# In re Paxton Supreme Court of Texas, No. 25-0641 **In re Paxton, No. 25-0641, is before the Supreme Court of Texas. Key issue: A court of appeals abused its discretion by granting a Rule 29.3 stay that kept a temporary injunction against the Attorney General's new prosecutor-reporting rules in place for the named appellees without making a preliminary inquiry into the likely merits, which In re State requires before countermanding the State's automatic supersedeas.** Practice areas: administrative law, civil procedure, governmental immunity ## Key issues - A court of appeals abused its discretion by granting a Rule 29.3 stay that kept a temporary injunction against the Attorney General's new prosecutor-reporting rules in place for the named appellees without making a preliminary inquiry into the likely merits, which In re State requires before countermanding the State's automatic supersedeas. - The Court conditionally granted mandamus and directed the court of appeals to evaluate the merits and decide by January 5, 2026 whether a Rule 29.3 stay is warranted, without preventing it from granting one under the proper standard. ## Factual History Since 1879, Government Code Section 41.006 has required district and county attorneys to report to the Attorney General the information he "desires relating to criminal matters and the interests of the state" (Petition for Writ of Mandamus filed (Relator), PDF p. 12). In 2025 the Attorney General promulgated rules, 1 Texas Administrative Code Sections 56.1-.10, requiring initial, quarterly, and annual reports from district and county attorneys in counties of 400,000 or more, covering twelve categories of information, including case files, correspondence, and privileged work product, and permitting enforcement by quo warranto or civil proceedings (Petition for Writ of Mandamus filed (Relator), PDF p. 12; Response to Petition for Writ of Mandamus Filed (Real Parties in Interest), PDF p. 12; Bland, J., concurring, PDF pp. 1-2). A group of counties, county attorneys, and district attorneys (the prosecutors) challenged the rules as exceeding the Attorney General's statutory authority and as imposing substantial burdens, including the risk of disclosing privileged information (Opinion, PDF pp. 1-2; Response to Petition for Writ of Mandamus Filed (Real Parties in Interest), PDF p. 12). ## Procedural History This is an original proceeding for writ of mandamus against a Rule 29.3 stay. After a full evidentiary hearing on June 20, 2025, the trial court found the prosecutors likely to succeed and issued a temporary injunction; the State's interlocutory appeal to the Fifteenth Court of Appeals automatically superseded it (Bland, J., concurring, PDF p. 2; Opinion, PDF p. 2). On July 17, 2025, seventeen days after the prosecutors' emergency motion, two justices of that court ordered a stay under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 29.3, leaving the temporary injunction in place as to the named appellees only, and Justice Farris dissented (Opinion, PDF p. 3; Bland, J., concurring, PDF p. 2). The State petitioned for mandamus six days later, and the Court conditionally granted relief per curiam on December 22, 2025, without oral argument (Bland, J., concurring, PDF p. 3; Opinion, PDF p. 5). ## Issues Presented The State presents one issue: whether the court of appeals' decision to grant Rule 29.3 relief was a clear abuse of discretion for which the State has no adequate remedy by appeal (Petition for Writ of Mandamus filed (Relator), PDF p. 10). The prosecutors frame two issues: whether the Fifteenth Court clearly abused its discretion when it considered likelihood of success and the State's unique status and the State does not attack its actual decision to grant temporary relief, and whether the Court should decline to impose a new requirement that appellate courts issue written, merits-analyzed opinions when granting temporary relief (Response to Petition for Writ of Mandamus Filed (Real Parties in Interest), PDF p. 9). ## Standard(s) of Review Mandamus issues when the relator shows a clear abuse of discretion and no adequate remedy by appeal (Petition for Writ of Mandamus filed (Relator), PDF p. 14). An appellate stay pending appeal is a kind of injunction, so the familiar considerations governing injunctive relief apply, and under *In re State* "appellate courts asked to issue temporary relief pending appeal should make a preliminary inquiry into the likely merits of the parties' legal positions" (Opinion, PDF pp. 3-4). ## Legal Arguments **Whether the court of appeals had to evaluate the merits before granting a Rule 29.3 stay.** **Relators (Attorney General):** *In re State* makes the likely merits a required consideration in every Rule 29.3 case, but the court of appeals said it was "reluctant to decide who is likely to succeed on the merits" and conducted no inquiry, so the movant failed to carry its burden and relief should have been denied, leaving the State's suspension right in place (Petition for Writ of Mandamus filed (Relator), PDF pp. 11-12, 14-17). **Real Parties in Interest (prosecutors):** The Fifteenth Court did consider the merits to the extent the posture allowed, finding "a close question of statutory construction" and "serious questions" about the Attorney General's authority; the merits need not be definitively determined at this preliminary stage, and the State does not argue that the stay itself was wrong (Response to Petition for Writ of Mandamus Filed (Real Parties in Interest), PDF pp. 9, 18). **Whether the court of appeals considered the State's unique status.** **Relators (Attorney General):** The State has a legislatively conferred right to supersede injunctions on appeal, a duty to execute the laws, and a presumption of validity for its rules, and an order with the practical effect of denying supersedeas prevents it from carrying out duly enacted law (Petition for Writ of Mandamus filed (Relator), PDF p. 20; Reply to Petition for Writ of Mandamus (Relator), PDF p. 10). **Real Parties in Interest (prosecutors):** By weighing the State's potential harms and expediting the appeal to lessen them, the court of appeals necessarily considered the State's status, and the State consists of many entities, not only the Attorney General (Response to Petition for Writ of Mandamus Filed (Real Parties in Interest), PDF pp. 9, 22). **Adequate remedy and requested relief.** **Relators (Attorney General):** The State lacks an adequate appellate remedy because the order may delay for years the information the Attorney General requested under statute, and the problem recurs (Petition for Writ of Mandamus filed (Relator), PDF p. 23). **Real Parties in Interest (prosecutors):** The Court should not impose a new rule requiring written, merits-analyzed orders for temporary relief, and should not grant mandamus without reinstating the court of appeals' administrative stay (Response to Petition for Writ of Mandamus Filed (Real Parties in Interest), PDF pp. 9, 26; Reply to Petition for Writ of Mandamus (Relator), PDF p. 12). **Relators (Attorney General), in reply:** Whether to reinstate the administrative stay is for the court of appeals to decide in the first instance (Reply to Petition for Writ of Mandamus (Relator), PDF p. 12). ## Stated Reasons the Court Should Take the Case The State argued that it has a special interest in the proper application of Rule 29.3 because it is routinely involved in such motions, particularly in the Fifteenth Court, that a ruling would prevent the misapplication from recurring and save judicial resources, and that it lacks an adequate appellate remedy (Petition for Writ of Mandamus filed (Relator), PDF pp. 11, 23). ## Practice Area Tags administrative-law, civil-procedure, governmental-immunity ## Procedural Posture/Vehicle Original proceeding for writ of mandamus against the Fifteenth Court of Appeals' Rule 29.3 order, decided per curiam without oral argument on December 22, 2025, with a concurring opinion by Justice Bland, joined by Justices Lehrmann and Huddle (Opinion, PDF pp. 1, 5; Bland, J., concurring, PDF p. 1). ## Amicus Involvement None ## Holding An appellate court asked to issue a Rule 29.3 stay against the State must make a preliminary inquiry into the likely merits before countermanding the State's automatic supersedeas, and the Fifteenth Court did not; the Court conditionally granted mandamus and directed that court to evaluate the merits and decide by January 5, 2026, whether a stay is warranted (Opinion, PDF pp. 3-5). ## Court's Reasoning **Supersedeas.** The State's appeal automatically superseded the injunction, because the State has been exempt from filing an appeal bond since 1838 and the Legislature has protected its right to supersede, so the Attorney General would ordinarily have been free to enforce the rules during the appeal (Opinion, PDF p. 2). But Rule 29.3 lets an appellate court issue injunctive relief against the government during an appeal despite that right (Opinion, PDF pp. 2-3). **The merits requirement.** *In re State* held that appellate courts asked for temporary relief should make a preliminary inquiry into the likely merits, and the court of appeals' discussion was confined to one paragraph saying it was reluctant to decide who was likely to succeed; that is not enough, because a stay pending appeal is a kind of injunction and the likely merits are a required consideration, "perhaps at its strongest" when the judiciary is asked to enjoin executive-branch action (Opinion, PDF pp. 3-4). The work of the other branches is entitled to a presumption of regularity, good faith, and legality, and the requirement derives from the separation of powers and "does not waver when time is short" (Opinion, PDF p. 4). **Remedy.** If the prosecutors are right that some information may not be disclosed, discrete challenges remain available; the court of appeals may block the rules entirely only after at least a preliminary merits assessment, and nothing in the decision prevents it from considering a stay under the proper standard (Opinion, PDF p. 5). The writ vacating the stay will issue only if the court of appeals does not act by January 5, 2026 (Opinion, PDF p. 5). **Concurrence (Justice Bland).** She agreed the court of appeals erred, but wrote that appellate courts must also evaluate the balance of harms and must have a reasonable time to decide whether a stay is warranted (Bland, J., concurring, PDF p. 1). *In re State* marked a shift, requiring appellate courts to inquire into the likely merits and the balance of harms before countermanding the State's supersedeas right, and here the court of appeals found the balance of harms favored a stay, a finding the State does not challenge (Bland, J., concurring, PDF pp. 4-6). Because both parties have fully briefed the merits and enough time has passed, she agreed the State is entitled to relief, noting the court of appeals could alternatively issue its opinion (Bland, J., concurring, PDF pp. 6-7). ## Disposition Mandamus conditionally granted; the court of appeals is directed to evaluate the merits and determine, by January 5, 2026, whether a Rule 29.3 stay is warranted, and the writ commanding vacatur of its order will issue only if it does not (Opinion, PDF p. 5). ## Vote Breakdown Per curiam opinion; Justice Bland filed a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Lehrmann and Justice Huddle (Opinion, PDF p. 1). --- Source: The SCOTX Report, https://scotxreport.com/cases/25-0641. AI-generated summary of the Court's opinion, orders and the parties' briefs, with pin cites to the page of each document; verify against the Court's own documents at search.txcourts.gov.