# Thompson v. Landry Supreme Court of Texas, No. 23-0875 **Thompson v. Landry, No. 23-0875 (Tex. May 9, 2025). Holding: A property owner may not set aside a subsequent purchaser's title on due-process grounds if she obtained notice of the default judgment or of the property's sale during the statutory limitations and redemption period, because she then had notice of any due-process violation in time to assert a legal remedy; a subsequent purchaser may also raise equitable defenses such as laches when the owner learns of the judgment or the purchaser's title after limitations runs but unreasonably delays; and because the record does not show when Landry received notice, the court of appeals' remand was proper.** Practice areas: real property, tax, federal constitution, civil procedure ## Key issues - A former owner cannot set aside a subsequent purchaser's title on due-process grounds, even after a defective tax-suit citation by publication, if she received notice of the default judgment or of the property's sale during the two-year statutory period to redeem or sue, because she then had an adequate remedy at law. - A subsequent purchaser may also raise equitable defenses such as laches against a former owner who learned of the judgment or sale after limitations ran but unreasonably delayed, to the purchaser's detriment; because the record did not show when the owner received notice, the Court affirmed the remand. ## Factual History Mae Landry inherited her grandmother's partial interest in a nearly twelve-acre property in Chambers County where she was born and has lived all her life, though she was never named as the record owner (Opinion, PDF pp. 2-3). In February 2004 taxing authorities sued to foreclose unpaid tax liens dating back more than a decade; they served Landry's grandmother, the record owner, by publication, posting the suit on the courthouse door, and served at least ten others with an interest in the property the same way, and the trial court rendered a default judgment on May 9, 2005 (Opinion, PDF p. 3 & nn.2-3). In December 2006, Cindy Thompson bought the property at the tax sale and paid the outstanding liens; the constable's deed was recorded February 9, 2007, and Thompson has paid the taxes since (Opinion, PDF p. 3). Landry and her husband lived in a mobile home on part of the property, and in 2009 her husband leased the property containing the home from Thompson's husband, and the Landrys paid rent and continued to live there (Opinion, PDF p. 3). ## Procedural History In January 2016 the Thompsons sought to evict the Landrys, and Landry obtained a temporary restraining order and tried to intervene in the tax suit to set aside the 2005 judgment, but the court of appeals directed the trial court to vacate its order because its power to modify the judgment had expired (Opinion, PDF p. 4). In June 2018, more than ten years after the sale, Landry sued Thompson to set aside her purchase, claiming that service by publication on her grandmother violated her right to procedural due process; Thompson moved for summary judgment on limitations, laches, and estoppel, and Landry cross-moved (Opinion, PDF p. 4). The trial court granted Landry's motion and declared the default judgment void (Opinion, PDF p. 4). The First Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that fact issues exist on the adequacy of service, that *Mitchell v. MAP Resources* precluded Thompson's limitations defense, and that Thompson had not conclusively established an equitable defense (Opinion, PDF pp. 4-5). Thompson petitioned for review on November 10, 2023; the Court requested merits briefing on June 14, 2024, granted review on December 20, 2024, heard argument on January 16, 2025, and decided the case on May 9, 2025 (Docket; Opinion, PDF pp. 1, 15). ## Issues Presented Thompson presents whether *In re E.R.* and *Mitchell* bar a due-process claim to set aside a delinquent-tax default judgment when the owner had actual notice of the judgment before the Tax Code's deadline to redeem expired, and whether the evidence shows as a matter of law that Landry had such notice (Brief on the Merits (Cindy Thompson, et al), PDF p. 9; Petition for Review (Cindy Thompson, et al), PDF p. 9). Landry restates the issues to ask whether *E.R.* and *Mitchell* were correctly applied and whether the judgment and deeds should be declared void (Brief on the Merits (Mae Landry), PDF pp. 13-14). The Court addressed whether a subsequent purchaser may defend by showing the former owner's notice of the judgment or sale within the limitations period, and whether a purchaser may assert equitable defenses based on unreasonable delay after notice (Opinion, PDF p. 7). ## Standard(s) of Review The Court reviews a trial court's rulings on cross-motions for summary judgment de novo, considering both sides' evidence, determining all questions presented, and rendering the judgment the trial court should have rendered (Opinion, PDF p. 5). ## Legal Arguments **Whether Landry's due-process collateral attack is barred.** **Petitioners (Thompson and CC & T Investments):** Landry knew the property had been sold at a tax sale, as shown by her testimony that she rented a portion of it from them from 2008 to 2016, and she first claimed she should have been personally served only after they asked her to vacate; her suit, filed more than ten years after the sheriff's deed, is barred by the Tax Code's two-year limitations and redemption period, laches, and estoppel, and the court of appeals' memorandum on rehearing misreads *Mitchell* (Brief on the Merits (Cindy Thompson, et al), PDF p. 19; Petition for Review (Cindy Thompson, et al), PDF p. 19; Opinion, PDF p. 4). **Respondent (Landry):** The tax suit failed to provide procedural due process because the taxing entities did not exercise diligent inquiry or personally serve known or readily ascertainable interest holders, as Rule of Civil Procedure 117a requires before service by publication or posting, so the judgment and deeds are void and may be attacked at any time under *E.R.* and *Mitchell* (Brief on the Merits (Mae Landry), PDF pp. 14-17; Opinion, PDF pp. 8-9). ## Stated Reasons the Court Should Take the Case Thompson's petition asked whether *In re E.R.* and *Mitchell* bar a due-process claim against a delinquent-tax default judgment when the owner had actual notice before the Tax Code's redemption deadline, and whether the evidence shows such notice as a matter of law (Petition for Review (Cindy Thompson, et al), PDF p. 9). Landry responded that the two issues overlap and answered them together (Response to Petition (Mae Landry), PDF p. 7). The Court noted that *Mitchell* had not addressed the effect of the owner's notice, because the record there was "devoid of information" about when the plaintiffs learned of the judgment (Opinion, PDF p. 11). ## Oral Argument - **Laches and void judgments.** Asked whether laches can run against the right to declare a judgment void, Landry's counsel said there was nothing to submit to the Court on that issue. (Oral Argument, 0:28:32) - **Best case on laches.** Asked for the best case that laches runs against a void judgment, petitioners' counsel pointed to personal versus subject-matter jurisdiction and the totality of circumstances, including the lease. (Oral Argument, 0:33:26) - **Lease as notice.** Asked whether signing a lease shows notice of the default, petitioners' counsel said it puts a party under a heightened duty to look before signing. (Oral Argument, 0:09:47) ## Practice Area Tags real-property, tax, federal-constitution, civil-procedure ## Procedural Posture/Vehicle Petition for review from the First Court of Appeals in an appeal from cross-motions for summary judgment; argued January 16, 2025, and decided May 9, 2025 (Opinion, PDF pp. 1, 4-5, 15). ## Amicus Involvement None. The docket shows no amicus filings. ## Holding A property owner may not set aside a subsequent purchaser's title on due-process grounds if she obtained notice of the default judgment or of the property's sale during the statutory limitations and redemption period, because she then had notice of any due-process violation in time to assert a legal remedy; a subsequent purchaser may also raise equitable defenses such as laches when the owner learns of the judgment or the purchaser's title after limitations runs but unreasonably delays; and because the record does not show when Landry received notice, the court of appeals' remand was proper (Opinion, PDF pp. 2, 10-15). ## Court's Reasoning **Two kinds of notice.** The first is whether the taxing authorities gave proper notice in the tax suit, an elementary requirement of due process; under *Mitchell*, a complete failure of service deprives a litigant of due process, renders the judgment void, and allows a challenge at any time, and the court of appeals held that fact issues exist about whether the authorities' service efforts were reasonably diligent, which Landry did not seek to reinstate, so that question remains for the trial court (Opinion, PDF pp. 7-10). The second is notice of the due-process violation itself: the owner challenges not only the judgment but the sale to a purchaser who was not a party to any violation, and under Tax Code sections 33.54 and 34.21 an owner has two years from the recording of the deed to redeem or sue (Opinion, PDF pp. 10-11). **Notice within the limitations period.** Actual notice of the divestment within the period gives an aggrieved owner the opportunity to remedy the harm, and so long as she has an adequate remedy at law, due process does not require equity to intervene; the court of appeals incorrectly called limitations "irrelevant," because it is irrelevant only if the owner failed to gain notice of the sale during that period (Opinion, PDF pp. 10-11). The summary-judgment record does not establish the date of Landry's notice, since the lease is dated August 3, 2009, outside the period that began running on February 9, 2007, so the date is left to the factfinder (Opinion, PDF pp. 11-12). **Equitable defenses.** Laches requires unreasonable delay and a good-faith change of position to the other's detriment; *In re E.R.* said relief may be unavailable when a parent, knowing of the judgment, "unreasonably stands mute" while another substantially relies on it, and the Court held that a subsequent purchaser may raise equitable defenses based on the former owner's notice of the judgment or of the purchaser's competing title (Opinion, PDF pp. 12-14). Thompson's evidence, including the lease, Landry's testimony that she knew her husband paid rent, her payment of taxes, and Landry's suit eleven years after the judgment, is some evidence of conforming conduct, but the record does not reveal the date of Landry's notice, so the defenses were properly remanded (Opinion, PDF pp. 14-15). ## Disposition The Court affirmed the court of appeals' judgment and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion (Opinion, PDF p. 15). ## Vote Breakdown Justice Bland delivered the opinion of the Court (Opinion, PDF p. 1). --- Source: The SCOTX Report, https://scotxreport.com/cases/23-0875. AI-generated summary of the Court's opinion, orders and the parties' briefs, with pin cites to the page of each document; verify against the Court's own documents at search.txcourts.gov.