# Perez v. City of San Antonio

Supreme Court of Texas, No. 24-0714

**Perez v. City of San Antonio, No. 24-0714 (Tex. June 13, 2025). Holding: When the Texas Religious Services Clause applies, its force is absolute and categorical, forbidding governmental prohibitions and limitations on religious services regardless of the government's interest or how tailored the limitation is; but its scope is not unlimited, and it does not extend to governmental actions for the preservation and management of public lands.**

Practice areas: texas constitution, real property

## Key issues

- Answering a Fifth Circuit certified question about the Texas Religious Services Clause (Art. I, § 6-a, adopted in 2021), the Court held that when the clause applies its force is absolute and categorical, barring government limits on religious services regardless of the government's interest or tailoring, but that its scope is not unlimited, and it does not extend to the government's preservation and management of publicly owned lands.
- The Court declined to define the clause's scope comprehensively, rejecting the City's view that it reaches only unequal treatment of religious services and the State's view that it covers only gatherings, and expressed no opinion on the plaintiffs' Free Exercise, freedom-of-worship, or Texas RFRA claims.

## Factual History
Gary Perez and Matilde Torres are members of the Lipan-Apache Native American Church, which teaches that life on earth began at a spring along the San Antonio River and that members must worship at certain times in a twenty-by-thirty-foot "Sacred Area" in Brackenridge Park, a City of San Antonio park, facing cypress trees and nesting cormorants that are part of the "spiritual ecology" (Opinion, PDF pp. 2-3). For over 125 years the Sacred Area has existed within the park, and the City has accommodated the Church's gatherings while building retaining walls and other improvements (Opinion, PDF p. 3). After a 2016 bond package that included nearly $8 million for park improvements, the City adopted a plan to repair failing retaining walls, remove and replace most of the trees, and deter migratory birds, including cormorants, from nesting nearby, because eroding walls, dying trees, and bird excrement created health and safety problems (Opinion, PDF pp. 3-4). When the City briefly blocked access after a retaining wall failed and a tree branch fell in 2023, Perez sued (Opinion, PDF p. 4). Perez says the plan will destroy the Church's worship space; the parties dispute how necessary the measures are and how far the City tried to accommodate the Church (Opinion, PDF pp. 4-5).

## Procedural History
This is a certified question from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Perez sued the City in federal court under the First Amendment, the Texas Freedom of Worship Clause, the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), and the new Religious Services Clause; the district court ordered access for limited-size ceremonies but declined to enjoin the tree-removal and bird-deterrence plans (Opinion, PDF pp. 4-5). The Fifth Circuit initially affirmed, finding the Religious Services Clause claim inadequately briefed, then granted rehearing, withdrew its opinion, and certified a question to this Court (Opinion, PDF pp. 5-6). The Court accepted the question and heard argument on December 4, 2024, with Perez, the City, and the State of Texas, appearing as amicus through the Attorney General, participating (Opinion, PDF p. 6; Statement of Justice Young, PDF p. 1). Justice Young, in a statement, would have granted amicus First Liberty Institute's request for five minutes of argument time, but the Court denied it (Statement of Justice Young, PDF pp. 1-2). The Court answered the question on June 13, 2025, over a dissent by Justice Sullivan (Opinion, PDF pp. 1, 36).

## Issues Presented
The certified question is whether the Religious Services Clause, Article I, Section 6-a of the Texas Constitution, "impose[s] a categorical bar on any limitation of any religious service, regardless of the sort of limitation and the government's interest in that limitation" (Opinion, PDF pp. 5-6). The parties and amici treat it as two questions, the "force" of the Clause when it applies and the "scope" of its application (Opinion, PDF p. 10; Brief on the Merits (Appellant in case), PDF p. 17).

## Standard(s) of Review
The Court's task is to identify what the Clause would have meant to those who ratified it in 2021, relying heavily on the literal text and considering linguistic and historical context, with contemporaneous legislative explanations yielding to plain text (Opinion, PDF pp. 7-9). The Court also stressed the risks of certified questions, which may be answered in the abstract without a factual record, and so confined its answer to what the question requires (Opinion, PDF pp. 22-24).

## Legal Arguments
**The Clause's force: whether it is categorical.**

**Appellants (Perez and Torres):** The Religious Services Amendment creates a categorical bar on government actions that prohibit or limit religious services, because the Legislature and the people adopted it after COVID-19 closures to go beyond the strict scrutiny that Texas RFRA already provided; at minimum, any limit should receive a heightened form of strict scrutiny (Brief on the Merits (Appellant in case), PDF p. 33; Reply Brief (Appellant in case), PDF p. 8).

**Appellee (City of San Antonio):** The Clause aims at lockdown orders that closed churches while permitting "essential" secular functions, so it bars only unequal treatment of religious services and subjects laws to strict scrutiny, as constitutional rights are generally construed in balance with other societal imperatives (Brief on the Merits (Appellee in case), PDF p. 41; Opinion, PDF pp. 10-11).

**The Clause's scope: whether it reaches park maintenance.**

**Appellants (Perez and Torres):** The text and longstanding interpretive principles of Texas constitutional law limit the scope, but where the Clause applies, and Perez says it applies here, it protects religious services from the City's tree removal and bird deterrence (Brief on the Merits (Appellant in case), PDF p. 33; Opinion, PDF pp. 29, 33).

**Appellee (City of San Antonio):** The Clause does not reach day-to-day municipal actions on city-owned land, such as park renovations to address safety issues, that may have an incidental downstream effect on religious practice (Brief on the Merits (Appellee in case), PDF p. 41).

**Amicus State of Texas** argued that the Clause protects only the right to gather for religious services, not what adherents do when gathered (Opinion, PDF pp. 27-28). The Senate and House sponsors of the amendment wrote in an amicus brief that the Clause protects acts of worship that inherently comprise religious services (Opinion, PDF p. 28). The opinion says all the amici that address the question agree that the Clause's force is categorical (Opinion, PDF pp. 10-11).

## Stated Reasons the Court Should Take the Case
The Fifth Circuit certified the question, and the Court accepted it, because the Clause is new and no Texas court has construed it (Opinion, PDF pp. 5-6; Statement of Justice Young, PDF p. 2).

## Oral Argument

- **Discrimination not in the text.** Asked where a discrimination component appears in the text, the City's counsel said it is not expressed, but is the only way to read the amendment given its origin. (Oral Argument, 0:25:19)
- **Private property.** Asked if a landowner can use trespass laws to bar services at a sacred site, appellants' counsel said absolutely; there is no right to trespass on private property. (Oral Argument, 0:04:06)
- **Prisoner leader.** Asked if confining a religious leader violates section 6-a, appellants' counsel said no; a coequal constitutional power is a background principle. (Oral Argument, 0:07:43)
- **Facilitating services.** Asked whether the government must facilitate a service, such as caring for diseased trees, appellants' counsel said it probably does not. (Oral Argument, 0:13:27)
- **Restaurant hypothetical.** On rebuttal, asked about a ban on groups of five or more eating or drinking, appellants' counsel said it would be indirect, though it stops church communion. (Oral Argument, 1:05:22)
- **Sacramental marriage.** Asked about marriage regulation at the age of consent, appellants' counsel disagreed that it would be swept in, since the regulation addresses harm. (Oral Argument, 1:07:28)

## Practice Area Tags
texas-constitution, real-property

## Procedural Posture/Vehicle
Certified question from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit under Texas Constitution article V, Section 3-c, and Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 58.1; argued December 4, 2024, and decided June 13, 2025, in an opinion by Justice Boyd with a dissent by Justice Sullivan (Opinion, PDF pp. 1, 36).

## Amicus Involvement
- [State of Texas (Office of the Attorney General)](https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=f2d6859e-0d51-49cc-9201-cdb5e2c257f1&coa=cossup&DT=BRIEFS&MediaID=3f70e9b1-90c6-4979-9bcb-0cfbe02d5f28) filed an amicus brief and participated in oral argument.
- [First Liberty Institute](https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=a9a7ed3e-bc8a-4e84-a979-e26642b0ef75&coa=cossup&DT=BRIEFS&MediaID=7d3de544-8741-4f68-b3fc-efe904ee4805) filed an amicus brief.
- [International Council of Thirteen Indigenous Grandmothers, et al.](https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=f3d30625-a52d-4936-80ba-7a42657686dd&coa=cossup&DT=BRIEFS&MediaID=562a2826-d4b5-4db0-855d-a60351d764db) filed an amicus brief.
- [Texas Catholic Conference of Bishops](https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=2c8e7ee7-15b1-48a7-be89-9178ffe8e053&coa=cossup&DT=BRIEFS&MediaID=65d008e9-94e5-42e3-8d64-f211d71de43d) filed an amicus letter brief.
- [The Baptist General Convention of Texas](https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=54f59135-2283-4436-89c7-10e268afe7f0&coa=cossup&DT=BRIEFS&MediaID=cef25dc8-5e67-4198-8ae6-ab550db66f24) filed an amicus letter.
- [Senator Kelly Hancock and Representative Jeff Leach](https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=961c0de1-c3c6-4f82-ab70-0ead09387613&coa=cossup&DT=BRIEFS&MediaID=56e4d0f5-7246-45a6-a318-91ed2afe6281) filed an amicus letter brief.
- [Wolfgang P. Hirczy de Mino, PhD](https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=adc9beb6-3405-4624-963a-521c38399106&coa=cossup&DT=BRIEFS&MediaID=44428f1b-f969-42c2-a2cc-a0eb6679d9ec) filed an amicus letter brief.

## Holding
When the Texas Religious Services Clause applies, its force is absolute and categorical, forbidding governmental prohibitions and limitations on religious services regardless of the government's interest or how tailored the limitation is; but its scope is not unlimited, and it does not extend to governmental actions for the preservation and management of public lands (Opinion, PDF pp. 2, 36).

## Court's Reasoning
**Force.** The Clause says the government "may not" enact a rule that "prohibits or limits religious services," a direct prohibition with no caveat, unlike provisions such as the Texas RFRA that expressly allow laws that survive strict scrutiny (Opinion, PDF pp. 12-13). Because the Free Exercise Clause, the Freedom of Worship Clause, and the RFRA already apply strict scrutiny, reading the new Clause to allow laws that survive it would leave it without independent meaning (Opinion, PDF pp. 13-14). The historical context confirms this: the Legislature proposed and voters ratified the Clause in response to COVID-19 shutdown orders, a proposal to add "narrowly tailored" language failed, and legislators on both sides and the press understood that no state interest could justify limiting services (Opinion, PDF pp. 14-19). The City's argument that every constitutional right is qualified by strict scrutiny ignores that the Clause's context differs from the Free Exercise Clause's (Opinion, PDF pp. 19-21).

**Scope.** The Court did not try to define the Clause's boundaries, because a certified question may be answered without a factual record and the consequences are unknown but vast (Opinion, PDF pp. 22-24). The text limits the Clause in five ways: it applies only to the State or a political subdivision, to enacting, adopting, or issuing a statute, order, proclamation, decision, or rule, to "religious services," to services by a qualifying religious organization, and to government actions that "prohibit or limit" them (Opinion, PDF pp. 24-25). The Court rejected the City's view that the Clause reaches only unequal treatment, because it was also adopted in response to orders such as Travis County's that barred all gatherings, and rejected the State's view that it protects only gatherings, because it also protects worship practices; it also rejected Perez's "longstanding interpretive principles" limit as amorphous and unpredictable (Opinion, PDF pp. 25-30).

**Application.** The Clause supplements, rather than supplants, existing protections, and the House sponsor said fire, health, zoning, and public-safety laws would remain enforceable (Opinion, PDF pp. 30-31). The City's decision to remove trees and deter birds in a public park does not prohibit the Church from gathering or regulate what it does when it gathers; it concerns preservation and maintenance of property the government owns, which differs in character from the COVID orders, so the Clause does not reach it (Opinion, PDF pp. 31-32). The Court noted cases such as *Lyng* and *Apache Stronghold* but expressed no opinion on Perez's Free Exercise, Freedom of Worship, or RFRA claims, which the Fifth Circuit set aside (Opinion, PDF pp. 33-35).

**Dissent (Justice Sullivan).** He would have declined to answer, because the certified question seeks an advisory opinion on an abstract question about a new provision no Texas court has construed, and the majority answers a question the Fifth Circuit did not ask, exceeding the Court's jurisdiction to answer only the questions certified (Sullivan, J., dissenting, PDF pp. 1-4). He also noted the Fifth Circuit had found the plaintiffs' briefing on this claim sparse, so the claim might fail anyway on forfeiture, and the plaintiffs may fare better under the RFRA or Article I, Section 6 (Sullivan, J., dissenting, PDF pp. 2, 5-6).

## Disposition
The Court answered the certified question as stated in its holding and left it to the federal courts to apply the answer in the underlying case (Opinion, PDF p. 36).

## Vote Breakdown
Justice Boyd delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Blacklock and Justices Lehrmann, Devine, Busby, Bland, Huddle, and Young; Justice Sullivan filed a dissenting opinion (Opinion, PDF p. 1).


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Source: The SCOTX Report, https://scotxreport.com/cases/24-0714. AI-generated summary of the Court's opinion, orders and the parties' briefs, with pin cites to the page of each document; verify against the Court's own documents at search.txcourts.gov.