# City of Houston v. Guzman Supreme Court of Texas, No. 25-0774 **City of Houston v. Guzman, No. 25-0774, is before the Supreme Court of Texas. Key issue: Whether a trial court's re-filing of a plaintiff's notice of nonsuit containing the language "This is final and disposes of all claims and actions made the basis of this lawsuit" as a signed order made a final judgment, so that the trial court lost plenary power and later could not enter a default judgment against the City and its police officer.** Practice areas: governmental immunity, civil procedure, personal injury ## Key issues - Whether a trial court's re-filing of a plaintiff's notice of nonsuit containing the language "This is final and disposes of all claims and actions made the basis of this lawsuit" as a signed order made a final judgment, so that the trial court lost plenary power and later could not enter a default judgment against the City and its police officer. - Whether a Tort Claims Act plaintiff's petition affirmatively demonstrates subject-matter jurisdiction when it alleges jurisdictional facts in the alternative against two governmental units, pleads nothing about scope of employment, and does not negate the Act's emergency exception for police vehicles, and whether negligent entrustment is cognizable and a default judgment may be entered against both a governmental unit and its employee. ## Factual History On October 7, 2020, Magdalena Guzman was in a motor-vehicle collision with a Houston Police Department patrol car driven by Officer Jessica Lee Moore (Brief on the Merits (Petitioner), PDF p. 14). Guzman alleges Moore was employed by the City of Houston and operating a vehicle it owned and that the crash was a "simple car crash" caused by Moore's negligence. Houston says the petition pleads no facts showing Moore was acting within the scope of her employment and none negating the emergency exception that applies when a police vehicle is involved (Brief on the Merits (Petitioner), PDF pp. 3-5, 14; Response to Petition, PDF pp. 7, 9-10). ## Procedural History Guzman sued Officer Moore, the City of Houston and Harris County on October 7, 2022 in the 165th District Court of Harris County (Judge Ursula Hall). Harris County moved to dismiss on November 9, 2022, asserting Moore was not its employee and the vehicle was not its property. On November 10, 2022, Guzman filed a "notice of partial non-suit" stating "This is final and disposes of all claims and actions made the basis of this lawsuit," and the trial court re-filed it as a "NONSUIT/DISMISSAL, PARTIAL (Rule 162)" with the notation "signed November 10, 2022." On October 12, 2023, Guzman moved for default against Houston and Moore; Houston told the court its plenary power had expired because of the nonsuit's language, but on December 1, 2023 the court signed an interlocutory default judgment against both (Brief on the Merits (Petitioner), PDF pp. 14-15). The Fourteenth Court of Appeals (Antú, J., joined by Jewell and Hart, JJ.) affirmed in the appeal and denied the companion mandamus petition in No. 14-24-00139-CV. City of Houston v. Guzman, No. 14-23-00957-CV, 2025 WL 2048198 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 22, 2025, pet. filed) (mem. op.). The City and Moore petitioned for review on September 5, 2025; the Court ordered a response, Guzman responded January 5, 2026, and the Court requested briefs on the merits on June 19, 2026. The petitioners filed their brief on August 19, 2026, and on September 28, 2026 the Court gave Guzman ten days to file her late brief. The related mandamus proceeding is No. 25-0776. ## Issues Presented 1. Whether a trial court can render final judgment by re-filing with the district clerk a notice of nonsuit containing finality language as an "order" signed that day. 2. Whether a court of appeals can look past a nonsuit stating it "is final and disposes of all claims and actions made the basis of this lawsuit" to find the plaintiff "really meant" it to be partial. 3. Whether a plaintiff's Tort Claims Act petition affirmatively demonstrates jurisdiction when it pleads jurisdictional facts in the alternative between two governmental units, nothing on scope of employment, and nothing negating the emergency exception. 4. Whether negligent entrustment is cognizable under the Act. 5. Whether a court can enter default judgment against both a governmental unit and its employee under the Act's election-of-remedies scheme (Brief on the Merits (Petitioner), PDF p. 17). Guzman frames her issues as whether she pleaded sufficient facts to establish a waiver of immunity and whether her partial nonsuit of Harris County served as a final judgment as to the City (Response to Petition, PDF p. 8). ## Legal Arguments **Petitioners (City of Houston and Jessica Lee Moore):** A nonsuit is effective immediately on filing, so Guzman's notice, which states it disposes of all claims and actions, was final, and the trial court could render final judgment by re-filing it as a signed order, after which its plenary power expired before the default judgment. A court of appeals cannot review the record to find the plaintiff "really meant" the nonsuit to be partial. On jurisdiction, suing the government tightens the plaintiff's pleading burden, and Guzman pleaded nothing that Moore was performing her actual job duties, pleaded jurisdictional facts only in the alternative between two governmental units, and pleaded nothing negating the emergency exception that is implicated whenever a police cruiser is involved. The petitioners also raise, as unbriefed issues, whether negligent entrustment is cognizable under the Act and whether default judgment may be entered against both a governmental unit and its employee (Brief on the Merits (Petitioner), PDF pp. 3-5; Reply to Response to Petition, PDF p. 2). **Respondent (Magdalena Guzman):** She pleaded sufficient facts to establish a waiver of immunity under section 101.021(1) for a simple car crash caused by Moore's negligence, when Moore was employed by the City and operating its vehicle, and alternatively should be allowed to amend. Her partial nonsuit of Harris County did not clearly and unequivocally express intent to serve as a final judgment as to the City, which it did not mention: the nonsuit states it disposes of "all claims and actions," not "all parties," and nothing else in it supplies the missing finality, so it was at least ambiguous and cannot be a final judgment of the entire case (Response to Petition, PDF pp. 8-10, 16). ## Stated Reasons the Court Should Take the Case The City asserts the Court has jurisdiction because the appeal presents questions of law important to the state's jurisprudence under Government Code section 22.001(a); the questions concern when a nonsuit is a final judgment, what a plaintiff must plead to establish jurisdiction in Tort Claims Act cases, and the treatment of default judgments against governmental units and employees (Petition for Review, PDF pp. 3, 11). ## Practice Area Tags governmental-immunity, civil-procedure, personal-injury ## Procedural Posture/Vehicle Petition for review from the Fourteenth Court of Appeals, which affirmed an interlocutory default judgment against a city and its police officer in a Tort Claims Act motor-vehicle suit. The Court requested briefs on the merits on June 19, 2026; the petitioners' brief is on file and the respondent's brief is overdue. The Court has not yet granted the petition. A companion original proceeding, No. 25-0776, challenges the same default judgment. ## Amicus Involvement None --- Source: The SCOTX Report, https://scotxreport.com/cases/25-0774. AI-generated summary of the Court's opinion, orders and the parties' briefs, with pin cites to the page of each document; verify against the Court's own documents at search.txcourts.gov.