# Karli v. Wilson Supreme Court of Texas, No. 25-1085 **Karli v. Wilson, No. 25-1085 (Tex. May 8, 2026). Holding: The Court made no ruling on the merits of the deed's construction; it vacated the court of appeals' judgment and remanded because the court of appeals decided the double-fraction question without the benefit of Clifton v.** Practice areas: oil and gas, real property ## Key issues - The Court vacated and remanded an oil-and-gas deed dispute involving double fractions so the court of appeals can reconsider it in light of Clifton v. Johnson (Tex. Mar. 13, 2026), which it lacked when it ruled. ## Factual History In a warranty deed dated December 20, 1950, C.R. Wilson and Mary Ida Wilson Allums conveyed 196.70 acres in Brazos County to the Veteran's Land Board of Texas but reserved minerals in language that gave each "an undivided one-thirty second right, title, and interest" in the oil, gas, and other minerals, provided they "shall not be entitled to receive any rental or bonus moneys paid for leases," and added "it being the intention to reserve unto" each "a one-fourth non-participating interest in the customary one-eighth royalty" (Petition for Review (Petitioner), PDF p. 17). Petitioners are successors to the Veteran's Land Board, Respondents are successors to Wilson and Allums, and a lessee currently produces from the minerals Petitioners own (Petition for Review (Petitioner), PDF p. 18). The parties agree that Petitioners own whatever Respondents do not, so the size of the reservation decides both sides' shares (Petition for Review (Petitioner), PDF p. 19). Petitioners say each grantor reserved a fixed 1/32 (collectively 1/16) of the minerals; Respondents say each reserved a floating one-fourth (collectively one-half) of the royalty on any lease (Petition for Review (Petitioner), PDF p. 20; Response to Petition (Respondent), PDF pp. 11, 17). ## Procedural History This is a petition for review of a court of appeals decision. On cross-motions for summary judgment the trial court determined that each Respondent-side grantor reserved a one-fourth interest, collectively one-half, rather than 1/32 (Petition for Review (Petitioner), PDF pp. 20, 30). The Eighth Court of Appeals (El Paso) affirmed in an opinion issued October 30, 2025, holding that the reservation was of a mineral interest, not a royalty only, and that the executive right was also sheared (Petition for Review (Petitioner), PDF pp. 24, 30). Petitioners filed a petition for review and Respondents responded on March 9, 2026 (Response to Petition (Respondent), PDF p. 19). On March 13, 2026, this Court decided *Clifton v. Johnson*, which the court of appeals did not have; on May 8, 2026, the Court granted the petition without oral argument, vacated the court of appeals' judgment, and remanded (Per Curiam Opinion, PDF pp. 1-2). ## Issues Presented Petitioners present three issues (Petition for Review (Petitioner), PDF p. 16): 1. Whether the court of appeals erred in determining that the deed reserved a one-fourth mineral interest (collectively one-half) rather than 1/32 (collectively 1/16) as the deed expressly states. 2. Whether the court of appeals improperly applied *Van Dyke v. Navigator Group* to a deed with an express fixed-fraction reservation. 3. Whether the court of appeals erred in finding that the rebuttable presumption in *Van Dyke* applied to the fraction in this reservation. Respondents restate the issues as whether the court of appeals properly found a one-fourth interest in accordance with long-standing precedent, and whether it properly applied *Van Dyke* because the deed is a multi-fraction deed that refers to one-eighth, creating a presumption the other language does not overcome (Response to Petition (Respondent), PDF p. 7). ## Standard(s) of Review Summary judgment rulings are reviewed de novo, and when both parties move and the court grants one motion and denies the other, the reviewing court examines both sides' evidence, decides all questions presented, and renders the judgment the trial court should have rendered (Petition for Review (Petitioner), PDF pp. 21-22). The goal in construing a deed is to ascertain the parties' true intentions from the instrument as a whole (Response to Petition (Respondent), PDF p. 10). ## Legal Arguments **Whether the deed reserved a fixed 1/32 or a floating one-fourth.** **Petitioners:** The first part of the reservation unequivocally reserves a fixed 1/32 (collectively 1/16) of the minerals, shorn of bonus and rental rights, and the closing language about a "one-fourth non-participating interest in the customary one-eighth royalty" merely confirms it, since one-fourth times one-eighth is 1/32; the two parts read together are in harmony (Petition for Review (Petitioner), PDF pp. 24-26). Respondents ask the Court to ignore the first part and give them a larger share of the royalty alone, which would increase the reservation eightfold (Petition for Review (Petitioner), PDF pp. 20, 24). **Respondents:** Where a deed states inconsistent fractions, the fraction in the initial clause is not determinative, and courts have consistently held that a smaller fraction in the heading followed by a larger fraction in the explanatory later language reflects an intent to reserve the larger one, as in *Tipps*, *Garrett*, *Luckel*, and *Jupiter Oil*; the grantors here reserved one-fourth each, floating with the royalty in current and future leases (Response to Petition (Respondent), PDF pp. 8, 11-12, 17). **Whether the Van Dyke presumption applies.** **Petitioners:** *Van Dyke* concerned reservations expressed as a fraction of one-eighth, but this is a fixed fractional mineral reservation with no reference to the usual one-eighth for the mineral estate; even if the presumption applied it would be rebutted by the express 1/32, and if it applied, the result would be 1/32 of 100%, which is what Petitioners say Respondents own (Petition for Review (Petitioner), PDF pp. 28-30). **Respondents:** Any reference to one-eighth in a multi-fraction deed creates a presumption that the grantor meant to reserve the entire interest, the presumption is rebuttable only by language within the four corners of the deed, and no such language exists; the grantors, assuming royalties would always be one-eighth, used "customary one-eighth royalty" to describe what they reserved (Response to Petition (Respondent), PDF pp. 8-9, 14-16). ## Stated Reasons the Court Should Take the Case Petitioners argued that the decision below presents an interpretive rule that, if left unreviewed, will be replicated by other courts of appeals and applied to thousands of recorded deeds, and that the case is an ideal vehicle because it arises from cross-motions for summary judgment with no disputed facts and a pure question of law (Petition for Review (Petitioner), PDF p. 20). Respondents answered that no conflict exists, because such reservations have been construed the same way for nearly a century, and that no error of importance to the jurisprudence was committed (Response to Petition (Respondent), PDF pp. 5-6). ## Practice Area Tags oil-and-gas, real-property ## Procedural Posture/Vehicle Petition for review from the Eighth Court of Appeals, disposed of by per curiam opinion without oral argument on May 8, 2026 (Per Curiam Opinion, PDF pp. 1-2). ## Amicus Involvement None ## Holding The Court made no ruling on the merits of the deed's construction; it vacated the court of appeals' judgment and remanded because the court of appeals decided the double-fraction question without the benefit of *Clifton v. Johnson* (Per Curiam Opinion, PDF pp. 1-2). ## Court's Reasoning The deed uses double fractions and thus implicates the presumption discussed in *Van Dyke v. Navigator Group*, and the court of appeals did not have *Clifton v. Johnson* (decided March 13, 2026) when it ruled (Per Curiam Opinion, PDF pp. 1-2). As in similar cases, and without oral argument, the Court granted the petition, vacated, and remanded for further proceedings, citing *Boren Descendants v. Fasken Oil & Ranch* and Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 59.1 and 60.2(f) (Per Curiam Opinion, PDF p. 2). ## Disposition Petition for review granted, the court of appeals' judgment vacated, and the case remanded to that court for further proceedings (Per Curiam Opinion, PDF p. 2). ## Vote Breakdown Per curiam opinion; no separate writings (Per Curiam Opinion, PDF p. 1). --- Source: The SCOTX Report, https://scotxreport.com/cases/25-1085. AI-generated summary of the Court's opinion, orders and the parties' briefs, with pin cites to the page of each document; verify against the Court's own documents at search.txcourts.gov.