# Paxton v. Am. Oversight Supreme Court of Texas, No. 24-0162 **Paxton v. Am. Oversight, No. 24-0162 (Tex. June 27, 2025). Holding: Section 552.321(b) of the Public Information Act is a venue provision that does not expand the jurisdiction of district courts over constitutional executive officers; under section 22.002(c) and A & T Consultants v.** Practice areas: open records, administrative law, texas constitution ## Key issues - Government Code § 552.321(b), which requires a Public Information Act mandamus suit to be filed in the district court of the county where the governmental body's main offices are located, is a venue provision that does not give district courts jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus against constitutional executive officers like the Governor and Attorney General. - Under Government Code § 22.002(c) and A & T Consultants v. Sharp, only the Supreme Court may issue mandamus against those officers, so the district court lacked jurisdiction over American Oversight's petition; the requestor's remaining remedies include criminal penalties and suit under § 552.3215 through the Travis County district attorney. ## Factual History In 2022, American Oversight sent three Public Information Act (PIA) requests to the Governor's office, seeking official communications involving any non-governmental email address attributed to the Governor, text messages about official business, and emails with the National Rifle Association, the Texas State Rifle Association, and similar groups (Opinion, PDF p. 3). The Governor's office withheld responsive documents as privileged after requesting rulings from the Attorney General's office, produced about 100 pages of text messages after a ruling that some information must be released, and reported no responsive information to the third request (Opinion, PDF p. 3). American Oversight also sent four requests to the Attorney General's office, seeking emails sent by the Attorney General or solicitor general between January 6 and 8, 2021, official communications on non-governmental addresses, text messages, and emails with the same groups; that office produced some documents, withheld others after rulings from its own office, and identified none responsive to the fourth request (Opinion, PDF pp. 3-4 & n.1). American Oversight was unsatisfied with both offices' responses (Opinion, PDF p. 4). ## Procedural History American Oversight petitioned for a writ of mandamus under PIA section 552.321 in Travis County district court against the Governor and the Attorney General (Opinion, PDF pp. 4-5). The State argued that sovereign immunity barred the petition and, on appeal, that only the Supreme Court may issue mandamus against constitutional executive officers; the district court denied the State's pleas to the jurisdiction, and the Third Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that section 552.321(b) authorizes district courts to issue mandamus against any governmental body, including one headed by a constitutional executive officer (Opinion, PDF pp. 5-6). The State petitioned for review on March 4, 2024, and the Court granted review on December 20, 2024, heard argument on February 19, 2025, and decided the case on June 27, 2025 (Docket; Opinion, PDF pp. 1, 23). ## Issues Presented The State presents two issues: whether the trial court has jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus against the Governor and the Attorney General, two of the six constitutional executive officers, and whether American Oversight showed a facially valid claim that they "refuse[d]" to provide public information (Brief on the Merits (Ken Paxton, et al), PDF p. 10). American Oversight frames them as whether the court of appeals correctly determined that the trial court had jurisdiction and that the petitioners' refusal to provide public information waived sovereign immunity (Brief on the Merits (American Oversight), PDF p. 14). The Court decided only the first, without reaching other issues (Opinion, PDF pp. 2, 23). ## Standard(s) of Review The briefs state no standard of review in their summaries. The Court treated the question as one of statutory and constitutional interpretation of the district court's jurisdiction, and read the Legislature's choice of mandamus as the requestor's remedy in section 552.321(a) to incorporate the writ's pre-existing limits on jurisdiction (Opinion, PDF pp. 6-7, 9). ## Legal Arguments **Whether section 552.321 authorizes district courts to issue mandamus against the Governor and Attorney General.** **Petitioners (Paxton and Abbott):** The Legislature has assigned to the Supreme Court alone jurisdiction over mandamus against constitutional executive officers under Government Code section 22.002(c), and section 552.321(b) merely specifies where a PIA mandamus action must be filed and does not address executive officers or overcome the more specific jurisdictional prohibition (Brief on the Merits (Ken Paxton, et al), PDF p. 19). In reply they argue that American Oversight points not to text but to its preferred reading of how the Legislature responded to *A & T Consultants v. Sharp*, and that the requestor's next step should have been a complaint to the Travis County district attorney (Reply Brief (Ken Paxton, et al), PDF p. 10). **Respondent (American Oversight):** Section 552.321 expressly authorizes district courts to issue mandamus against governmental bodies that violate the PIA and speaks to both jurisdiction and venue, and subsection (b), enacted in 1999, supersedes the earlier and more general section 22.002(c); article V, section 8 gives district courts default jurisdiction and has no exception for the Governor, and because the Governor and Attorney General are officers for public information, mandamus against them in their official capacities is equivalent to mandamus against their offices (Brief on the Merits (American Oversight), PDF p. 23; Response to Petition (American Oversight), PDF p. 17). It also argues that reading section 552.321(b) as only a venue provision would render it superfluous and let executive officers violate the Act with impunity (Opinion, PDF pp. 15, 20-21). **Whether the requestor stated a claim within the PIA's waiver of immunity.** The State argued in the alternative that American Oversight merely speculated that more documents exist and that the offices conducted good-faith searches; American Oversight responded that genuine fact questions remained about their compliance (Brief on the Merits (Ken Paxton, et al), PDF p. 19; Response to Petition (American Oversight), PDF p. 17). The Court did not reach this issue (Opinion, PDF p. 23). ## Stated Reasons the Court Should Take the Case In reply to the response to its petition, the State argued that mandamus against executive officers "ordinarily involves questions of general public import," that the Court had never interpreted the amended section 552.321(a) as applied to executive officers, and that the case also asks whether a requestor may seek mandamus based only on disbelief that the government complied despite sworn affidavits of diligent searches (Reply to Response to Petition filed (Ken Paxton, et al), PDF p. 5). American Oversight characterized the case as an uncomplicated public-records matter raising unexceptional issues, which the State disputed (Reply to Response to Petition filed (Ken Paxton, et al), PDF p. 5). ## Oral Argument - **Mandamus against the Governor.** Asked whether it would be problematic if the Legislature expressly allowed mandamus against the Governor, petitioners' counsel said it raises separation-of-powers concerns, since the Constitution bars even this Court. (Oral Argument, 0:15:22) - **Overriding section 22.002.** Asked how the PIA overrides section 22.002, American Oversight's counsel said it requires district-court mandamus against any governmental body, without exempting the Governor or Attorney General. (Oral Argument, 0:26:21) - **Avoiding the constitutional question.** Asked why the Court should not avoid a serious constitutional question, American Oversight's counsel said the PIA must be liberally construed, and its text plainly does not exempt these bodies. (Oral Argument, 0:28:04) - **Sharp.** Justice Blaine asked how the statutes harmonize; American Oversight's counsel said Sharp requires statutory authorization naming district courts for any exception, which section 552.321 provides. (Oral Argument, 0:21:36) - **Original petition here.** Asked about an original petition here to review privilege claims, petitioners' counsel said it would resemble Sharp, since whether the privilege applies is a question of law. (Oral Argument, 0:14:20) - **Suing the officer.** Asked why this is not mandamus against the Attorney General's office, petitioners' counsel said it was filed against the constitutional officers, but the statute speaks of the governmental body. (Oral Argument, 0:07:00) ## Practice Area Tags open-records, administrative-law, texas-constitution ## Procedural Posture/Vehicle Petition for review from the Third Court of Appeals in an interlocutory appeal from the denial of pleas to the jurisdiction; argued February 19, 2025, and decided June 27, 2025 (Opinion, PDF pp. 1, 5-6, 23). ## Amicus Involvement - [Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law First Amendment Clinic, et al.](https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=0f1bdbf1-3983-44f2-8fcb-b1eb5600ef72&coa=cossup&DT=BRIEFS&MediaID=6f392b50-44bb-468b-ac73-629f5120c10b) filed an amicus brief on March 17, 2025. ## Holding Section 552.321(b) of the Public Information Act is a venue provision that does not expand the jurisdiction of district courts over constitutional executive officers; under section 22.002(c) and *A & T Consultants v. Sharp*, only the Supreme Court may issue mandamus against the Governor and the Attorney General, so the district court lacks jurisdiction over American Oversight's petitions (Opinion, PDF pp. 2, 12, 15-19, 23). ## Court's Reasoning In section 552.321(a) the Legislature chose mandamus as the sole remedy for requestors, a choice that incorporates the writ's common-law limits, including limits on jurisdiction (Opinion, PDF pp. 6-7). District courts have broad original jurisdiction under article V, section 8 unless another law confers jurisdiction elsewhere, and section 22.002(c) provides that only the Supreme Court may issue mandamus against "the officers of the executive departments," which include the Governor and Attorney General (Opinion, PDF pp. 9-12). *Sharp* held that district courts generally lack jurisdiction over executive-officer respondents and that any exception requires "express statutory authorization" naming district courts as the proper fora (Opinion, PDF pp. 13-14). Section 552.321(b), added in 1999, says only that a suit "must be filed in a district court for the county in which the main offices of the governmental body are located"; it does not mention jurisdiction, authority, power, or constitutional executive officers, reads as an ordinary venue provision, and looks nothing like the express authorization *Sharp* pointed to (Opinion, PDF pp. 14-19). The Court rejected the argument that this reading makes subsection (b) superfluous, since it clarifies where mandamus actions that could be filed at any level of the court system must originate, and may even bar original actions in this Court (Opinion, PDF pp. 19-21). It also rejected the claim that executive officers could violate the Act with impunity, noting the PIA's criminal penalties and the civil remedy in section 552.3215, under which a requestor may complain to the Travis County district attorney, who may sue for declaratory or injunctive relief; American Oversight did not proceed under that provision (Opinion, PDF pp. 2, 21-22). **Concurrence (Justice Young).** He joined the opinion but wrote to address the court of appeals' second holding, which applies only to the Governor: that the Legislature could authorize a district court to issue mandamus against him (Young, J., concurring, PDF p. 1). Because the Constitution excludes the Governor, and only him, from the Court's mandamus jurisdiction, he thought it highly likely that no court in Texas is or could be authorized to issue mandamus against the Governor, and tentatively viewed the court of appeals as having disregarded his unique constitutional status as chief executive officer, though he stressed that his views were tentative and invited further analysis (Young, J., concurring, PDF pp. 1-3, 44-46). ## Disposition Without reaching other issues, the Court reversed the court of appeals' judgment and remanded the case to the district court for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction (Opinion, PDF pp. 2, 23). ## Vote Breakdown Chief Justice Blacklock delivered the opinion of the Court; Justice Young filed a concurring opinion; Justice Sullivan did not participate in the decision (Opinion, PDF p. 1). --- Source: The SCOTX Report, https://scotxreport.com/cases/24-0162. AI-generated summary of the Court's opinion, orders and the parties' briefs, with pin cites to the page of each document; verify against the Court's own documents at search.txcourts.gov.