# In re L.H. Supreme Court of Texas, No. 25-0229 **In re L.H., No. 25-0229, is before the Supreme Court of Texas. Key issue: In a discretionary transfer of a juvenile over eighteen under Family Code § 54.02(j)(4)(A), does "not practicable to proceed in juvenile court before the 18th birthday" mean the State could not reasonably begin and carry on the case, or does it look at the overall progression of the case?** Practice areas: juvenile law, criminal law ## Key issues - In a discretionary transfer of a juvenile over eighteen under Family Code § 54.02(j)(4)(A), does "not practicable to proceed in juvenile court before the 18th birthday" mean the State could not reasonably begin and carry on the case, or does it look at the overall progression of the case? - Must the sufficiency review consider events after the juvenile's eighteenth birthday, given the juvenile court's retained jurisdiction under § 51.0412? ## Factual History On April 28, 2021, sixteen-year-old L.H. shot his stepfather in the head during a family dinner celebrating his brother's birthday, and the State says the shooting was unprovoked and that L.H. has severe, persistent mental illness, including schizophrenia-spectrum diagnoses and a fixed delusion that a vaccine gave him HIV (Brief on the Merits (Petitioner), PDF pp. 11-12). ## Procedural History The State filed its original juvenile petition on May 25, 2021, and on January 14, 2022 asked the juvenile court to waive jurisdiction under section 54.02(a); on July 25, 2022 the court denied waiver after a hearing, and the next day a grand jury approved a determinate-sentence petition (Brief on the Merits (Petitioner), PDF p. 13). After L.H. turned eighteen the juvenile court found him unfit to proceed in March 2023, he was sent to a state hospital, and when he was found fit in July 2023 the court found the State had used due diligence and retained jurisdiction under section 51.0412 (Brief on the Merits (Petitioner), PDF p. 14). The State then sought transfer under section 54.02(j), and after an April 1, 2024 hearing the 313th District Court of Harris County waived jurisdiction on May 2, 2024 (Brief on the Merits (Petitioner), PDF p. 15; Brief on the Merits (Respondent), PDF p. 13). The First Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Justice Countiss on November 7, 2024, sustained L.H.'s legal-sufficiency challenge, reversed and remanded, and a new panel denied rehearing on January 28, 2025 (Brief on the Merits (Respondent), PDF p. 14). The Supreme Court granted review on March 27, 2026; L.H. also filed a cross-petition. ## Issues Presented - The State (Brief on the Merits (Petitioner), PDF p. 10): (1) whether the court of appeals erroneously read "practicable to proceed" in section 54.02(j)(4)(A) to mean reasonably feasible to begin and carry on an action; and (2) whether it erroneously omitted from its sufficiency analysis events after L.H.'s eighteenth birthday despite the juvenile court's retained jurisdiction under section 51.0412. - L.H. (Brief on the Merits (Respondent), PDF p. 16): whether the court of appeals correctly construed "practicable to proceed" under the plain meaning of the text and *In re J.J.T.*, and whether the record conclusively shows it was practicable for the State to proceed in juvenile court before he turned eighteen. ## Standard(s) of Review The court of appeals sustained a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting the juvenile court's waiver findings (Brief on the Merits (Respondent), PDF p. 14). ## Legal Arguments **What "practicable to proceed" means.** **The State (Petitioner):** The First Court's reading conflicts with the plain language and purpose of section 54.02, and *J.J.T.* recognized that the phrase focuses on the overall progression of a juvenile case, not on individual judicial proceedings; a discretionary-transfer hearing is dispositional, deciding only where the prosecution will occur (Brief on the Merits (Petitioner), PDF pp. 10, 15-16). In reply, the State says L.H.'s narrow reading ignores the statute's plain language and purpose (Reply Brief (Petitioner's Reply Brief), PDF p. 3). **L.H. (Respondent):** The First Court applied the ordinary meanings of "practicable" and "proceed" and asked what the State could practicably accomplish in juvenile court before he turned eighteen, whereas the State seeks an open-ended inquiry into the case's overall progression that would make "before the 18th birthday" surplusage (Brief on the Merits (Respondent), PDF pp. 31-32). **Whether post-eighteen events count.** **The State (Petitioner):** The juvenile court's retained jurisdiction under section 51.0412 means events after the eighteenth birthday belong in the sufficiency analysis (Brief on the Merits (Petitioner), PDF pp. 10, 15). **L.H. (Respondent):** That argument is inadequately briefed, and section 51.0412 extends jurisdiction only for enumerated proceedings that do not include section 54.02(j) transfers, so the two provisions serve different purposes and are not in pari materia (Brief on the Merits (Respondent), PDF pp. 16, 32). ## Stated Reasons the Court Should Take the Case The State argued the court of appeals' reading conflicts with this Court's recent statement in *J.J.T.* that section 54.02(j) limits prosecution of an adult for a juvenile act only if the case could reasonably have been dealt with while he was still a juvenile (Brief on the Merits (Petitioner), PDF p. 10). L.H. argued the State's issues do not warrant review because the State does not dispute the First Court's plain-meaning analysis and offers no substantive analysis of section 51.0412 (Brief on the Merits (Respondent), PDF pp. 15-16). ## Oral Argument - **Moore and "dealing with" the case.** Asked whether Moore means the case was dealt with once the transfer was heard, the State's counsel said section 54.02(j)(4)(A) has no such prohibition; it is more a jurisdictional limitation. (Oral Argument, 2:58:56; 3:02:50) - **Deference.** Asked whether the trial court is owed deference, the State's counsel said yes, and the First Court judged sufficiency through a mistaken reading of the statute. (Oral Argument, 3:06:35) - **Different statutory wording.** Asked why section 51.0412 speaks of completing the proceeding, the State's counsel said it means the same thing but covers more situations. (Oral Argument, 3:12:53) - **A busy docket.** Asked whether a court's busyness would be a proper consideration, the State's counsel said it would, as an objective inquiry into a reason beyond the State's control. (Oral Argument, 3:16:15) - **The airport analogy.** Asked whether it is practicable to drive to the airport after a flight is canceled, L.H.'s counsel said it would be futile, and a cancellation is beyond the traveler's control. (Oral Argument, 3:23:32) - **Something operating on the proceeding.** L.H.'s counsel said the State would need something operating on the proceeding itself, such as a missing essential witness, not a judge simply denying its motion. (Oral Argument, 3:27:54) - **If the Court affirms.** Asked the practical consequence of affirming, L.H.'s counsel said he would get a dismissal with prejudice because no jurisdiction would remain. (Oral Argument, 3:30:14) - **What the State accomplished.** L.H.'s counsel said the State fully litigated a transfer hearing, presented the evidence it wanted, and was missing nothing. (Oral Argument, 3:31:30) ## Practice Area Tags juvenile-law, criminal-law ## Procedural Posture/Vehicle Petition for review from the First Court of Appeals (Houston); granted March 27, 2026. Argued September 15, 2026. ## Amicus Involvement None noted --- Source: The SCOTX Report, https://scotxreport.com/cases/25-0229. AI-generated summary of the Court's opinion, orders and the parties' briefs, with pin cites to the page of each document; verify against the Court's own documents at search.txcourts.gov.