# Tex. Pub. Policy Found. v. Highland Park Indep. Sch. Dist.

Supreme Court of Texas, No. 25-0759

**Tex. Pub. Policy Found. v. Highland Park Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 25-0759, is before the Supreme Court of Texas. Key issue: Should the Court overrule In re City of Georgetown and hold attorney-client privilege isn't "other law" that overrides Public Information Act disclosure, or, if privilege still applies, narrow it so it doesn't shield a purely factual investigation with no legal advice?**

Practice areas: open records, civil procedure

## Key issues

- Should the Court overrule In re City of Georgetown and hold attorney-client privilege isn't "other law" that overrides Public Information Act disclosure, or, if privilege still applies, narrow it so it doesn't shield a purely factual investigation with no legal advice?
- Did the district waive privilege when a senior official publicly disclosed the withheld report's conclusions?

## Factual History
The Seay Tennis Center is a Highland Park ISD facility, and as early as 2015 citizens raised concerns about its management and finances (Brief on the Merits (Petitioner), PDF p. 15). In 2019 the district retained attorney Bryan Neal to investigate alleged financial misconduct, and Neal commissioned the accounting firm Whitley Penn, which produced a report on the Center's financial operations (Brief on the Merits (Petitioner), PDF p. 15). The district says it retained a law firm to give legal advice on the Center's operations and, because the lawyer was not an accountant, needed accounting help to give that advice (Brief on the Merits (Respondent), PDF p. 14). The Texas Public Policy Foundation (TPPF) says a senior district official, Superintendent White, later wrote that the district took appropriate steps including obtaining "expert assistance," and testified that this meant Whitley Penn, not Neal (Brief on the Merits (Petitioner), PDF pp. 15-16). In 2022 TPPF requested the report under the Public Information Act, the district sought an Attorney General ruling, and the Attorney General concluded the report was a completed report under section 552.022(a)(1) but that it could be withheld as privileged on the district's assertions (Brief on the Merits (Petitioner), PDF p. 16).

## Procedural History
TPPF sued for a writ of mandamus under Government Code section 552.321(a); the district court reviewed the report in camera, declared it privileged, and after a short bench trial found that White's email did not waive privilege, entering final judgment on April 30, 2024 with findings on May 20, 2024 (Brief on the Merits (Petitioner), PDF pp. 9, 16-17). The Fifth Court of Appeals (Dallas) affirmed, holding that Whitley Penn was an attorney's representative under Rule of Evidence 503 and the report was a communication made to facilitate legal services, and that the email did not waive privilege because it did not reveal Neal's advice or the report's contents (Brief on the Merits (Petitioner), PDF p. 17). Justice Lewis concurred to highlight "dangers and absurdities" of an overbroad privilege in investigations and said Supreme Court review was warranted (Brief on the Merits (Petitioner), PDF pp. 17-18). The Supreme Court granted review.

## Issues Presented
- TPPF (Brief on the Merits (Petitioner), PDF p. 11): (1) whether to overrule *In re City of Georgetown* and hold attorney-client privilege is not "other law" overriding section 552.022; (2) if it is, whether the law should strike a better balance so governments cannot use privilege as a loophole; and (3) whether the district waived privilege.
- HPISD (Brief on the Merits (Respondent), PDF p. 10): (1) whether the Court should decline to overrule its holding that the Rules of Evidence, including attorney-client privilege, are "other law," given long reliance and legislative acquiescence; (2) whether it should decline to amend the Act by carving out exceptions to the privilege; and (3) whether it should decline to find waiver.

## Standard(s) of Review
Neither side's merits brief has a separate standard-of-review section; the questions presented are legal ones about the meaning of "other law" in section 552.022, the scope of the privilege, and waiver.

## Legal Arguments
**Whether to overrule *In re City of Georgetown*.**

**TPPF (Petitioner):** The Act promises "complete information," a purely factual investigative report on a public facility's finances is "core public information," and *Georgetown* contradicts the Act's text and purpose by reading a privilege exception into a statute that excludes one for core public information, which the Court may not do (Brief on the Merits (Petitioner), PDF pp. 19-20). Legislative silence is not acquiescence, especially to a decision contrary to plain text (Brief on the Merits (Petitioner), PDF p. 20). In reply, TPPF says HPISD never explains why "other law" should not be read as the Act dictates and that acquiescence cannot apply to clear text (Reply Brief (Petitioner), PDF p. 2).

**HPISD (Respondent):** The Court should decline to overturn *Georgetown*, which correctly reads "other law" to include the Rules of Evidence, applies the privilege outside litigation, and has been relied on for 25 years with the Legislature's acquiescence; the privilege has "special force" for governments because public officials need candid legal advice (Brief on the Merits (Respondent), PDF pp. 3, 11).

**Whether to narrow the privilege for factual investigations.**

**TPPF (Petitioner):** Even without overruling *Georgetown*, the Court could carve out a narrower exception so that core public information containing no legal advice, like the Whitley Penn report, must be disclosed (Brief on the Merits (Petitioner), PDF p. 20).

**HPISD (Respondent):** The Court should decline TPPF's invitation to legislate by amending the Act to add exceptions to the privilege (Brief on the Merits (Respondent), PDF p. 10).

**Whether the privilege was waived.**

**TPPF (Petitioner):** Even if the report remains privileged, HPISD waived privilege by disclosing a significant portion of it through White's statement, and a broad privilege requires a broad reading of waiver (Brief on the Merits (Petitioner), PDF pp. 20, 48; Reply to Response (Petitioner), PDF p. 2).

**HPISD (Respondent):** The email sent on the administration's behalf did not waive privilege, and TPPF's contrary position is a counterfactual last resort (Response to Petition (Respondent), PDF p. 7; Brief on the Merits (Respondent), PDF p. 10).

## Stated Reasons the Court Should Take the Case
TPPF argued that no facts are in dispute and the case is an ideal vehicle to resolve a major Public Information Act loophole created by *Georgetown* and to restore transparency (Reply to Response (Petitioner), PDF p. 13). HPISD argued the Court should leave undisturbed its holding that "other law" includes the Rules of Evidence because the Legislature has acquiesced in it (Response to Petition (Respondent), PDF pp. 2, 7).

## Oral Argument

- **Common-law privilege as "other law".** Petitioner's counsel was pressed on whether common law counts as "other law" and what happens if the Rules of Evidence disappeared; counsel said *Georgetown* would become a dead letter. (Oral Argument, 0:10:52; 0:11:50)
- **Middle path.** Asked how to rule for Petitioner without overruling *Georgetown*, counsel proposed protecting only pure attorney advice and legal impressions, grounded in the Act's opening section. (Oral Argument, 0:13:36)
- **Loophole concern.** Respondent's counsel said the privilege has built-in limits: the attorney must have obtained the report to give legal advice, which counsel called undisputed, and crime-fraud applies. (Oral Argument, 0:25:57; 0:27:30)
- **Section .001.** A Justice asked what Respondent does with the Act's direction to construe it liberally for disclosure; counsel returned to *Georgetown* and the codified common-law privilege. (Oral Argument, 0:42:20; 0:43:46)
- **Legislative acquiescence.** A Justice asked if acquiescence could defeat the argument that privilege is not confidential; Petitioner's counsel quoted Justice Scalia that vindication by congressional inaction is a canard. (Oral Argument, 0:17:52; 0:19:08)
- **Statute trumps rule.** Respondent's counsel agreed that if a statute conflicted with a Texas evidence or procedure rule the statute would control, but said the two are consistent here. (Oral Argument, 0:34:16)
- **Redaction process.** Asked about having agencies propose redactions to the Attorney General, Respondent's counsel said that invites more litigation and runs against *Huey*, which treats a mixed document as wholly privileged. (Oral Argument, 0:36:14; 0:38:08)
- **Underlying facts.** On rebuttal, a Justice asked why Petitioner would not just request the underlying papers, documents and information, not including the report; Petitioner's counsel said that could be done. (Oral Argument, 0:45:42)

## Practice Area Tags
open-records, civil-procedure

## Procedural Posture/Vehicle
Petition for review from the Fifth Court of Appeals (Dallas). Oral argument: October 8, 2026.

## Amicus Involvement
- Amicus curiae briefs were filed at the petition and merits stages; they are not summarized here.

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Source: The SCOTX Report, https://scotxreport.com/cases/25-0759. AI-generated summary of the Court's opinion, orders and the parties' briefs, with pin cites to the page of each document; verify against the Court's own documents at search.txcourts.gov.