp. 2-3, 20). The City responds that the issue is not novel because the Houston court decided the same questions on similar facts in *Jordan* (Response to Petition, PDF p. 14). ## Amicus Involvement None --- Source: The SCOTX Report, https://scotxreport.com/cases/26-0575. AI-generated summary of the Court's opinion, orders and the parties' briefs, with pin cites to the page of each document; verify against the Court's own documents at search.txcourts.gov.