# Ruth v. Comm'n for Lawyer Discipline Supreme Court of Texas, No. 24-0613 **Ruth v. Comm'n for Lawyer Discipline, No. 24-0613 (Tex. June 12, 2026). Holding: Rule 4.02 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, which prohibits a lawyer from contacting represented persons "[i]n representing a client," does not apply to a pro se lawyer, and the rule of lenity requires the Commission to show conduct falling clearly within the rule's terms.** Practice areas: legal ethics ## Key issues - The disciplinary "no-contact" rule, Rule 4.02(a), does not apply to a lawyer representing himself, because it bars contact only "in representing a client." - The Court reversed a five-year active suspension and rendered judgment for the lawyer, invoking the rule of lenity: a lawyer must have clearer notice before being disciplined for contacting represented parties while pro se. ## Factual History In August 2020 the Commission for Lawyer Discipline began a disciplinary proceeding against attorney William Ruth over his handling of a personal-injury case, and Ruth represented himself while the Commission was represented by counsel from the Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel (Opinion, PDF p. 2). After Ruth put individual Commission members on the electronic service list for two motions, the Commission's counsel emailed him to stop "improperly communicating directly with Commission members, parties who are represented by counsel," but he served them with more filings, wrote the former Commission chair asking that counsel be recused, and sent them correspondence addressed to the district judge (Opinion, PDF p. 2). The Commission says he did this repeatedly between October 2020 and December 2021 (Brief on the Merits (Respondent), PDF pp. 12-13). ## Procedural History In April 2022 the Commission filed a second disciplinary proceeding based on those communications, alleging violations of Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct 4.02(a) and 8.04(a)(1) (Opinion, PDF p. 3). The trial court granted the Commission's motion for partial summary judgment, found that Ruth communicated about the subject of the representation with an entity of government he knew to be represented, held that he violated both rules, and after a sanctions hearing actively suspended him from practice for five years and awarded the Commission attorney's fees (Opinion, PDF p. 4). The Fourth Court of Appeals (San Antonio) affirmed, holding that "a lawyer acting pro se represents himself as a client" and is subject to Rule 4.02 (Opinion, PDF p. 5). The vehicle in this Court is a petition for review filed by Ruth in an attorney-disciplinary proceeding, argued on November 5, 2025, and decided on June 12, 2026 (Opinion, PDF pp. 1, 5, 17). A related first disciplinary case against Ruth is pending separately (Brief on the Merits (Respondent), PDF p. 11). ## Issues Presented The sole issue is whether the no-contact rule, Rule 4.02(a), which applies when a lawyer is "[i]n representing a client," applies to a lawyer acting pro se (Opinion, PDF pp. 1-2, 5). Ruth argues the plain text limits the rule to lawyers representing clients (Brief on the Merits (Petitioner), PDF p. 22). ## Standard(s) of Review The Court applies statutory-construction principles to the disciplinary rules, looking to the plain and common meaning of the words in the context of the rules as a whole (Opinion, PDF p. 5). Because a disciplinary proceeding is "highly penal," the rule of lenity applies to the extent the rule is unclear (Opinion, PDF pp. 13-14). ## Legal Arguments **Whether Rule 4.02(a) applies to a lawyer representing himself.** **Ruth (Petitioner):** The plain meaning of the rule's text limits it to lawyers representing clients, and the trial court's suspension rests on the opposite conclusion of law (Brief on the Merits (Petitioner), PDF p. 22). Texas Ethics Committee Opinion 653 and the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers support that reading, and the rule's purpose of protecting represented parties from a lawyer's superior knowledge is served by limiting it to lawyers acting as lawyers, not parties who hold a license (Brief on the Merits (Petitioner), PDF pp. 30-32). **Commission for Lawyer Discipline (Respondent):** A lawyer who represents himself, including in his own disciplinary matter, remains subject to the no-contact rule; Texas courts that have addressed similar issues, and most other jurisdictions, agree; and Ruth relies on a non-binding ethics opinion and a hyperliteral reading, whereas the rule read in the context of the ethics rules as a whole clearly applies to pro se lawyers (Brief on the Merits (Respondent), PDF pp. 19, 22). Adopting Ruth's reading would lower the ethical bar for lawyers who choose to represent themselves (Brief on the Merits (Respondent), PDF p. 19). ## Stated Reasons the Court Should Take the Case Ruth's briefing presented the question as a purely legal one on which, he said, no Texas appellate opinion had squarely ruled, and on which the court of appeals disagreed with the Restatement and the Texas Committee on Professional Ethics (Brief on the Merits (Petitioner), PDF pp. 9, 23, 31). ## Oral Argument - **Both lawyer and litigant.** Asked whether a self-represented lawyer is both lawyer and litigant, Ruth's counsel said no, comparing a non-lawyer who represents themselves and is not a lawyer for being their own client. (Oral Argument, 0:02:22) - **Policy call.** Asked whether a self-represented lawyer could talk to a represented party, Ruth's counsel said maybe not, because that is a policy call made when writing the rule. (Oral Argument, 0:07:45) ## Practice Area Tags legal-ethics ## Procedural Posture/Vehicle Petition for review from the Fourth Court of Appeals (San Antonio) in an attorney-disciplinary proceeding; argued November 5, 2025, and decided June 12, 2026 (Opinion, PDF pp. 1, 5, 17). ## Amicus Involvement None ## Holding Rule 4.02 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, which prohibits a lawyer from contacting represented persons "[i]n representing a client," does not apply to a pro se lawyer, and the rule of lenity requires the Commission to show conduct falling clearly within the rule's terms (Opinion, PDF pp. 1-2, 14-16). ## Court's Reasoning **Text and context.** Some disciplinary rules apply to a lawyer's conduct generally, while others, including Rule 4.02, are expressly confined to conduct "[i]n representing a client," and Comment 2 confirms the rule does not bar communications between a lawyer's client and represented persons (Opinion, PDF pp. 6-7). Authorities diverge: some jurisdictions with a clarifying provision say the rule reaches pro se lawyers, a divided ABA opinion and most jurisdictions apply it to them, and the Restatement and the Texas ethics committee say it does not (Opinion, PDF pp. 8-10). A pro se lawyer is in one sense both lawyer and client and in another neither, and applying the rule to one serves its purpose but conflicts with Comment 2 (Opinion, PDF p. 11). **The prefatory language cannot be meaningless.** The Court agreed with the Connecticut Supreme Court that a lawyer who is a party and contacts a represented person does not violate a rule limited to "representing a client," because holding otherwise would leave the prefatory language meaningless, and it doubted there is a legitimate basis to prohibit a pro se lawyer from doing what a represented lawyer-litigant may do (Opinion, PDF pp. 11-12). **Lenity.** Given the rule's lack of express language on pro se lawyers, the Court was hesitant to subject them to discipline, and because a disciplinary proceeding is highly penal the Commission must show conduct "clearly within" the rule's terms, which a pro se lawyer's communication does not (Opinion, PDF pp. 13-15). As a policy matter the rule might be amended to say so, but "we do not revise our rules by opinion" (Opinion, PDF p. 15). The Court emphasized that other rules not limited to representing a client, such as those on frivolous filings, still hold pro se lawyers accountable (Opinion, PDF pp. 15-16). **Concurrence.** Justice Huddle, concurring in the judgment, would hold that a pro se lawyer is "representing a client" and subject to Rule 4.02(a) but agreed Ruth should not be disciplined because he could justifiably rely on the Texas ethics committee's contrary guidance (Huddle, J., concurring in the judgment, PDF pp. 1-2). ## Disposition Court of appeals' judgment reversed and the disciplinary proceeding against Ruth dismissed (Opinion, PDF pp. 16-17). ## Vote Breakdown Justice Lehrmann delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Blacklock and Justices Devine, Busby, Bland, Young, Sullivan, and Hawkins (Opinion, PDF p. 1). Justice Huddle concurred in the judgment only, in a separate opinion (Huddle, J., concurring in the judgment, PDF p. 1). --- Source: The SCOTX Report, https://scotxreport.com/cases/24-0613. AI-generated summary of the Court's opinion, orders and the parties' briefs, with pin cites to the page of each document; verify against the Court's own documents at search.txcourts.gov.