# In re Claim Tech Solutions Supreme Court of Texas, No. 25-0932 **In re Claim Tech Solutions, No. 25-0932, is before the Supreme Court of Texas. Key issue: Can a third-party claimant sue an insurer's claims administrator for tortious interference, invasion of privacy and conspiracy over negotiated reductions of her medical bills, before the at-fault driver's liability has been established?** Practice areas: civil procedure, insurance ## Key issues - Can a third-party claimant sue an insurer's claims administrator for tortious interference, invasion of privacy and conspiracy over negotiated reductions of her medical bills, before the at-fault driver's liability has been established? - Should the trial court have dismissed those claims under Rule 91a because the claimant assigned away her interest, the no-direct-action rule and remoteness defeat justiciability, and the insurer was justified, and does mandamus lie to review the denial? ## Factual History Breyani Holman and her minor son were in a car accident with Liberty County Mutual's insured, Memphis Perez, and were treated at Fairfield Emergency Room, where Holman signed forms including an "Irrevocable Assignment of Insurance Benefits" and an Accident Payment Agreement (Brief on the Merits (Relator), PDF p. 15; Brief on the Merits (Real Parties in Interest), PDF pp. 7-8). They then presented third-party injury claims to Liberty, whose claims administrator, ClaimTECH Solutions, negotiated the medical bills down with Fairfield, and Liberty paid the reduced amount directly and the account was closed (Brief on the Merits (Relator), PDF p. 16). Holman alleges she was never told of these contacts and did not authorize them, and that they were made outside the ordinary litigation process and reduced the value of her tort claim against Perez (Brief on the Merits (Real Parties in Interest), PDF p. 8). She sued Perez for negligence in the 55th District Court, and that case remains pending (Brief on the Merits (Relator), PDF p. 16). This case is consolidated for argument with 25-0880 (*In re Liberty County Mutual Insurance Co.*), the insurer's own mandamus petition. ## Procedural History Holman sued Liberty and ClaimTECH for tortious interference, invasion of privacy and related claims, and each moved to dismiss under Rule 91a; the 333rd District Court denied ClaimTECH's motion in January 2025 (and Liberty's in February 2025) (Brief on the Merits (Real Parties in Interest), PDF p. 6). The First Court of Appeals denied both mandamus petitions without requesting a response, and the Supreme Court consolidated the two mandamus proceedings and requested merits briefing (Brief on the Merits (Real Parties in Interest), PDF p. 6; Brief on the Merits (Relator), PDF p. 17). The trial-court case is stayed pending this proceeding (Brief on the Merits (Relator), PDF p. 13). ## Issues Presented - ClaimTECH (Brief on the Merits (Relator), PDF p. 15): (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the Rule 91a motions to dismiss; and (2) whether Liberty has an adequate remedy on appeal. - Holman (Brief on the Merits (Real Parties in Interest), PDF p. 7): whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Rule 91a motions to dismiss claims arising from an insurer's undisclosed contact with a claimant's medical provider to negotiate reduced charges and thereby diminish the value of her personal-injury claims. ## Standard(s) of Review Mandamus is available when the trial court abuses its discretion and the relator has no adequate remedy by appeal, and mandamus may review the denial of a Rule 91a motion (Brief on the Merits (Relator), PDF p. 18). Holman adds that Rule 91a dismissal is proper only when a claim is foreclosed as a matter of law, not when it is difficult, unsettled, or needs factual development (Brief on the Merits (Real Parties in Interest), PDF p. 9). ## Legal Arguments **Whether there is a justiciable claim.** **ClaimTECH (Relator), joined by Liberty:** Holman's theory is that settling her medical bills reduced her potential recovery against the at-fault driver, and it fails because she assigned away any justiciable interest, the no-direct-action rule precludes standing, and her claimed injury depends on hypothetical, remote, or contingent events (Brief on the Merits (Relator), PDF pp. 17-18). In reply, they say she has no property interest in her personal-injury claims, is not entitled to a windfall, and her premise conflicts with Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 41.0105 (Reply Brief (Relator), PDF p. 3). **Holman (Real Party in Interest):** The Fairfield assignments transferred only the right to receive insurance benefits, not her independent tort claims; the no-direct-action rule bars suits to enforce a liability policy, not suits against an insurer for torts it committed; and her injury is present, not speculative (Brief on the Merits (Real Parties in Interest), PDF pp. 3, 9). **Whether the conduct was justified or states a claim.** **ClaimTECH (Relator), joined by Liberty:** Defendants have a legal right to mitigate their exposure by pre-paying potential damages, with or without the injured party's consent, and the facts as pleaded affirmatively show Holman is not entitled to relief on her claims for wrongful payment of interest, tortious interference, and invasion of privacy (Brief on the Merits (Relator), PDF pp. 5, 18). **Holman (Real Party in Interest):** Her claims for tortious interference, invasion of privacy and conspiracy are cognizable under established Texas tort law, *Stern* does not support dismissal at the pleading stage, the Restatement does not immunize the conduct, and whether any privilege applies depends on contested facts (Brief on the Merits (Real Parties in Interest), PDF pp. 3, 9). **Whether ClaimTECH's agency position helps it, and whether mandamus is available.** **Holman (Real Party in Interest):** ClaimTECH's theory that it acted as the insurer's agent confirms joint conduct, not immunity (Response to Petition for Writ of Mandamus Filed (Real Parties in Interest), PDF p. 3). Mandamus is unavailable because reasonable jurists could disagree about whether the claims are viable, so appeal after final judgment is an adequate remedy (Brief on the Merits (Real Parties in Interest), PDF p. 9). ## Stated Reasons the Court Should Take the Case The relators framed the central issue as whether Holman's theory, that settling a claimant's medical bills reduced her potential recovery against the at-fault driver, is legally viable in Texas (Brief on the Merits (Relator), PDF p. 17). Holman argued the petition asks the Court to excuse a medical-bill negotiator that, acting for an insurer, secretly contacted a claimant's medical provider and negotiated reduced payments, conduct no Texas court has addressed or approved (Response to Petition for Writ of Mandamus Filed (Real Parties in Interest), PDF p. 6). ## Practice Area Tags civil-procedure, insurance ## Procedural Posture/Vehicle Original proceeding (petition for writ of mandamus) after the First Court of Appeals (Houston) denied relief; consolidated with 25-0880. Oral argument: November 3, 2026. ## Amicus Involvement None noted --- Source: The SCOTX Report, https://scotxreport.com/cases/25-0932. AI-generated summary of the Court's opinion, orders and the parties' briefs, with pin cites to the page of each document; verify against the Court's own documents at search.txcourts.gov.