# In re C.K.M. Supreme Court of Texas, No. 24-0267 **In re C.K.M., No. 24-0267 (Tex. Mar. 14, 2025). Holding: The Dismissal Order was not a final judgment, because it neither clearly and unequivocally expresses an intent to finally dispose of all claims and parties nor actually disposes of the termination petition or the parents' counter-petitions; the trial court therefore kept its plenary power and the Sanctions Order is not void, though the Department's appeal from it must be dismissed for want of a final judgment.** Practice areas: family law, civil procedure ## Key issues - An order directing the clerk to "remove this cause from the Court's docket" and notifying the parties "this cause is hereby dismissed" is not a final judgment where it lacks other indicia of finality and does not dispose of pending counter-claims and sanctions motions, so the trial court kept plenary power to enter a sanctions order. - The Court dismissed the appeal from the sanctions order for want of a final judgment, reversed the court of appeals' judgment vacating that order, and remanded to the trial court. ## Factual History In September 2022, the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services filed a petition for temporary orders requiring Mother and Father to participate in state-provided services for the safety of their child, and the trial court promptly granted them (Opinion, PDF p. 2). On August 4, 2023, the Department filed a separate petition to terminate Mother's and Father's parental rights and obtain conservatorship (Opinion, PDF p. 2). Mother moved to consolidate the two suits, answered, counter-petitioned for sole managing conservatorship, and moved for sanctions in both suits, asserting that the Department's claims were frivolous and brought in bad faith; Father filed his own answer, counter-petition, and sanctions motion (Opinion, PDF p. 2). In response, the Department moved to nonsuit all its claims (Opinion, PDF p. 2). ## Procedural History At an August 10, 2023 hearing the trial court orally granted consolidation and told the Department that, because the parents had filed sanctions motions, it planned a separate hearing on them (Opinion, PDF pp. 2-3). On August 21 it signed the Department's proposed "Order on Motion to Terminate Temporary Order for Required Participation in Services," which terminated the temporary order, relieved the attorney ad litem, and directed the clerk to "remove this cause from the Court's docket and send notice to all parties that this cause is hereby dismissed" (the Dismissal Order), after telling the Department it would still hold the sanctions hearing (Opinion, PDF pp. 3-4). It signed the consolidation order the next day, held the sanctions hearing on September 20, and on September 29 granted the sanctions motions and ordered the Department to pay the parents' fees and costs (the Sanctions Order) (Opinion, PDF p. 4). A divided Fifth Court of Appeals (sitting in Dallas) held that the Dismissal Order was final, that the trial court's plenary power therefore expired before the Sanctions Order, and that the Sanctions Order was void, so it vacated that order and dismissed the Department's appeal (Opinion, PDF pp. 4-5). Father petitioned for review on April 5, 2024, and the Department responded on July 5, 2024; the Court requested merits briefing and decided the case per curiam on March 14, 2025, without oral argument (Docket; Opinion, PDF p. 11). ## Issues Presented Father presents one issue: whether the court of appeals erred in finding the August 21 order unambiguous and thus refusing to examine the record to determine whether the trial court intended it to be a final judgment (Petition for Review (Petitioner), PDF p. 9; Father's Brief on the Merits, PDF p. 9). The Department frames the issues as whether the court of appeals properly held that the dismissal order disposed of all issues and parties, and whether the Sanctions Order, entered thirty-nine days later, was therefore void (Department's Brief on the Merits, PDF p. 7). ## Standard(s) of Review A judgment issued without a conventional trial is final if it actually disposes of all claims and parties then before the court, or if it states with unmistakable clarity that it is a final judgment as to all claims and all parties (Opinion, PDF p. 5). Under the first method the appellate court reviews the record, and under the second it looks only to the order's words (Opinion, PDF pp. 5-7). ## Legal Arguments **Whether the Dismissal Order was a final judgment.** **Petitioner (Father):** The August 21 order was intended only to grant the Department's nonsuit of its own case; when it was signed the sanctions motions and counter-petitions were pending, the reporter's record shows the trial court meant to keep jurisdiction, and the court of appeals wrongly called the order unambiguous and refused to consult the record (Father's Brief on the Merits, PDF p. 13). He adds that Rule of Civil Procedure 162 provides that a nonsuit has no effect on a pending motion for sanctions, and that the Department used the nonsuit to try to avoid sanctions (Father's Brief on the Merits, PDF p. 13 n.2; Mother's Brief on the Merits, PDF p. 14). **Mother:** In her brief on the merits she makes the same points, that the order granted only the Department's nonsuit, that the parents' counter-petitions and sanctions motions remained pending, and that no final judgment was ever signed; the Court noted that she filed no petition for review and so could not be granted relief (Mother's Brief on the Merits, PDF p. 14; Opinion, PDF p. 5 n.6). **Respondent (Department):** The petition presents nothing for review, because the order dismissing "this cause" and removing it from the docket clearly and unequivocally disposed of the entire case, no magic language is required for finality, and the Sanctions Order came 39 days later, after plenary power expired, and was void (Department's Brief on the Merits, PDF p. 13; Response to Petition (Respondent), PDF p. 11). It also argues that the court of appeals properly refused to use a reporter's record to second-guess the order's language (Response to Petition (Respondent), PDF p. 11). The Department relied only on the second finality method, not the first (Opinion, PDF p. 6). ## Stated Reasons the Court Should Take the Case Father's petition presents the question whether the court of appeals erred in not examining the record to determine whether the order was intended to be final (Petition for Review (Petitioner), PDF p. 9). The Department responded that the petition presents nothing for review because the court of appeals relied on well-established rules (Response to Petition (Respondent), PDF p. 11). The Court described the case as "yet another 'new scenario'" on finality (Opinion, PDF p. 1). ## Practice Area Tags family-law, civil-procedure ## Procedural Posture/Vehicle Petition for review from the Fifth Court of Appeals; decided per curiam without oral argument under Rule of Appellate Procedure 59.1 (Opinion, PDF pp. 1, 11). ## Amicus Involvement None. The docket shows no amicus filings. ## Holding The Dismissal Order was not a final judgment, because it neither clearly and unequivocally expresses an intent to finally dispose of all claims and parties nor actually disposes of the termination petition or the parents' counter-petitions; the trial court therefore kept its plenary power and the Sanctions Order is not void, though the Department's appeal from it must be dismissed for want of a final judgment (Opinion, PDF pp. 1, 9-11). ## Court's Reasoning Under the second *Lehmann* method, the trial court's intent to finally dispose of the case must be unequivocally expressed in the words of the order, and the Court has found finality where several indicia appear together, such as being titled final, disposing of all claims and parties, and being appealable, but not where an order has only one such statement, like a Mother Hubbard clause, a finality label, or enforcement language (Opinion, PDF pp. 6-9). The Dismissal Order has no such "host of indicia": it does not say it is final or appealable or disposes of all claims and parties, has no Mother Hubbard clause or enforcement language, and has no decretal language except relieving the ad litem (Opinion, PDF p. 9). The Department argued that "this cause" means the entire consolidated case, but the order's title, introductory paragraph, finding, and relief all concern only the request to terminate the temporary order, so its reference to dismissing the "cause" and removing it from the docket does not alone clearly and unequivocally express an intent to render a final judgment (Opinion, PDF pp. 9-10). Under the first method, the order is not final either, because the record shows it does not address the termination petition or either parent's counter-petition, which the Department does not dispute (Opinion, PDF pp. 6 n.9, 10-11). ## Disposition Without hearing oral argument, the Court granted the petition for review, reversed the court of appeals' judgment vacating the Sanctions Order, dismissed the appeal, and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings (Opinion, PDF p. 11). ## Vote Breakdown Per curiam opinion of the Court (Opinion, PDF p. 1). --- Source: The SCOTX Report, https://scotxreport.com/cases/24-0267. AI-generated summary of the Court's opinion, orders and the parties' briefs, with pin cites to the page of each document; verify against the Court's own documents at search.txcourts.gov.