# In the Interest C.S. Jr. Supreme Court of Texas, No. 25-0008 **In the Interest C.S. Jr., No. 25-0008 (Tex. June 5, 2026). Holding: Where trial did not begin before the one-year automatic-dismissal date, the determinant of subject-matter jurisdiction is the Section 263.401(a) extension order itself, and a trial court that signals only that it will grant an extension but does not render one before the date loses jurisdiction by operation of law; the trial and appellate judgments are vacated and the case dismissed.** Practice areas: family law, civil procedure ## Key issues - A trial court that intends to extend the automatic dismissal date in a parental-termination case but does not do so in writing or on the record before the date passes loses jurisdiction; the case is dismissed by operation of law. - The Court vacated the judgments terminating the mother's rights in part and dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction over Justice Lehrmann's dissent. ## Factual History In February 2023 Mother, with her two young children present, fought with her boyfriend's ex-girlfriend and then pointed a gun at her and threatened to shoot, which led to an aggravated-assault charge and a Department of Family and Protective Services investigation; the Department also detected a strong odor of marijuana at her home on two visits (Lehrmann, J., dissenting, PDF p. 2). The Court did not reach those facts because it held the trial court lost jurisdiction before trial (Opinion, PDF pp. 2, 12). ## Procedural History The Department sued to terminate Mother's parental rights, and under Family Code Section 263.401(a) the suit was automatically dismissed on March 11, 2024, unless the trial court granted an extension before then (Opinion, PDF pp. 3-4). At a February 23, 2024 pretrial hearing, the trial judge said "I am going to have to grant an extension," asked the Department's counsel to prepare an extension order, and set trial for an April trial week, but no extension order was entered before March 11 (Opinion, PDF pp. 4-6). After March 11, Mother moved to dismiss for want of jurisdiction, the court issued an order purporting to retain the suit, and after trial terminated Mother's rights, and the Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed (Opinion, PDF pp. 2, 5). The vehicle in this Court is a petition for review filed by Mother, argued October 9, 2025, and decided June 5, 2026 (Opinion, PDF pp. 1, 12). ## Issues Presented Mother presents four issues, the first two of which the Court decided (Brief on the Merits (T.W), PDF p. 9): 1. Whether error is preserved when an objection to the missing findings required by Section 263.401(b) is made during trial but after the initial dismissal deadline, and what the consequence is. 2. Whether, under Family Code Section 101.026, a trial court defectively "renders" an order retaining the suit when it does not make its oral pronouncement in the presence of a court reporter or memorialize it in a writing made part of the public record, and whether the court lost jurisdiction on March 11, 2024. 3. Whether termination under the "O" ground is justified when she substantially complied with her service plan. 4. Whether the evidence supports the best-interest finding (Petition for Review (Parental Termination) (T.W), PDF p. 8). ## Standard(s) of Review The Court did not state a standard of review. It treated subject-matter jurisdiction as a threshold question it must assure itself of, and decided what the trial court did or did not do before the automatic-dismissal date as a matter of law (Opinion, PDF pp. 1-3, 5-6). ## Legal Arguments **Whether the trial court lost jurisdiction on March 11, 2024.** **Mother (Petitioner):** The order to retain the suit was defective because the court did not make the extraordinary-circumstances and best-interest findings before the automatic dismissal date, citing docket congestion and attorney schedules, which she says are ordinary administrative problems that cannot be "extraordinary circumstances"; the written order came after March 11, and she preserved the error by objecting before trial on the merits (Brief on the Merits (T.W), PDF pp. 24-25). She also argues the court defectively rendered an oral order because no court reporter was present and the pronouncement was not memorialized in a public writing (Brief on the Merits (T.W), PDF p. 9). **Department (Respondent):** The findings are mandatory but not jurisdictional under *In re J.S.*, so Mother's complaint was waived and she was estopped by having advocated for an extension at an earlier hearing (Brief on the Merits (Respondent), PDF p. 32). On rendition, the Department says a record can be waived in a contested hearing, Subsection (a) requires only that the extension be granted in no particular form, and the trial court clearly stated it was granting the extension, which all parties understood (Brief on the Merits (Respondent), PDF p. 33). ## Stated Reasons the Court Should Take the Case Mother argued that the trial court lost jurisdiction when it failed to make the required findings before the dismissal date; the Department answered that *In re J.S.* had rejected that contention by making it a mandatory but non-jurisdictional error (Response to Petition (Respondent), PDF p. 19). ## Oral Argument - **Marijuana, the State's position.** Asked whether marijuana use is per se endangerment, the Department's second counsel said no per se rule is known, but it is always a risk and relevant, case by case. (Oral Argument, 0:42:04) - **Marijuana in other counties.** Asked whether other counties treat marijuana differently, the Department's first counsel said it is a factor they have seen, but here a hair follicle test left the timing unclear. (Oral Argument, 0:28:30) - **Deference.** Asked how to get around deference given a gun, cocaine, and marijuana in the children's blood, the children's counsel said most best-interest factors favor the children's position. (Oral Argument, 0:13:00) - **Dismissal deadline.** Asked why strict compliance should not be expected for extending the dismissal deadline, the Department's second counsel said to look to the statute: dismissal unless the court grants an extension. (Oral Argument, 0:37:30) - **Mother's notice.** Asked whether the mother learned of the new trial setting before the dismissal deadline, her counsel said yes: by recollection she looked at the docket on February 27. (Oral Argument, 0:10:09) - **No motion to continue.** Asked whether the mother filed a motion to continue, her counsel said arguably they could have, but nothing in the record shows she agreed to the extension. (Oral Argument, 0:07:23) - **Three outcomes.** Asked whether preserving the mother's relationship with grandparent conservatorship is an option besides termination, the children's counsel said there are three possible resolutions. (Oral Argument, 0:16:00) ## Practice Area Tags family-law, civil-procedure ## Procedural Posture/Vehicle Petition for review from the Eleventh Court of Appeals (Eastland) in a parental-termination case; argued October 9, 2025, and decided June 5, 2026 (Opinion, PDF pp. 1, 12). ## Amicus Involvement None ## Holding Where trial did not begin before the one-year automatic-dismissal date, the determinant of subject-matter jurisdiction is the Section 263.401(a) extension order itself, and a trial court that signals only that it will grant an extension but does not render one before the date loses jurisdiction by operation of law; the trial and appellate judgments are vacated and the case dismissed (Opinion, PDF pp. 2-3, 6, 12). ## Court's Reasoning **Jurisdiction came first.** Courts always have jurisdiction to determine their own jurisdiction, and Mother's motion to dismiss was proper because every party is duty-bound to raise jurisdictional defects (Opinion, PDF pp. 2, 4-5). The Legislature divested trial courts of jurisdiction over cases not tried within a year, and an extension may delay dismissal only if the court properly grants it before the deadline (Opinion, PDF pp. 2-3). **The court never granted the extension.** The judge's "I am grant—I am going to have to grant an extension" showed the granting was still in the future and depended on the proposed order, which was never entered before March 11 (Opinion, PDF pp. 4, 6). Whose fault that was is immaterial, and the State retains other tools, including new termination proceedings if necessary (Opinion, PDF p. 7). **Rendition.** Under *In re G.X.H.*, Family Code Section 101.026's definition of "render" informs what it means to grant an extension, which requires a pronouncement made orally in the presence of a court reporter or in writing, including on the docket sheet or a separate written instrument (Opinion, PDF pp. 8-9). The Court rejected the dissent's reliance on Section 201.009 to permit oral extensions without a court reporter, and noted that written orders, which are instantly available, are especially important for a statute with automatic dismissal (Opinion, PDF pp. 10-11). **Dissent.** Justice Lehrmann, joined by Justices Bland and Huddle, and by Justice Busby as to Part II, would hold that the trial court granted the extension on the record before the date passed, and that the associate judge could do so orally without a court reporter because the Family Code lets associate judges preserve the record by other means (Lehrmann, J., dissenting, PDF pp. 1-2). ## Disposition The judgments of the trial court and court of appeals are vacated, and the case is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction (Opinion, PDF p. 12). ## Vote Breakdown Justice Young delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Blacklock and Justices Devine, Sullivan, and Hawkins (Opinion, PDF p. 1). Justice Lehrmann filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Bland and Huddle, and by Justice Busby as to Part II (Opinion, PDF p. 1). --- Source: The SCOTX Report, https://scotxreport.com/cases/25-0008. AI-generated summary of the Court's opinion, orders and the parties' briefs, with pin cites to the page of each document; verify against the Court's own documents at search.txcourts.gov.