# JMI Contractors, LLC v. Medellin Supreme Court of Texas, No. 24-0846 **JMI Contractors, LLC v. Medellin, No. 24-0846 (Tex. June 26, 2026). Holding: Medellin's claim sounds only in premises liability because his injury stems from nonfeasance and not contemporaneous malfeasance, and the record does not support an independent negligent-activity claim or the retained-control framework of Lee Lewis; and an independent contractor may not invoke the necessary-use exception to the open-and-obvious doctrine, so his premises claim fails as a matter of law.** Practice areas: personal injury, employment ## Key issues - An independent contractor cannot invoke the "necessary-use exception" to premises liability for an open and obvious danger—resolving, as a new bright-line holding, a question the Court had previously only hinted at. - A workplace fall from an unguarded roof edge sounds in premises liability, not negligent activity, because the injury stemmed from a failure to remedy a dangerous condition (nonfeasance), not from contemporaneous negligent conduct (malfeasance). ## Factual History Jose Medellin, an independent contractor with roofing experience hired by Metal Roof, which was itself retained by general contractor JMI Contractors, LLC for a roofing project at an apartment complex in San Antonio, was helping stretch a rubberized membrane over part of the roof (Opinion, PDF pp. 2-3). Raul Rodriguez, a JMI employee, supervised the job site, and while pulling the roll with Reybel Rodriguez, an independent contractor, Medellin lost track of the roof's edge, stepped off, fell about 30 feet, and was seriously injured (Opinion, PDF p. 3). JMI says he drank beer and smoked marijuana hours earlier and walked backward off a flat roof despite knowing the risk, while Medellin says JMI controlled jobsite safety (Brief on the Merits (JMI Contractors, LLC), PDF pp. 14-16, 18; Brief on the Merits (Jose Manuel Medellin), PDF p. 19). ## Procedural History Medellin sued JMI on several theories, and a Bexar County jury found JMI liable on both negligent activity and premises liability, the trial court entered judgment on the verdict and the court of appeals affirmed (Opinion, PDF pp. 1, 3-4). The Fourth Court of Appeals (San Antonio) initially ordered a new trial on an issue not before this Court, but on rehearing withdrew that opinion and affirmed, holding that the necessary-use exception applied because JMI controlled the jobsite's safety requirements (Opinion, PDF pp. 4-5). The Supreme Court granted review and heard argument on January 15, 2026 (Opinion, PDF pp. 1, 5), and on June 26, 2026 reversed and rendered judgment for JMI in an opinion by Justice Hawkins, with a concurrence by Justice Busby (Opinion, PDF pp. 1, 32). ## Issues Presented - JMI (Brief on the Merits (JMI Contractors, LLC), PDF p. 13): whether the court of appeals improperly blended negligent-activity and premises-defect theories in assessing JMI's duties, whether it was appropriate to apply the necessary-use exception to impose a duty on JMI, and whether the court of appeals erred on the exclusion of evidence of Medellin's substance use, the closing argument and the punitive-damages evidence. - Medellin (Brief on the Merits (Jose Manuel Medellin), PDF p. 12): whether a general judgment on two separately submitted theories must be affirmed if the evidence supports one, whether a general contractor that retains control of jobsite safety owes a duty to make the premises safe where the necessary-use exception applies, and whether the evidentiary, closing-argument and gross-negligence challenges show error. ## Standard(s) of Review Whether an injury implicates premises liability or negligent activity is a question of law reviewed de novo, and a plaintiff's pleading does not change the character of the claim (Opinion, PDF pp. 15-16). ## Legal Arguments **Whether the claim sounds in negligent activity or premises liability.** **JMI (Petitioner):** The court of appeals improperly blended two distinct theories, and Medellin's injury from an open and obvious roof edge arose from a premises condition and not from contemporaneous activity (Brief on the Merits (JMI Contractors, LLC), PDF pp. 13, 18). **Medellin (Respondent):** Unlike the plaintiff in *United Scaffolding v. Levine*, he submitted and won separate findings on premises liability and negligent activity, so the general judgment must be affirmed if either theory is supported (Brief on the Merits (Jose Manuel Medellin), PDF p. 19). **Whether the necessary-use exception reaches independent contractors.** **JMI (Petitioner):** The court of appeals applied the exception to require JMI to warn Medellin of the project's risks although this Court has expressed doubt that it applies to independent contractors, and this appeal is a vehicle to decide that question (Brief on the Merits (JMI Contractors, LLC), PDF p. 18). **Medellin (Respondent):** A general contractor that retains contractual and actual control over jobsite safety owes a duty to make the premises safe where the necessary-use exception applies, even if the fall risk is open and obvious (Brief on the Merits (Jose Manuel Medellin), PDF p. 12). ## Stated Reasons the Court Should Take the Case JMI argued that the court of appeals blended two theories of liability and applied the necessary-use exception to an independent contractor despite this Court's expressed doubt, and Medellin responded that the petition presents no novel legal question (Brief on the Merits (JMI Contractors, LLC), PDF p. 18; Brief on the Merits (Jose Manuel Medellin), PDF p. 19). ## Oral Argument - **Native condition.** Asked where to draw the line between negligent activity and premises defects, JMI's counsel said the alleged defect is the unguarded roof edge, as it existed before any work. (Oral Argument, 0:02:43; 0:04:37) - **Warn or make safe.** JMI's counsel said the premises duty to an invitee is ordinarily to warn or make the premises safe, and a flat roof edge is commonplace. (Oral Argument, 0:08:52; 0:10:53) - **Necessary use.** Asked whether independent contractors can never use the necessary-use exception, JMI's counsel said it should not apply to them. (Oral Argument, 0:16:59) - **Case-by-case.** Asked why the necessary-use exception should reach independent contractors, Medellin's counsel said it is fact-specific, so a bright line excluding them would be wrong. (Oral Argument, 0:40:35) - **Open and obvious.** Asked how open and obviousness matters if there is negligent activity, Medellin's counsel said it is not relevant, and trial counsel submitted both theories to be safe. (Oral Argument, 0:42:00; 0:42:45) - **Impairment evidence.** Asked why jurors hearing about marijuana and beer would be prejudiced, Medellin's counsel said impairment could be relevant, but treating all consumption as relevant, whenever it occurred, goes too far. (Oral Argument, 0:33:16) - **Unusual activity.** On rebuttal, JMI's counsel said a skilled roofer walking backward toward the edge twice made the earlier consumption relevant, and no expert is needed to explain impairment. (Oral Argument, 0:45:21; 0:46:22) ## Practice Area Tags personal-injury, employment ## Procedural Posture/Vehicle Petition for review from the Fourth Court of Appeals (San Antonio); argued January 15, 2026; opinion by Justice Hawkins issued June 26, 2026, with a concurrence by Justice Busby (Opinion, PDF pp. 1, 32). ## Amicus Involvement None noted ## Holding Medellin's claim sounds only in premises liability because his injury stems from nonfeasance and not contemporaneous malfeasance, and the record does not support an independent negligent-activity claim or the retained-control framework of *Lee Lewis*; and an independent contractor may not invoke the necessary-use exception to the open-and-obvious doctrine, so his premises claim fails as a matter of law (Opinion, PDF pp. 2, 18-22, 30-32). ## Standard of Review De novo review of the legal question whether an injury implicates premises liability or negligent activity and of whether the necessary-use exception applies (Opinion, PDF pp. 15-16, 22-23). ## Court's Reasoning Negligent activity and premises liability are separate, non-interchangeable theories, a negligent-activity claim requires contemporaneous action, and where an injury results from an activity made dangerous only by its relation to a premises condition the claim sounds in premises liability, as in the "minefield" example (Opinion, PDF pp. 10, 16-18). Medellin's claim concerns the unguarded roof edge, the instruction to "pull the roll" came from another independent contractor and not from JMI, failing to provide safety measures is nonfeasance, and the jury's general finding of "some control" does not show the particularized control over his activity that *Lee Lewis*, as limited by *Dow Chemical* and *Moritz*, requires (Opinion, PDF pp. 18-22). Because he agreed the roof edge was open and obvious, his premises claim fails unless the necessary-use exception applies, and the Court held that it does not reach independent contractors, who are expected to evaluate and mitigate obvious hazards, are better positioned to do so and bring their own equipment and the authority to refuse unsafe work, as Medellin's experience and testimony show (Opinion, PDF pp. 22-23, 30-32). Justice Busby, concurring, agreed that the dangerous condition was open and obvious and that the Court was not altering the separate duty of one who retains control of an independent contractor's work to exercise it with reasonable care (Concurring Opinion, PDF pp. 1-3). ## Disposition Court of appeals' judgment reversed and a take-nothing judgment rendered in favor of JMI (Opinion, PDF p. 32). ## Vote Breakdown, Authorship, and Any Concurrence/Dissent Justice Hawkins delivered the opinion of the Court, and Justice Busby filed a concurring opinion (Opinion, PDF p. 1). --- Source: The SCOTX Report, https://scotxreport.com/cases/24-0846. AI-generated summary of the Court's opinion, orders and the parties' briefs, with pin cites to the page of each document; verify against the Court's own documents at search.txcourts.gov.