# Dallas County v. Leonard Supreme Court of Texas, No. 26-0128 **Dallas County v. Leonard, No. 26-0128, is before the Supreme Court of Texas. Key issue: When a governmental unit invokes the Tort Claims Act's emergency exception, must the plaintiff negate the emergency with affirmative evidence, and can a county courtesy-patrol officer's post-accident statements, a blank "on emergency" box on a crash report and a dispute over his lights raise a fact issue?** Practice areas: governmental immunity, personal injury ## Key issues - When a governmental unit invokes the Tort Claims Act's emergency exception, must the plaintiff negate the emergency with affirmative evidence, and can a county courtesy-patrol officer's post-accident statements, a blank "on emergency" box on a crash report and a dispute over his lights raise a fact issue? - Does a vehicle stopped in rush-hour traffic that a courtesy-patrol officer says he was moving toward qualify as an "emergency situation" under section 101.055(2) as a matter of law? ## Factual History On October 11, 2021, Devin McDonald, a Dallas County courtesy-patrol officer whose job was to scan freeways for hazards, was in bumper-to-bumper evening rush-hour traffic in the far-right lane of North Central Expressway when, he says, a vehicle several lanes to his left caught his eye, stopped with dark brake lights and a widening gap ahead of it; he says he activated his emergency lights and began to move toward it and, as he turned, struck the car driven by Keith Leonard (Brief on the Merits (Petitioner), PDF pp. 11-12). His handwritten account at the scene said he looked at a vehicle that had stopped in the far-left lane and, looking back, hit the brakes too late, and the investigating deputy's crash report left the "Pol., Fire, EMS on Emergency" box unchecked (Brief on the Merits (Petitioner), PDF pp. 12-13). The County says those accounts are consistent with McDonald's later deposition and describe how the collision happened, not whether there was an emergency (Brief on the Merits (Petitioner), PDF pp. 12-13). Leonard says his car had stopped for traffic, that neither of McDonald's written statements mentions a stalled vehicle, an emergency or anyone in need, and that the deputy who wrote the crash report was a County employee who recorded that McDonald looked left and then struck him (Brief on the Merits (Respondent), PDF pp. 9-12). ## Procedural History Leonard sued Dallas County on June 29, 2023 for negligence, the County filed a plea to the jurisdiction asserting the emergency exception, and the trial court granted it and dismissed the claims with prejudice (Brief on the Merits (Respondent), PDF p. 6; Brief on the Merits (Petitioner), PDF p. 34). The Dallas Court of Appeals, in an August 22, 2025 opinion (736 S.W.3d 547), reversed, agreeing that a stalled vehicle in live lanes is an emergency but holding that Leonard raised a fact issue whether McDonald was reacting to one, over a dissent by Justice Goldstein (Brief on the Merits (Petitioner), PDF pp. 15, 17). The Supreme Court granted review on May 1, 2026. ## Issues Presented - Dallas County (Brief on the Merits (Petitioner), PDF p. 10): whether Leonard, who bore the burden to overcome immunity, produced any affirmative evidence that McDonald was not reacting to an emergency, since the evidence he offered does not negate the emergency even if taken as true, so that the court of appeals erred in overturning the trial court. - Leonard (Brief on the Merits (Respondent), PDF pp. 18, 24): whether the contemporaneous statements, McDonald's testimony and the County's own crash report affirmatively negate an emergency or at least raise a genuine fact issue that must go to a fact-finder. ## Standard(s) of Review A plea to the jurisdiction mirrors summary judgment, so the nonmovant must produce more than a scintilla of evidence, and the County says evidence equally consistent with an emergency and no emergency supports no inference (Brief on the Merits (Petitioner), PDF pp. 15-16). Leonard says the standard credits his evidence and indulges reasonable inferences in his favor (Brief on the Merits (Respondent), PDF p. 19). ## Legal Arguments **Who bears the burden and how broadly the exception reads.** **Dallas County (Petitioner):** Immunity is the default and, once the County pleaded the emergency exception with facts, Leonard had to negate it with affirmative evidence, and the exception is read broadly so that employees are encouraged to act in the moment rather than second-guessed in a later suit (Brief on the Merits (Petitioner), PDF pp. 14-15, 18-24). In reply, the County says the burden was Leonard's and that the exception's policy favors the County (Brief on the Merits (Petitioner's Reply Brief), PDF pp. 11-12). **Keith Leonard (Respondent):** The exception applies only to an actual emergency, not one that could eventually become one, and the County's proposed rule would make it unfalsifiable by letting an employee's post-suit testimony that he perceived an emergency defeat the waiver even if every contemporaneous record says otherwise (Brief on the Merits (Respondent), PDF pp. 19, 23). **Whether Leonard's evidence negates the emergency.** **Dallas County (Petitioner):** Leonard's three pieces of evidence do not rise above a scintilla: McDonald's later detail does not contradict his brief scene statement, an unchecked box on someone else's form says nothing about whether an emergency existed, and whether his lights were on goes to how he responded, not whether there was an emergency (Brief on the Merits (Petitioner), PDF pp. 16-17). In reply, it adds that the objective circumstances establish the emergency and Leonard leaves them unchallenged (Brief on the Merits (Petitioner's Reply Brief), PDF p. 27). **Keith Leonard (Respondent):** The evidence is more than three items, including McDonald's handwritten statement and affidavit, the County's own crash report, discovery responses and his testimony, and it shows only a vehicle that stopped in stop-and-go traffic and then moved on, with no evidence it was stalled (Brief on the Merits (Respondent), PDF pp. 20-21). The County's cases involved conceded emergencies and disputes over the quality of the response, and the lights dispute and the checked or unchecked emergency box are probative of whether an emergency response was under way (Brief on the Merits (Respondent), PDF pp. 22, 38, 41, 45). **Whether McDonald was performing a routine function.** **Keith Leonard (Respondent):** Looking at traffic that slowed and stopped in stop-and-go traffic was a routine function of McDonald's job, and whether there was an urgent need for assistance is at least debatable and must be resolved by a fact-finder (Brief on the Merits (Respondent), PDF pp. 45-47). ## Stated Reasons the Court Should Take the Case Dallas County argued that the court of appeals dramatically narrowed the emergency exception by letting minor descriptions in a post-accident report waive immunity, which will make emergency responders hesitate to respond for fear of liability (Petition for Review (Petitioner), PDF p. 15). ## Practice Area Tags governmental-immunity, personal-injury ## Procedural Posture/Vehicle Petition for review from the Dallas Court of Appeals; granted May 1, 2026. Oral argument: January 11, 2027. ## Amicus Involvement The docket shows one amicus curiae brief received July 15, 2026, which is not summarized here. --- Source: The SCOTX Report, https://scotxreport.com/cases/26-0128. AI-generated summary of the Court's opinion, orders and the parties' briefs, with pin cites to the page of each document; verify against the Court's own documents at search.txcourts.gov.